Some dynamics of signaling games

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America

Volumn 111, Issue SUPPL.3, 2014, Pages 10873-10880

  Huttegger, Simon ^a   Skyrms, Brian ^a   Tarres̀, Pierre ^b   Wagner, Elliott ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITÉ DE TOULOUSE   (France)

^c KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Costly signaling; Moran process; Replicator dynamics

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; GAME; INFORMATION PROCESSING; LEARNING; POPULATION DYNAMICS; PRIORITY JOURNAL; REINFORCEMENT; SIGNAL TRANSDUCTION;

COSTLY SIGNALING; MORAN PROCESS; REPLICATOR DYNAMICS;

EVOLUTION, MOLECULAR; GAME THEORY; GENETICS, POPULATION; HUMANS; MODELS, GENETIC; MUTATION; POPULATION DYNAMICS; SELECTION, GENETIC; SIGNAL TRANSDUCTION;

EID: 84904667707     PISSN: 00278424     EISSN: 10916490     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1400838111     Document Type: Article

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