Evolutionary dynamics of Lewis signaling games: Signaling systems vs. partial pooling

Synthese

Volumn 172, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 177-191

  Huttegger, Simon M ^a   Skyrms, Brian ^a   Smead, Rory ^a   Zollman, Kevin J S ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Dynamics; Evolution; Moran; Replicator; Replicator mutator; Signaling

Indexed keywords

EID: 77349103678     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-009-9477-0     Document Type: Article

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