Unilateral versus multilateral international sanctions: A public choice perspective

International Studies Quarterly

Volumn 43, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 37-58

  Kaempfer, William H ^a   Lowenberg, Anton D ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO   (United States)

^b CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS; SANCTION; TERMS OF TRADE;

EID: 0033016219     PISSN: 00208833     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0020-8833.00110     Document Type: Article

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