The emergence of commitments and cooperation

11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2012, AAMAS 2012: Innovative Applications Track

Volumn 2, Issue , 2012, Pages 992-999

  Han, The Anh ^a   Pereira, Luís Moniz ^a   Santos, Francisco C ^a  

^a UNIVERSIDADE NOVA DE LISBOA   (Portugal)

Author keywords

Evolution of commitment; Evolution of cooperation; Evolutionary game theory; Prisoner's dilemma

Indexed keywords

AUTONOMOUS AGENTS; COMPUTER SIMULATION; COPYRIGHTS; GAME THEORY; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

ANALYTICAL RESULTS; COMMITMENT STRATEGY; EVOLUTION OF COMMITMENT; EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION; EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY; MANAGEMENT COSTS; NATURAL SELECTION; PRISONER'S DILEMMA;

COSTS;

EID: 84899407734     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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