Fast or rational a response-times study of bayesian updating

Management Science

Volumn 60, Issue 4, 2014, Pages 923-938

  Achtziger, Anja ^a   Alós Ferrer, Carlos ^b  

^a ZEPPELIN UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF COLOGNE   (Germany)

Author keywords

Belief updating; Dual processes; Reinforcement; Response times

Indexed keywords

REINFORCEMENT; REINFORCEMENT LEARNING;

BAYESIAN UPDATING; BELIEF UPDATING; DECISION MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY; DECISION PROCESS; DUAL PROCESS; DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES; RATIONAL BELIEFS; RESPONSE TIMES;

DECISION MAKING;

EID: 84899492145     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: 15265501     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2013.1793     Document Type: Article

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