Artificial agents learning human fairness

Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS

Volumn 2, Issue , 2008, Pages 845-852

  De Jong, Steven ^a   Tuyls, Karl ^b   Verbeeck, Katja ^c  

^a MAASTRICHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^b EINDHOVEN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY   (Netherlands)

^c Katholieke Hogeschool St Lieven   (Belgium)

Author keywords

Fairness; Homo egualis; Reinforcement learning

Indexed keywords

AUTONOMOUS AGENTS; REINFORCEMENT LEARNING;

ADAPTIVE MULTIAGENT SYSTEMS; ANALYTICAL RESULTS; BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS; CLASSICAL GAME THEORY; COMPUTATIONAL MODEL; CONTINUOUS ACTION LEARNING AUTOMATA; FAIRNESS; HOMO EGUALIS;

MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

EID: 84899907018     PISSN: 15488403     EISSN: 15582914     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (47)

1. H. Aldewereld. Autonomy vs. Conformity: an Institutional Perspective on Norms and Protocols. PhD thesis, Universiteit Utrecht, 2007.
2. K. Basu. The Traveler's Dilemma. Scientific American, Volume 296, Number 6:68-73, 2007.
3. K. Binmore. Natural Justice. Oxford University Press, 2005.
4. S. Bowles, R. Boyd, E. Fehr, and H. Gintis. Homo reciprocans: A Research Initiative on the Origins, Dimensions, and Policy Implications of Reciprocal Fairness. Advances in Complex Systems, 4:1-30, 1997.
5. M. H. Bowling and M. M. Veloso. Multiagent learning using a variable learning rate. Artificial Intelligence, 136:215-250, 2002.
6. G. Charness and M. Rabin. Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117:817-869, 2002.
7. Y. Chevaleyre, P. E. Dunne, U. Endriss, J. Lang, M. Lemaitre, N. Maudet, J. Padget, S. Phelps, J. A. Rodriguez-Aguilar, and P. Sousa. Issues in Multiagent Resource Allocation. Informatica, 30:3-31,2006.
8. Y. Chevaleyre, U. Endriss, J. Lang, and N. Maudet. A Short Introduction to Computational Social Choice. In Proceedings of the 33rd Conference on Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Computer Science (SOFSEM-2007), volume 4362 of LNCS, pages 51-69. Springer-Verlag, 2007.
9. A. Dannenberg, T. Riechmann, B. Sturm, and C. Vogt. Inequity Aversion and Individual Behavior in Public Good Games: An Experimental Investigation. SSRN eLihrary, 2007.
10. S. de Jong, K. Tuyls, and I. Sprinkhuizen-Kuyper. Robust and Scalable Coordination of Potential-Field Driven Agents. In Proceedings of IAWTIC/CIMCA 2006. Sydney, 2006.
11. S. de Jong, K. Tuyls, K. Verbeeck, and N. Roos. Priority awareness: towards a computational model of human fairness for multi-agent systems. Adaptive Agents and Multi-Agent Systems III - Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, 4865, 2008.
12. I. Erev and A. E. Roth. Predicting how people play games with unique, mixed strategy equilibria. American Economic Review, 88:848-881, 1998.
13. A. Falk and U. Fischbacher. A theory of reciprocity. Games and Economic Beliavior, 54:293-315, 2006.
14. E. Fehr. Don't lose your reputation. Nature, 432:499-500, 2004.
15. E. Fehr and S. Gaechter. Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14:159-181, 2000.
16. E. Fehr and S. Gaechter. Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature, 415:137-140, 2002.
17. E. Fehr and K. Schmidt. A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114:817-868, 1999.
18. H. Gintis. Game Theory Evolving: A Problem-Centered Introduction to Modeling Strategic Interaction. Princeton University Press, 2001.
19. W. Gueth, R. Schmittberger, and B. Schwarze. An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 3 (4):367-388, 1982.
20. C. Hauert, S. D. Monte, J. Hofbauer, and K. Sigmund. Volunteering as red queen mechanism for cooperation in public goods games. Science, 296:1129-1132, 2002.
21. C. Hauert, A. Trauisen, H. Brandt, M. Nowak, and K. Sigmund. Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment. Science, 316:1905-1907,2007.
22. J. Henrich, R. Boyd, S. Bowles, C. Camerer, E. Fehr, and H. Gintis. Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies. Oxford University Press, 2004.
23. M. Jackson. Mechanism Theory. Humanities and Social Sciences, October:228-277, 2000.
24. X. Mao, A. ter Mors, N. Roos, and C. Witteveen. Agent-Based Scheduling for Aircraft Deicing. In P.-Y. Schobbens, W. Vanhoof, and G. Schwanen, editors, Proceedings of the ISlh Belgium - Netherlands Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 229-236. BNVKI, October 2006.
25. M. Milinski, D. Semmann, and H. Krambeck. Reputation helps solve the tragedy of the commons. Nature, 415:424-426, 2002
26. K. Narendra and M. Thathachar. Learning Automata: An introduction. Prentice-Hall International, 1989.
27. J. Nash. Equilibrium Points in N-person Games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 36:48-19, 1950.
28. J. Nash. The Bargaining Problem. Econometrica, 18:155-162, 1950.
29. M. Nowak, K. Page, and K. Sigmund. Fairness versus reason in the Ultimatum Game. Science, 289:1773-1775, 2000.
30. R. Nydegger and H. Owen. Two-person bargaining, an experimental test of the Nash axioms. International Journal of Game Theory, 3:239-250, 1974.
31. H. Oosterbeek, R. Sloof. and G. van de Kuilen. Cultural Differences in Ultimatum Game Experiments: Evidence from a Meta-Analysis. Experimental Economics, 7:171-188, 2004.
32. K. Panchanathan and R. Boyd. Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the second-order free rider problem. Nature, 432:499-502, 2004.
33. D. C. Parkes. Computational Mechanism Design. In Lecture notes of Tutorials at 10th Conf. on Theoretical Aspectsof Rationality and Knowledge (TARK-05). Institute of Mathematical Sciences, University of Singapore. 2008.
34. J. A. Rodriguez-Aguilar. On the design and construction of agent-mediated electronic institutions. PhD thesis, Monografies de l'Institut d'Investigació en Intelligència Artificial, 2003.
35. A. Roth and M. Malouf. Game Theoretic Models and the Role of Information in Bargaining. Psychological Review, 86:574-594, 1979.
36. S. Russell and P. Norvig. Artificial Intelligence, A Modern Approach. Prentice Hall, 2 edition, 1995.
37. F. Santos, J. Pacheco. and T. Lenaerts. Cooperation Prevails When Individuals Adjust Their Social Ties. PLoS Compia. Biol, 2(10):1284-1291,2006.
38. F. Santos, J. Pacheco, and T. Lenaerts. Evolutionary Dynamics of Social Dilemmas in Structured Heterogeneous Populations. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA, 103:3490-3494, 2006.
39. S. Sen and S. Airiau. Emergence of norms through social learning. In Proceedings of the Twentieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 1507-1512, 2007.
40. Y. Shoham, R. Powers, and T. Grenager. If multi-agent learning is the answer, what is the question? Artificial Intelligence. 171(7):365-377, 2007.
41. K. Sigmund, C. Hauert, and M. Nowak. Reward and punishment. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 98(19):10757-10762, 2001.
42. H. Simon. Models of Man. John Wiley, 1957.
43. M. Thathachar and P. Sastry. Networks of Learning Automata: Techniques for Online Stochastic Optimization. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004.
44. K. Tuyls and A. Nowe. Evolutionary Game Theory and Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning. The Knowledge Engineering Review, 20:63-90, 2005.
45. J. Vazquez-Salceda, H. Aldewereld, and F. Dignum. Norms in multiagent systems: from theory to practice. Compiti. Syst. Sci. Eng., 20(4), 2005.
46. K. Verbeeck, A. Nowé, J. Parent, and K. Tuyls. Exploring Selfish Reinforcement Learning in Repeated Games with Stochastic Rewards. Journal of Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 14:239-269, 2007.
47. T. Yamagishi. The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good. / Person, andSoc. Psych., 51(1): 110-116, 1986.