Deployed ARMOR protection: The application of a game theoretic model for security at the Los Angeles International Airport

Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS

Volumn 3, Issue , 2008, Pages 1805-1812

  Pita, James ^a   Jain, Manish ^a   Marecki, Janusz ^a   Ordonez, Fernando ^a   Portway, Christopher ^a   Tambe, Milind ^a   Western, Craig ^a   Paruchuri, Praveen ^b   Kraus, Sarit ^c,d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b INTELLIGENT AUTOMATION INC   (United States)

^c BAR ILAN UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^d UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

Author keywords

Bayesian and stackelberg games; Game theory; Security of agent systems

Indexed keywords

AIRPORTS; ARMOR; AUTONOMOUS AGENTS; GAME THEORY; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS; RANDOM PROCESSES;

AGENT SYSTEMS; BAYESIAN STACKELBERG GAMES; DEPLOYED APPLICATIONS; GAME-THEORETIC MODEL; LOS ANGELES INTERNATIONAL AIRPORTS; MULTI-AGENT ALGORITHMS; SOFTWARE ASSISTANTS; STACKELBERG GAMES;

AIRPORT SECURITY;

EID: 84899939869     PISSN: 15488403     EISSN: 15582914     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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