On swap-distance geometry of voting rules

12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2013, AAMAS 2013

Volumn 1, Issue , 2013, Pages 383-390

  Obraztsova, Svetlana ^a,b   Elkind, Edith ^c   Faliszewski, Piotr ^d   Slinko, Arkadii ^e  

^a NATIONAL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS   (Greece)

^b STEKLOV MATHEMATICAL INSTITUTE   (Russian Federation)

^c NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY   (Singapore)

^d AGH UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY   (Poland)

^e UNIVERSITY OF AUCKLAND   (New Zealand)

Author keywords

Connectivity; Convexity; Elections; Swap distance

Indexed keywords

AUTONOMOUS AGENTS;

CONNECTIVITY; CONVEXITY; ELECTIONS; GEOMETRY OF VOTING; MONOCHROMATIC COMPONENTS; MONOTONICITY; SWAP DISTANCE; VOTING RULES;

MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

EID: 84899434082     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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