Good agreements make good friends

Scientific Reports

Volumn 3, Issue , 2013, Pages

  Han, The Anh ^a,b   Pereira, Luis Moniz ^c,d   Santos, Francisco C ^e   Lenaerts, Tom ^a,b  

^a VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT BRUSSEL   (Belgium)

^b UNIVERSITÉ LIBRE DE BRUXELLES   (Belgium)

^c UNIVERSIDADE NOVA DE LISBOA   (Portugal)

^d UNIVERSITY OF LISBON   (Portugal)

^e ATP Group CMAF Instituto Para A Investigação Interdisciplinar   (Portugal)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

FRIEND; PUNISHMENT; ALGORITHM; ARTICLE; COOPERATION; HUMAN; HUMAN RELATION; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; THEORETICAL MODEL;

ALGORITHMS; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; HUMANS; INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS; MODELS, THEORETICAL; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR;

EID: 84902949378     PISSN: None     EISSN: 20452322     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1038/srep02695     Document Type: Article

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