A bottom-up institutional approach to cooperative governance of risky commons

Nature Climate Change

Volumn 3, Issue 9, 2013, Pages 797-801

  Vasconcelos, Vítor V ^a,b,c   Santos, Francisco C ^a,c   Pacheco, Jorge M ^a,b  

^a CMAF   (Portugal)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MINHO   (Portugal)

^c INSTITUTO SUPERIOR TÉCNICO   (Portugal)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BOTTOM-UP APPROACH; CLIMATE CHANGE; ENVIRONMENTAL RISK; GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE; GOVERNANCE APPROACH; INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK; PUBLIC GOODS; RISK ASSESSMENT; RISK PERCEPTION;

EID: 84883411367     PISSN: 1758678X     EISSN: 17586798     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1038/nclimate1927     Document Type: Article

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