A NAASTy alternative to RAND pricing commitments

Telecommunications Policy

Volumn 35, Issue 11, 2011, Pages 1010-1017

  Rysman, Marc ^a   Simcoe, Timothy ^b  

^a USA   (United States)

^b BOSTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Intellectual property; Licensing; RAND; Standard setting

Indexed keywords

FREE ACCESS; PATENT HOLDERS; RAND; STANDARD SETTING; STANDARD SETTING ORGANIZATION; TECHNOLOGY VENDORS;

LAWS AND LEGISLATION; PATENTS AND INVENTIONS;

STANDARDS;

EID: 80855123709     PISSN: 03085961     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.telpol.2011.07.003     Document Type: Article

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