International relations under risk: Framing state choice

International Relations under Risk: Framing State Choice

Volumn , Issue , 2004, Pages 1-151

  Berejikian, Jeffrey D ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA   (United States)

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EID: 84900773094     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Book

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