Approximation methods for infinite Bayesian stackelberg games: Modeling distributional payoff uncertainty

10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2011, AAMAS 2011

Volumn 2, Issue , 2011, Pages 945-952

  Kiekintveld, Christopher ^a   Marecki, Janusz ^b   Tambe, Milind ^c  

^a University of Texas at El Paso   (United States)

^b IBM T J WATSON RESEARCH CENTER   (United States)

^c University of Southern California Dept of Computer Science ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

Bayesian Stackelberg games; Game theory; Risk analysis; Robustness; Security; Uncertainty

Indexed keywords

AUTONOMOUS AGENTS; GAME THEORY; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS; RISK ANALYSIS; ROBUSTNESS (CONTROL SYSTEMS);

APPROXIMATE SOLUTION; APPROXIMATION METHODS; BAYESIAN STACKELBERG GAMES; CONTINUOUS DISTRIBUTION; CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION; SECURITY; SOLUTION ALGORITHMS; UNCERTAINTY;

UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS;

EID: 84899446115     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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