Antitrust rulemaking as a solution to abuse of the standard-setting process

Michigan Law Review

Volumn 110, Issue 5, 2012, Pages 847-874

  Speegle, Adam ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 84858145383     PISSN: 00262234     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (203)

1. Christopher Hardee, Single-Firm Opportunism and the FTC's Rambus Defeat: Implications for Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 18 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 97, 98-99 (2009).
2. It is estimated that over 500 different interoperability standards are required to produce a typical laptop computer.
3. Brad Biddle et al., How Many Standards in a Laptop? (And Other Empirical Questions), Proc. 2010 ITU-T Kaleidoscope Acad. Conf. 123, 125, available at http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-t/opb/proc/T-PROC-KALEI-2010-PDF-E.pdf.
4. Patrick D. Curran, Comment, Standard-Setting Organizations: Patents, Price Fixing, and Per Se Legality, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 983, 988-992 (2003).
5. S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Should Technology Choice Be a Concern of Antitrust Policy?, 9 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 283, 290-295+314-316 (1996).
6. David J. Teece & Edward F. Sherry, Standards Setting and Antitrust, 87 Minn. L. Rev. 1913, 1915 (2003).
7. Curran, supra note 3, at 989 n.26.
8. Hardee, supra note 1, at 99
9. Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 4, at 293-294.
10. Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 Calif. L. Rev. 1889, 1896-1898 (2002) (discussing the need for standard-setting in the face of complex technology demands).
11. Id. at 1892-1893.
12. Hardee, supra note 1, at 98-99, 99 n.6.
13. See id.
14. Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 310 (3d Cir. 2007).
15. Bruce H. Kobayashi & Joshua D. Wright, Federalism, Substantive Preemption, and Limits on Antitrust: An Application to Patent Holdup, 5 J. Competition L. & Econ. 469, 489 (2009) (discussing cases where deception was used to extract royalties through patent holdup).
16. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1991, 2011-2017 (2007) (explaining through modeling that patent holdup results in higher prices and lower output).
17. id. at 2016 (explaining how injunctions or threats of injunctions hold up manufacture of products relying on a standard).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006).
19. Workshop on Section 5 of the FTC Act as a Competition Statute 4-20 (Oct. 17, 2008) [hereinafter Section 5 Workshop], available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/section5/transcript.pdf (opening remarks of William Kovacic, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n) (explaining reluctance on the part of the Commission to bring actions under an independent Section 5).
20. "Independent" Section 5 refers to the FTC's use of this provision without reference to the Sherman Act. As discussed infra in Section II.A, the FTC may not directly enforce the Sherman Act, but rather must use Section 5 of the FTCA with a reference to the Sherman Act. Where the FTC desires to use Section 5 beyond the limits of the Sherman Act, it invokes Section 5 without reference. This is known as an enforcement action under an independent Section 5.
21. Daniel A. Crane, Reflections on Section 5 of the FTC Act and the FTC's Case Against Intel, 2010 Competition Pol'y Int'l Antitrust Chron. 1, 3-5 [hereinafter Crane, Reflections on Section 5].
22. Lemley, supra note 6, at 1892-1893.
23. Joseph Scott Miller, Standard Setting, Patents, and Access Lock-In: RAND Licensing and the Theory of the Firm, 40 Ind. L. Rev. 351, 365 (2007).
24. Lemley, supra note 6, at 1901-1902.
25. Curran, supra note 3, at 990.
26. Lemley, supra note 6, at 1902.
27. Lemley, supra note 6, at 1901-1902.
28. id.
29. Robert A. Skitol & Kenneth M. Vorrasi, Patent Holdup in Standards Development: Life After Rambus v. FTC, Antitrust, Summer 2009, at 26+28 (discussing how recent precedent permits scenarios where patent holdup may occur in both the "open" and "closed" standard context).
30. Section 5 Workshop, supra note 14, at 240-43 (remarks of Robert A. Skitol, Partner, Drinker, Biddle & Reath LLP) (offering a series of hypothetical scenarios giving rise to patent holdup).
31. Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 460-61 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (discussing the lag between standard adoption and patent disclosure).
32. Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, File No. 051-0094, 2008 WL 258308, at *5 para. 37(a) (F.T.C. Jan. 22, 2008) (charging that the defendant anticompetitively increased its royalty rates).
33. Gil Ohana et al., Disclosure and Negotiation of Licensing Terms Prior to Adoption of Industry Standards: Preventing Another Patent Ambush?, 24 Eur. Competition L. Rev. 644, 644-645 (2003).
34. Teece & Sherry, supra note 4, at 1914-1917 (discussing benefits of adoption of a standard in the context of the alternative "standards war").
35. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 11, at 2010-2017 (discussing the harm to victims of patent holdup).
36. id. at 2013.
37. Id. at 1993.
38. Id.
39. Section 5 Workshop, supra note 14, at 228-231 (remarks of Scott Peterson, Senior Counsel, Hewlett-Packard Co.).
40. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 11, at 1992-1994.
41. Lemley, supra note 6, at 1909-1937 (discussing legal avenues available to private parties and the failings of this enforcement mechanism).
42. Id. at 1904.
43. id. at 1902-1904, 1973 (providing a survey of SSO agreements).
44. Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things To Do About Patent Holdup of Standards (And One Not To), 48 B.C. L. Rev. 149, 156 (2007).
45. Michael G. Cowie & Joseph P. Lavelle, Patents Covering Industry Standards: The Risks to Enforceability Due to Conduct Before Standard-Setting Organizations, 30 AIPLA Q.J. 95, 102 (2002) ("SSOs have been reluctant to specify or become involved in setting royalty rates for patented technology for fear that they will be accused of price fixing or another violation of the antitrust laws.").
46. Amy A. Marasco & Elizabeth Dodson, Invention and Innovation: Protecting Intellectual Property in Standard-Setting, 2 Int'l J. IT Standards & Standardization Res. 49, 50 (2004).
47. Cowie & Lavelle, supra note 35, at 144-145 (discussing a case in which the court found SSO bylaws too vague to support defendant's claims).
48. Lemley, supra note 6, at 1964-1967 (describing problems that arise from using an SSO term like "reasonableness" to defend against patent holdup).
49. Lemley, supra note 6, at 1915-1917 (explaining the limitations on third-party beneficiary claims against parties who engage in patent holdup).
50. Request for Investigation of Rembrandt, Inc. for Anticompetitive Conduct That Threatens Digital Television Conversion from Albert A. Foer, President, Am. Antitrust Inst., to Donald Clark, Sec'y, Fed. Trade Comm'n (Mar. 26, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/aai.pdf (requesting FTC action, in communication by third-party beneficiary, where firm repudiated RAND commitment to third party by claiming that actions related to an SSO did not create a contractual or other right as to third-party beneficiaries).
51. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 11, at 2008-2017 (describing litigation-settlement decision by firms based on internal cost considerations).
52. Section 5 Workshop, supra note 14, at 262-63 (remarks of Michael Lindsay, Partner, Dorsey & Whitney LLP) (discussing the incentives of manufacturers when faced with patent holdup).
53. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 11, at 1992-1994.
54. Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern Information?, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 783, 786-788 (2007).
55. Section 5 Workshop, supra note 14, at 262-263 (remarks of Michael Lindsay, Partner, Dorsey & Whitney LLP).
56. Id.
57. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 11, at 2009.
58. Lemley & Weiser, supra note 41, at 786-787.
59. Section 5 Workshop, supra note 14, at 266-267 (remarks of Robert A. Skitol, Partner, Drinker, Biddle & Reath LLP).
60. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 11, at 1992-1993.
61. id. at 1994-2010 (explaining that production concerns associated with an injunction drive firms to settle questionable infringement suits).
62. David Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1219, 1220-1221 (1988).
63. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
64. Id. § 2.
65. Gregory J. Werden, Competition, Consumer Welfare, & the Sherman Act, 9 Sedona Conf. J. 87, 89-90 (2008).
66. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Federal Trade Commission and the Sherman Act, 62 Fla. L. Rev. 871, 874 (2010).
67. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
68. Hardee, supra note 1, at 106-07 (explaining the problems of using Section 2 to combat standard-setting abuse and discussing how, even though it has been employed in cases such as Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008), the statute lacks firm case law supporting its use against many forms of patent holdup).
69. Section 5 Workshop, supra note 14, at 228-231 (remarks of Scott Peterson, Senior Counsel, Hewlett-Packard Co.).
70. id.
71. Hardee, supra note 1, at 107-108 (2009).
72. Crane, Reflections on Section 5, supra note 15, at 3-5.
73. Section 5 Workshop, supra note 14, at 72-80 (remarks of Daniel A. Crane, Professor, Benjamin N. Cardozo Sch. of Law).
74. Crane, Reflections on Section 5, supra note 15, at 3-5.
75. 15 U.S.C. § 3 (2006) (establishing violation of the Sherman Act as a felony punishable by imprisonment and financial penalties); id. § 6 (allowing for forfeitures of property in transit); id. § 8 (establishing violations of the Sherman Act related to importation of goods as misdemeanor offenses).
76. Id. § 15 ("[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property... shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained.").
77. Section 5 Workshop, supra note 14, at 254-255 (remarks of Jonathan Leibowitz, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n).
78. Id. at 211.
79. 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
80. infra Section II.C.
81. Specifically, the complaint pertained to Rambus's conduct regarding dynamic random access memory ("DRAM") technology. Complaint ¶ 1, Rambus Inc., File No. 011-0017, Docket No. 9302, 2002 WL 1436415 (F.T.C. June 18, 2002) [hereinafter Rambus Complaint].
82. Id. ¶¶ 54-55.
83. Id. ¶ 45.
84. Rambus, 522 F.3d at 462-67 ("In this case under § 5 of the FTC Act, the Commission expressly limited its theory of liability to Rambus's unlawful monopolization of four markets in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act.... Therefore, we apply principles of antitrust law developed under the Sherman Act....").
85. Id. at 463-464.
86. See supra Section I.B.
87. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2006).
88. Marc Winerman, The Origins of the FTC: Concentration, Cooperation, Control, and Competition, 71 Antitrust L.J. 1/2, 75+90-92 (2003) (describing the founding of the FTC).
89. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).
90. S. Rep. No. 63-597, at 13 (1914) ("[T]here were too many unfair practices to define, and after writing 20 of them into law it would be quite possible to invent others.").
91. Neil W. Averitt, The Meaning of "Unfair Methods of Competition" in Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 21 B.C. L. Rev. 227, 228 (1980).
92. Averitt, supra note 72, at 230.
93. S. Rep. No. 62-1326, at 12 (1913) ("[A]s the statute is now construed there are... many other practices that seriously interfere with competition, and are plainly opposed to the public welfare, concerning which it is impossible to predict with any certainty whether they will be held to be due or undue restraints of trade.").
94. FTC v. Motion Picture Adver. Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394-95 (1953) (It is... clear that the Federal Trade Commission Act was designed to supplement and bolster the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act-to stop in their incipiency acts and practices which, when full blown, would violate those Acts, as well as to condemn as 'unfair methods of competition' existing violations of them. (citations omitted)).
95. Averitt, supra note 72, at 242.
96. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972).
97. Motion Picture Adver., 344 U.S. at 394-95 ("The 'unfair methods of competition' which are condemned by Section 5(a) of the Act, are not confined to those that were illegal at common law or that were condemned by the Sherman Act."); see also Section 5 Workshop, supra note 14, at 64 (remarks of Robert Pitofsky, Sheehy Professor of Trade Regulation, Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr).
98. 384 U.S. 316, 321-22 (1966).
99. 405 U.S. at 242.
100. 476 U.S. 447, 454 (1986).
101. 630 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1980) (rejecting FTC's claim that a publisher of an airline schedule violated Section 5 by refusing to publish schedules for smaller airlines).
102. 637 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1980) (rejecting FTC's application of Section 5 against an independent parallel adoption of delivered pricing systems).
103. 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984) (rejecting FTC's claim that the use of most favored nation clauses by two major suppliers was a violation of Section 5 because it facilitated parallel pricing).
104. Complaint at *25-27, Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, File No. 051-0094, 2008 WL 258308 (F.T.C. Jan. 22, 2008) [hereinafter Negotiated Data Complaint] (Majoras, Comm'r, dissenting).
105. William E. Kovacic & Marc Winerman, Competition Policy and the Application of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 76 Antitrust L.J. 929, 942 (2010) ("In each instance, the court found that the Commission had failed to make a compelling case for condemning the conduct in question.").
106. William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy Enforcement Norms, 71 Antitrust L.J. 377, 384-386 (2003).
107. William E. Kovacic, Public Choice and the Public Interest: Federal Trade Commission Antitrust Enforcement During the Reagan Administration, 33 Antitrust Bull. 467 (1988) (discussing the shift in FTC enforcement priorities brought about by the Reagan Administration).
108. Crane, Reflections on Section 5, supra note 15, at 3-4,
109. Section 5 Workshop, supra note 14, at 4-20 (remarks of William Kovacic, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n).
110. supra Section I.B.
111. supra Section I.B.
112. Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 988, 997 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
113. infra Section II.C.
114. Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616, 626 (1996).
115. Hovenkamp, supra note 51, at 878-879.
116. Dell, 121 F.T.C. at 626.
117. Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust Responses, 34 J. Corp. L. 1151, 1199 (2009).
118. Crane, Reflections on Section 5, supra note 15, at 3-5.
119. supra Section II.A.
120. 121 F.T.C. 616.
121. Id. at 617. A computer bus is a component of a computer that carries information internally. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 617-618.
124. Id. at 618-622.
125. Id. at 626.
126. Id.
127. Complaint ¶¶ 1-2, Union Oil Co. of Cal., File No. 011-0214, Docket No. 9305, 2003 WL 1190102 (F.T.C. Mar. 4, 2003).
128. Id.
129. Id. ¶ 1.
130. Id. ¶¶ 1-3.
131. Id. ¶¶ 5-6.
132. Union Oil Co. of Cal., Docket No. 9305, 2005 WL 2003365, at *3 (F.T.C. Aug. 2, 2005).
133. Rambus Complaint, supra note 64, ¶ 1.
134. Id. ¶ 2.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. ¶ 2.
138. Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 467 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (describing the FTC's shift from Section 5 in the original complaint to a theory based entirely on the Sherman Act).
139. Id. at 462-467; see also supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
140. Negotiated Data Complaint, supra note 84, ¶ 1, at *1.
141. Id.
142. Id. ¶¶ 26-32, at *4-5. A different company had originally offered the contested royalty, but the claim carried to N-Data as successor to that company. Id. ¶¶ 12-13, at *2; id. ¶¶ 23-24, at * 4.
143. Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, File No. 051-0094, Docket No. C-4234, 2008 WL 4407246, at *6-22 (F.T.C. Sept. 22, 2008).
144. Negotiated Data Complaint, supra note 84, ¶ 1, at *1; see also Robert P. Taylor, Standard Setting: Where Are We After Rambus and N-Data, in 15th Annual Institute on Intellectual Property Law 167, 176-79 (Practising Law Inst. ed. 2009) (noting the aggressive shift in enforcement against SSO abuse highlighted in the N-Data case).
145. Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616, 634-38 (1996) (Azcuenaga, Comm'r, dissenting).
146. Negotiated Data Complaint, supra note 84, at *23 (Kovacic, Comm'r, dissenting); id. at *27 (Majoras, Comm'r, dissenting).
147. Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 467 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (noting the shift in the FTC's argument from Section 5 to the Sherman Act); see also supra text accompanying notes 109-115.
148. The FTC is a body of five commissioners appointed by the president. 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2006). The commissioners, in addition to voting to initiate enforcement actions and to take other agency action, may also serve as a panel in adjudicative proceedings on appeal from an administrative law judge. FTC decisions are appealable to a federal court of appeals. 16 C.F.R. pt. 3 (2010).
149. Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessonsfrom Administrative Law, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 869, 894-895 (2009).
150. Kovacic & Winerman, supra note 85, at 941-942.
151. Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616, 634-38 (1996) (Azcuenaga, Comm'r, dissenting).
152. Negotiated Data Complaint, supra note 84, at *25-26 (Majoras, Comm'r, dissenting); see also supra text accompanying notes 81-87.
153. See supra notes 81-90 and accompanying text; see also infra note 145.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 81-87; see also infra note 145.
155. Negotiated Data Complaint, supra note 84, at * 23-24 (Kovacic, Comm'r, dissenting).
156. See supra Section II.C.
157. Negotiated Data Complaint, supra note 84, at * 23-24 (Kovacic, Comm'r, dissenting) ("The Commission overlooks how the proposed settlement could affect the application of state statutes that are modeled on the FTC Act....").
158. Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 106-111 (1998).
159. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).
160. id. § 554. See generally Croley, supra note 134, at 106-11 (describing the rulemaking process).
161. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984) (holding that courts should defer to an agency's reasonable interpretation when traditional methods of statutory interpretation render an ambiguous meaning); see also Thomas W. Merrill & Kristen E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. 833, 833 (2001) (discussing Chevron deference).
162. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006); see also Fed. Trade Comm'n, Operating Manual ch. 7, §.4, at 33 (2003) [hereinafter FTC Operating Manual], available at http://www.ftc.gov/foia/ch07rulemaking.pdf ("[T]he Commission has statutory authority under FTCA § 6(g) to promulgate rules respecting unfair methods of competition.").
163. Nat'l Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 698 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that the FTCA conferred broad powers on the FTC to make substantive rules and regulations).
164. C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and Rulemaking To Preserve Drug Competition, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 629, 677 (2009).
165. Discriminatory Practices in Men's and Boys' Tailored Clothing Industry, 59 Fed. Reg. 8527 (Feb. 23, 1994) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 412) (repealing the previous rule governing promotional allowances in the mens' and boys' tailored clothing industry); Discriminatory Practices in Men's and Boys' Tailored Clothing Industry, 58 Fed. Reg. 35,907 (proposed July 2, 1993) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 412) (issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking seeking comments on whether to repeal the rule).
166. FTC Staff Narrows Rulemaking Possibilities to Three Areas, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 884, at A-13 (Oct. 12, 1978) (noting potential antitrust rulemaking opportunities considered by FTC staff).
167. See infra Section III.C.1 for a more detailed discussion of the reasons behind the infrequent use of antitrust rulemaking.
168. See infra notes 148-151 and accompanying text.
169. Negotiated Data Complaint, supra note 84, ¶¶ 1-2, 38.
170. Marc Winerman, The FTC at Ninety: History Through Headlines, 72 Antitrust L.J. 871, 890 (2005).
171. H.R. Rep. No. 11-367, pt. 1, at 104 (2009)
172. "Congress instituted the Magnuson-Moss rulemaking procedures in the 1970s due to its growing concern that the FTC, which at the time was carrying out multiple wide-ranging concurrent rulemakings, should be required to carry out more structured rulemaking procedures.".
173. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006); see also FTC Operating Manual, supra note 138, §.4 (discussing procedures for rulemaking under the unfair competition powers in Section 5).
174. See supra notes 116-119 and accompanying text.
175. Workshop on Tools To Prevent Patent "Hold-Up" 38-41 (June 21, 2011) [hereinafter "Hold-Up" Workshop], available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/workshops/standards/transcript.pdf (remarks of Earl Nied, Program Dir., Intel Corp.).
176. Lemley, supra note 6, at 1904 (describing a survey conducted in which twentyfour of thirty-six SSOs analyzed imposed either an express or implied obligation that members disclose intellectual property rights of which they were aware).
177. "Hold-Up" Workshop, supra note 148, at 47-51 (remarks of Amy Marasco, Manager, Microsoft Corp.).
178. See id.
179. Even though SSOs are limited by antitrust laws in that they are unable to require terms such as specific pricing, they may still address issues including patent disclosure and reasonableness of pricing. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
180. Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 1159, 1206-1210 (2008) [hereinafter Crane, Technocracy].
181. FTC Staff Narrows Rulemaking Possibilities to Three Areas, supra note 141, at A-13 (describing potential antitrust rulemaking opportunities considered by FTC staff).
182. Discriminatory Practices in Men's and Boys' Tailored Clothing Industry, 32 Fed. Reg. 15,584 (Nov. 9, 1967) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 412) (issuing notice of a final rule).
183. Discriminatory Practices in Men's and Boys' Tailored Clothing Industry, 59 Fed. Reg. 8527 (Feb. 23, 1994) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 412) (repealing the previous rule governing promotional allowances in the mens' and boys' tailored clothing industry).
184. Crane, Technocracy, supra note 153, at 1206-10 (discussing how the success of antitrust rules turns on questions such as whether courts would view antitrust law as lending itself to a rule-based approach).
185. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 § 40(a)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 1831t (2006) (requiring the FTC to issue a rule prescribing the manner and content of certain disclosures and of enforcement of the rule).
186. Hemphill, supra note 139, at 680-681.
187. Winerman, supra note 145, at 890; see also Kovacic & Winerman, supra note 85, at 943 ("In the... 1970s, Commission efforts to use Section 5 litigation to reach beyond prevailing interpretations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act elicited strong political backlash from the Congress.").
188. H.R. Rep. No. 11-367 (2009); supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
189. M. Sean Royall et al., Deterring "Patent Ambush" in Standard Setting: Lessons from Rambus and Qualcomm, Antitrust, Summer 2009, at 34+36-37.
190. Crane, Technocracy, supra note 153, at 1205.
191. Fed. Trade Comm'n, The Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning Patent Notice and Remedies with Competition 21-25 (2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/110307patentreport.pdf.
192. Fed. Trade Comm'n, The FTC in 2011, at 21-50 (2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/04/2011ChairmansReport.pdf (discussing the FTC's annual activities in consumer protection).
193. Fed. Trade Comm'n, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration (2002) (concluding that FTC investigations and enforcement deterred anticompetitive pharmaceutical agreements).
194. See supra Section II.C.
195. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006); see also FTC Operating Manual, supra note 138, §.4 (describing FTC rulemaking procedures).
196. Croley, supra note 134, at 106-111.
197. Negotiated Data Complaint, supra note 84, at *22-23 (Kovacic, Comm'r, dissenting).
198. See supra Section II.C.
199. Hemphill, supra note 139, at 673-674.
200. Richard J.Jr. Pierce, Two Problems in Administrative Law: Political Polarity on the District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988 Duke L.J. 300, 308.
201. Michael R. Baye & Joshua D. Wright, Is Antitrust Too Complicated for Generalist Judges? The Impact of Economic Complexity and Judicial Training on Appeals, 54 J.L. & Econ. 1 (2011) (concluding that antitrust cases are too complicated for generalist judges).
202. Crane, Technocracy, supra note 153, at 1159-1165, 1197-1202.
203. Describing the development of the FTC into an agency of antitrust experts and arguing that such expertise justifies expanding the FTC's norm-creation authority in antitrust); Pierce, Jr., supra note 172, at 308 (speaking to the preference to defer to administrative agencies and the rulemaking process to take advantage of the expertise of agency staff.