Campaign management under approval-driven voting rules

Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn 1, Issue , 2011, Pages 726-731

  Schlotter, Ildikó ^a   Faliszewski, Piotr ^b   Elkind, Edith ^c  

^a BUDAPEST UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMICS   (Hungary)

^b AGH UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY   (Poland)

^c NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY   (Singapore)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN; LARGE CLASS; MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES; PARAMETERIZED; PREFERENCE ORDER; PREFERENCE-BASED; TRACTABLE ALGORITHMS; VOTING RULES;

COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY;

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE;

EID: 80055045392     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (19)

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