Closeness counts in social choice

Power, Freedom, and Voting

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 289-306

  Meskanen, Tommi ^a   Nurmi, Hannu ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TURKU   (Finland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 71549171292     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-73382-9_15     Document Type: Chapter

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