Rationalizations of Condorcet-consistent rules via distances of hamming type

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 39, Issue 4, 2012, Pages 891-905

  Elkind, Edith ^a   Faliszewski, Piotr ^b   Slinko, Arkadii ^c  

^a NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY   (Singapore)

^b AGH UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY   (Poland)

^c UNIVERSITY OF AUCKLAND   (New Zealand)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84867101134     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-011-0555-0     Document Type: Article

References (18)

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