IRIS - A tool for strategic security allocation in transportation networks

Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS

Volumn 2, Issue , 2009, Pages 1327-1334

  Tsai, Jason ^a   Rathi, Shyamsunder ^a   Kiekintveld, Christopher ^a   Ordóñez, Fernando ^a   Tambe, Milind ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Bayesian and stackelberg games; Game theory; Security of agent systems

Indexed keywords

AUTONOMOUS AGENTS; GAME THEORY; LAW ENFORCEMENT; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS; NETWORK SECURITY; RANDOM PROCESSES; SCHEDULING; TERRORISM;

AGENT SYSTEMS; ALGORITHM FOR SOLVING; COMMERCIAL FLIGHTS; PREFERENCE ELICITATION; SCHEDULING CONSTRAINTS; SOFTWARE SCHEDULING; STACKELBERG GAMES; TRANSPORTATION NETWORK;

COMPUTER GAMES;

EID: 84899861231     PISSN: 15488403     EISSN: 15582914     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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