Manipulation of Nanson's and Baldwin's rules

Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn 1, Issue , 2011, Pages 713-718

  Narodytska, Nina ^a   Walsh, Toby ^a   Xia, Lirong ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES   (Australia)

^b Duke University   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

APPROXIMATION METHODS; COMPUTATIONAL PROPERTIES; NP-HARD; VOTING RULES;

APPROXIMATION THEORY; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; MANIPULATORS;

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE;

EID: 80055056499     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (20)

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