Private law in the gaps

Fordham Law Review

Volumn 82, Issue 4, 2014, Pages 1689-1750

  Pojanowski, Jeffrey A ^a  

^a NOTRE DAME LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

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EID: 84898886375     PISSN: 0015704X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (266)

1. See, e.g., Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common Law, 94 VA. L. REV. 813 (2008)
2. Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation: Erie for the Age of Statutes, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 753 (2013)
3. Margaret H. Lemos, Interpretive Methodology and Delegations to Courts: Are "Common-Law Statutes" Different?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 89 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013)
4. Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1985)
5. Gillian E. Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1293 (2012)
6. Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975)
7. Caleb Nelson, State and Federal Models of the Interaction Between Statutes and Unwritten Law, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 657 (2013) (conflicts of law).
8. See, e.g., Bruesewitz V. Wyeth, LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068 (2011) (analyzing whether a federal vaccine injury incorporates Restatement principles on products liability)
9. O'Neal V. St. John Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 791 N.W.2d 853 (Mich. 2010) (reconciling a tort causation statute with previous jurisprudence)
10. Perlmutter V. Beth David Hosp., 123 N.E.2d 792 (N.Y. 1954) (considering whether a state sales act governs a suit based on negligent blood transfusion)
11. cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 544 (1983) (arguing in the context of federal law that "unless the statute plainly hands courts the power to create and revise a form of common law, the domain of the statute should be restricted to cases anticipated by its framers and expressly resolved in the legislative process").
12. Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 11 MINN. L. REV. 241 (1992).
13. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Moderation As a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707 (1991).
14. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990)
15. John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1287 (2010) (defining, tracing the history of, and defending modern textualism).
16. See Symposium, The New Private Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1639 (2012).
17. See JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS (1992)
18. ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995)
19. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733 (1998)
20. Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801 (1997).
21. Compare John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Statutory Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 685 (1999) (defending rule-based formalism in legal interpretation),
22. Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988)
23. Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949 (1988) (reconstructing and defending private law formalism).
24. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, The States As Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750 (2010)
25. Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Statutes in Common Law Courts, 91 TEX. L. REV. 479 (2013).
26. This analysis adopts the dichotomy that textualist John Manning draws. See John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?', 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70 (2006) [hereinafter Manning, What Divides]
27. see also John F. Manning, Competing Presumptions About Statutory Coherence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2009 (2006) [hereinafter Manning, Competing Presumptions]
28. Manning, supra note 8. This dichotomization is not exclusive to textualists. See Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REV. 355, 406-07 (2012).
29. This discussion does not focus on "dynamic" theories of interpretation in which contemporary public values play an equal role alongside original meaning and purposes at the time of enactment. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994). The relationship between dynamic interpretation, legislative supremacy, and private law is sufficiently complex to warrant its own article.
30. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1169 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds, 1994).
31. See John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 121
32. Stack, supra note 16, at 385-87. For an example of this more modest purposivism, see Justice Stephen Breyer's opinion for the Court in Zuni Public School District V. U.S. Department of Education, 550 U.S. 81 (2007).
33. See, e.g., Church of the Holy Trinity V. United States, 143 U.S. 457,472 (1892) ("It is the duty of the courts⋯ to say that, however broad the language of the statute may be, the act, although within the letter, is not within the intention of the legislature, and therefore cannot be within the statute.").
34. See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. Cm. L. REV. 800, 817 (1983).
35. Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 191 (1986).
36. See generally Larry Alexander, Pursuing the Good-Indirectly, 95 ETHICS 315 (1985)
37. See, e.g., John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L REV. 2387 (2003).
38. Other varieties of statutory formalism do not emphasize original understanding, see Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231,
39. or instead focus on original intention, see Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, "Is That English You 're Speaking?" Why Intention Free Interpretation Is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967, 974-78 (2004) (arguing that textualism is most plausibly understood as rule-restricted intentionalism).
40. Id. at 514-15 (citing H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958))
41. see also Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958).
42. See id. at 2530-31 (Sotomayor, J. concurring) (finding merit to these arguments but yielding because the text "compellfed] the conclusion"). For more detailed commentary on this case, see Frederick Liu, Astrue V. Ratliff and the Death of Strong Purposivism, 159 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 167, 173 (2011) ("Interpretive consensus on the Supreme Court is not impossible⋯. If Ratliff is any indication, strong purposivism is dead⋯. ").
43. see also Ragsdale V. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 93-94 (2002) (describing legislation as a compromise)
44. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59, 63-65 (1988).
45. See, e.g., Rodriguez V. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 526 (1987) (per curiam) ("[I]t frustrates rather than effectuates legislative intent simplistically to assume that whatever furthers the statute's primary objective must be the law.").
46. See id.; see also Wyeth V. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 584-88 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring) (describing how constitutional structure requires the primacy of statutory text).
47. See Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 416-17 (2005)
48. ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 4 (2006).
49. See Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Reason and Reasonableness in Review of Agency Decisions, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. 799, 836-37 (2010) (discussing agencies' comparative competence in fact gathering and policymaking).
50. See generally Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CM. L. REV. 883 (2006).
51. See, e.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. V. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 613-14 (2009) (following Restatement principles to determine the apportionment of liability under an environmental cleanup statute).
52. See generally Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of General Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 503 (2006).
53. See, e.g., Hinderlider V. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938) (applying federal common law in an interstate dispute). See generally Merrill, supra note 1.
54. See City of Milwaukee V. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304, 312 (1981)
55. Bradford R. Clark, Federal Lawmaking and the Role of Structure in Constitutional Interpretation, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 699, 700 (2008).
56. Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 805, 805 (1989).
57. See generally Caleb Nelson, A Critical Guide to Erie Railroad Co. V. Tompkins, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 921 (2013)
58. See Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1995).
59. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg, Introduction: Pragmatism and Private Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1640, 1640 (2012)
60. Henry E. Smith, Property As the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1691 (2012) ("Private law deals with the interactions of persons in society.")
61. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Philosophy of Private Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 623, 649 (Jules Coleman and Scott J. Shapiro eds., 2002) (identifying and defending the distinction).
62. See, e.g., MacPherson V. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1052-53 (N.Y. 1916) (Cardozo, J.) (noting that the "tests and standards" of negligence "are the tests and standards of our law⋯. [I]rrespective of contract")
63. Thomas C. Grey, Accidental Torts, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1225, 1228 (2001) (identifying this traditional distinction).
64. See Lucas V. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992) (finding that a takings rule turns on an "antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate").
65. See Snyder V. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011) (holding that the First Amendment insulates public speech about a public issue from tort claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress).
66. One could also add restitution, a flourishing field of private law theory in the British Commonwealth that has attracted little interest in the United States. See, e.g., Chaim Saiman, Restitution in America: Why the US Refuses To Join the Restitution Party, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 99 (2008).
67. See, e.g., JAMES GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW: PROPERTY, TORT, CONTRACT, UNJUST ENRICHMENT (2006)
68. Peter Benson, Misfeasance As an Organizing Idea in Private Law, 60 U. TORONTO L.J. 731 (2010) (addressing tort, contract, and property)
69. See, e.g., Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923) (discussing property, tort, and contract)
70. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976) (discussing contract)
71. Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611 (1988) (discussing property).
72. Leon Green, Tort Law Public Law in Disguise, 38 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1959).
73. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL and ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970)
74. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987).
75. See, e.g., Marc A. Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation and Selective Reimbursement, 53 VA. L. REV. 774 (1967)
76. Fleming James, Jr., Tort Law in Midstream: Its Challenges to the Judicial Process, 8 BUFF. L. REV. 315 (1959).
77. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 1 (4th ed. 1971).
78. See generally G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 139-79 (2003) (describing the approach and its dominance in the middle of the twentieth century)
79. John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 521-31 (2003) (giving a theoretical account of compensation-deterrence theory).
80. PROSSER, supra note 92, § 3, at 15 (quoting Roscoe Pound, A Theory of Social Interests, 15 PAPERS & PROCS. OF THE AM. SOC. SOC'Y 16, 28 (1921)
81. JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT, at 1 (London, T. Payne, P. Emily & E. Brooks 1776)).
82. See, e.g., W. Jonathan Cardi & Michael D. Green, Duty Wars, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 671 (2008)
83. Dilan A. Esper & Gregory C. Keating, Abusing "Duty," 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 265 (2006)
84. Robert L. Rabin, The Duty Concept in Negligence Law: A Comment, 54 VAND. L. REV. 787 (2001)
85. Ernest J. Weinrib, The Passing of Palsgraf?, 54 VAND. L. REV. 803 (2001).
86. See, e.g., VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS: CASES & MATERIALS 134 (12th ed. 2010).
87. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 7 cmt. a (2011).
88. See, e.g., Palsgraf V. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928) (stating that a plaintiff must "sue[] in her own right for a wrong personal to her, and not as the vicarious beneficiary of a breach of duty to another").
89. This is so even though defendants can owe strangers a general duty of reasonable care in the most common negligence cases, namely those in which one's affirmative conduct risks reasonably foreseeable physical injuries to others. See, e.g., MacPherson V. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
90. see also Tarasoff V. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976) ("[L]egal duties are not discoverable facts of nature, but merely conclusory expressions that⋯ liability should be imposed for damage done.").
91. Rowland V. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968) (stating that the "departure" from the universal duty of care "involves balancing a number of considerations")
92. cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM, § 7(b) (2011) ("In exceptional cases, when an articulated countervailing principle or policy warrants denying or limiting liability in a particular class of cases, a court may decide that the defendant has no duty or that the ordinary duty of reasonable care requires modification.").
93. Rowland, 443 P.2d at 564. For a more recent, defendant-friendly example of duty instrumentalism, see Lauer V. City of N.Y., 733 N.E.2d 184 (N.Y. 2000) (concerning negligent infliction of emotional distress).
94. Fleming James, Jr., Limitations on Liability for Economic Loss Caused by Negligence: A Pragmatic Appraisal, 25 VAND. L. REV. 43 (1972)
95. see Peter Benson, The Problem with Pure Economic Loss, 60 S.C. L. REV. 823, 830 (2009) (stating that James offers "the most influential and intuitively compelling approach" to the doctrine).
96. see also John A. Siliciano, Negligent Accounting and the Limits of Instrumental Tort Reform, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1929, 1943 (1988) ("[T]he laws of physics generally limit the degree of physical harm caused by a tortious act.").
97. Cf. Louisiana ex rel Guste V. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1023 (5th Cir. 1985) (noting that the pure economic loss rule is "a pragmatic limitation imposed by the Court upon the tort doctrine of foreseeability").
98. See Stephen R. Perry, Protected Interests and Undertakings in the Law of Negligence, 42 U. TORONTO L.J. 247, 269-71 (1992).
99. See J'Aire Corp. V. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60, 64 (Cal. 1979)
100. Rowland V. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 568 (Cal. 1968).
101. See Tarasoff V. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 358-62 (Cal. 1976) (applying Rowland to hold that a therapist has a duty to warn a third-party whom he has reason to believe would be harmed by his patient); PROSSER, supra note 92, § 56, at 341 (noting that the no-duty rule, while "revolting to any moral sense" persists due to "the difficulties of setting any standards of unselfish service to fellow men").
102. See Palsgraf V. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103-04 (N.Y. 1929) (Andrews, J., dissenting) (stating that proximate cause concerns "practical politics" and a doctrine "of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice")
103. Leon Green, The Palsgraf Case, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 789, 791 (1930) (proximate cause)
104. Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 61 (1956).
105. See, e.g., STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 108-36 (2004) (discussing consequentialist theories of contract law).
106. For a classic example of functionalism in contract law, see Jones V. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 191 (N.Y. Sup. 1969) ("[U]nconscionability permits a court to accomplish directly what heretofore was often accomplished by construction of language, manipulations of fluid rules of contract law and determinations based upon a presumed public policy.").
107. See also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 69-71 (2d ed. 1977)
108. Arthur L. Corbin, Recent Developments in the Law of Contracts, 50 HARV. L. REV. 449 (1937).
109. See, e.g., Peter Benson, Philosophy of Property Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 77, at 752-53 (characterizing instrumental theories of property law in these terms)
110. see also, e.g., State V. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971) (right to exclude)
111. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 155-56 (1988) (making an economic argument for adverse possession)
112. A.M. Honoré, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961) (disaggregating property as a bundle of rights).
113. Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (stating that Swift V. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), rests on the fallacious "assumption that there is 'a transcendental body of law outside of any particular State but obligatory within it unless and until changed by statute'" (quoting Black & White Taxicab V. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)))
114. see S. Pac. Co. V. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("The common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice of some sovereign.").
115. On the connection between Holmes and private law instrumentalism, see John C.P. Goldberg and Benjamin C. Zipursky, Seeing Tort Law from the Internal Point of View: Holmes and Hart on Legal Duties, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1563 (2006).
116. United States V. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 311 (1947).
117. See Am. Elec. Power Co. V. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2539 (2011)
118. City of Milwaukee V. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304, 312 (1981).
119. Clearfield Trust Co. V. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943)
120. see Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., State Courts and the Making of Federal Common Law, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 825, 916 (2005) (discussing Clearfield Trust in these terms).
121. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. V. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 468 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring); see id. at 472 ("The law which we apply to this case consists of principles of established credit in jurisprudence, selected by us because they are appropriate to effectuate the policy of the governing Act.").
122. United States V. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979).
123. This ascription includes matters of private law. See, e.g., George D. Brown, Federal Common Law and the Role of Federal Courts in Private Law Adjudication-A (New) Erie Problem?, 12 PACE L. REV. 229, 233-35 (1992) (federal common law skeptic); Weinberg, supra note 69, at 835 (federal common law enthusiast).
124. See Andrew S. Gold, A Moral Rights Theory of Private Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1873, 1882-85 (2011)
125. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Pragmatic Conceptualism, 6 LEGAL THEORY 457, 465 (2000)
126. see also JULES COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 38-41 (2001) (positing the "consilience" criterion in which a theory that explains more features of the subject is superior to one that explains fewer).
127. Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449 (1992).
128. Ernest J. Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 485, 498-503 (1989).
129. Benjamin Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695 (2003) (distinguishing the two theories).
130. cf. John Oberdiek, Method and Morality in the New Private Law of Torts, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 189, 190 (2012) (arguing that most corrective justice theorists see the goal of tort law not simply to be tort law, but rather to "effect[] corrective justice").
131. see also Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, in NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 15, 19 (2007) ("From the fact that a 'private' realm is a creature of government regulation it does not follow that government action in that realm is normatively indistinguishable from government action in the 'public' realm.").
132. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Palsgraf, Punitive Damages, and Preemption, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1757, 1757 (2012)
133. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse Defended: A Reply to Posner, Calabresi, Rustad, Chamallas, and Robinette, 88 IND. L.J. 569, 576 (2013)
134. Palsgraf V. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99,101 (N.Y. 1928).
135. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and the Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657, 699 (2001).
136. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Legal Malpractice and the Structure of Negligence Law, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 649, 656-57 (1998).
137. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Easy Case for Products Liability Law: A Response to Professors Polinsky and Shavell, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1919, 1923-24 (2010).
138. See, e.g., Stephen A. Smith, Towards a Theory of Contract, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE, 4TH SERIES 107 (Jeremy Horder ed., 2000).
139. See, e.g., J. E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW (1997).
140. Exxon Shipping Co. V. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 508 n.21 (2008)
141. (quoting E. River S.S. Corp. V. Transamerica Délavai Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 865 (1986)).
142. cf. City of Milwaukee V. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304, 312-13 (1981) ("The enactment of a federal rule in an area of national concern, and the decision whether to displace state law in doing so, is generally made not by the federal judiciary, purposefully insulated from democratic pressures, but by the people through their elected representatives in Congress."
143. (citing Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 497 (1954))).
144. See Ernest A. Young, Preemption and Federal Common Law, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1639, 1671 (2008)
145. Ernest A. Young, The Last Brooding Omnipresence: Erie Railroad Co. V. Tompkins and the Unconstitutionality of Preemptive Maritime Law, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1349 (1999).
146. See, e.g., United States V. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975)
147. In re Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J.)
148. United States V. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J.)
149. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932) (Hand, J.).
150. For the foundational respondeat superior case concerning a statutory tort action for injury caused by a drunken sailor, see Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. V. United States, 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J.).
151. See Heaven V. Pender, (1883) 11 Q.B.D. 503 (Eng.) (duty)
152. Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd. V. Morts Dock and Eng'g Co. (Wagon Mound I), [1961] A.C. 388 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Austl.) (proximate cause)
153. see also Jolley V. Sutton London Borough Council, (2000) 1 W.L.R. 1082 (H.L.) (Eng.) (limiting liability under proximate cause when the plaintiff was crushed by a rotting boat abandoned in a housing project courtyard).
154. Compare Perry V. S.N., 973 S.W.2d 301, 309 (Tex. 1998) (refusing to apply a mandatory reporting statute in a negligence per se context)
155. Beggs V. Washington, 247 P.3d 421, 425 (Wash. 2011) (en banc) (finding an implied right to sue based on violation of such a statute).
156. Compare Nelson V. Dolan, 434 N.W.2d 25 (Neb. 1989) (exclusive)
157. Sanchez V. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983) (not exclusive).
158. Robert F. Williams, Statutes As Sources of Law Beyond Their Terms in Common-Law Cases, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 554, 561 (1982)
159. Id. at 390-91 (citing James Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 213, 226-27 (1934)).
160. See Derek Auchie, The Undignified Death of the Casus Omissus Rule, 25 STATUTE L. REV. 40, 41 (2004)
161. Hans W. Baade, The Casus Omissus: A Pre-history of Statutory Analogy, 20 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 45, 46 (1994).
162. Roger Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Common Law Orbits, 17 CATH. U. L. REV. 401, 419 (1967) (observing that when a court extends a statute by analogy, a "judicial rule takes on a life of its own in the common law").
163. See Bruce W. Frier, Interpreting Codes, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2201, 2211 (1991) ("In a steadily growing number of decisions, courts have been willing to extend the UCC by analogy, thereby abandoning older doctrine on narrow construction of statutes.")
164. Williams, supra note 190, at 586-88 (discussing the judicial practice of extending the UCC by analogy); Traynor, supra note 204, at 423 (advocating the use of the UCC as "a source for⋯ judicial rules to govern situations not explicitly covered"). Even before the rise of textualism, extension of commercial law statutes by analogy was controversial. See, e.g., Reed Dickerson, Was Prosser's Folly Also Traynor's or Should the Judge's Monument Be Moved to a Firmer Site?, 2 HOFSTRA L. REV. 469, 469 (1974) (arguing that "legislative supremacy" requires courts to "respect not only the text" of the UCC, "but [also] its negative implications").
165. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM, § 14 (2011).
166. The related doctrine of implied private rights of action allows direct suits for injuries flowing from such statutory violations. See Pojanowski, supra note 14, at 530 (discussing links between implied rights of action and negligence per se); see also Neil Foster, Statutes and Civil Liability in the Commonwealth and the United States: A Comparative Critique, in TORT LAW: CHALLENGING ORTHODOXY 169, 208-09 (S.G.A. Pitel, J.W. Neyers & E. Chamberlain eds., 2013) (comparing the two doctrines).
167. Compare Perry V. S.N., 973 S.W.2d 301, 309 (Tex. 1998) (refusing to apply a mandatory reporting statute in the negligence per se context)
168. Beggs V. State, 247 P.3d 421, 425 (Wash. 2011) (finding an implied right to sue based on a violation of a statute criminalizing failure to report child abuse).
169. Perlmutter V. Beth David Hosp., 123 N.E.2d 792, 795-96 (N.Y. 1954).
170. See, e.g., State ex rel Smith V. Greene, 494 S.W.2d 55, 59 (Mo. 1973) (holding that because a survival statute showed no "overt attempt to change the common law" backdrop, punitive damages were recoverable).
171. See, e.g., Mattyasovszky V. W. Towns Bus Co., 330 N.E.2d 509 (Ill. 1975) (denying punitive damages absent further legislative action)
172. see also Robert E. Keeton, Statutes, Gaps, and Values in Tort Law, 44 J. AIR L. & COM. 1, 7 (1978) (describing such an inference as not only an "error," but an "egregious" one)
173. Harvey S. Perlman, Thoughts on the Role of Legislation in Tort Cases, 36 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 813, 832 (2000) ("But legislative silence as to private claims, without more, is as likely to reflect a lack of attention as an intent to foreclose or authorize liability.").
174. See Dillon V. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968) (confronting bystander claims for emotional distress).
175. See J'Aire Corp. V. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60,63 (Cal. 1979) (using a multifactor test for allowing economic loss claims based on a special relationship).
176. Sea-Land Servs., Inc. V. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573,611 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting).
177. Mobil Oil Corp. V. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 623 (1978).
178. Moragne concerned a cause of action based on unseaworthiness, a maritime tort different from the negligence tort usually at the center of duty debates. See Moragne, 398 U.S. at 376. The Court has held there is "no rational basis, however, for distinguishing negligence from seaworthiness" in determining the scope of duty. Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. V. Garris, 532 U.S. 811,815 (2001).
179. Cf. Peter L. Strauss, On Resegregating the Worlds of Statute and Common Law, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 429 (bemoaning such segregation).
180. Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383, 385 (1921)
181. see WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT 126 (1999) (describing Pound's preference for legislative purpose over background common law).
182. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 86 (1982).
183. see also Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 13 (1936) (arguing that courts should "treat a statute⋯ as both a declaration and source of law, and as a premise for legal reasoning" enacted as "policy by the supreme lawmaking body").
184. See Hans A. Linde, Courts and Torts: "Public Policy" Without Public Politics, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 821, 824 (1994) ("[M]y modest heresy is that an opinion should not invoke public policy unless it can cite a source for it."); id. at 848-49 (stating that Moragne is an example of this "search for extrinsic public policy").
185. See Moragne V. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 404 (1970). Moragne is the only Warren Court majority opinion to cite the Legal Process materials. See HART & SACKS, supra note 19, at civ n.234, cxv n.290.
186. Sea-Land Servs., Inc. V. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 583 (1974).
187. See J'Aire Corp. V. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60, 62-63 (Cal. 1979) (employing a multifactor test for allowing economic loss claims based on a special relationship)
188. Dillon V. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 912-13 (Cal. 1968) (confronting bystander claims for emotional distress)
189. Rowland V. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 566-67 (Cal. 1968) (abolishing premises liability categories).
190. See also Pope V. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 379, 390 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (attacking the attitude that statutes present "wilful and arbitrary interference with the harmony of the common law and with its rational unfolding by judges").
191. Mobil Oil Corp. V. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 627-28 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
192. United States V. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439,444,445 (1988).
193. Cf. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 318 (2012) (characterizing the presumption against legislative change to common law as a "stabilizing canon").
194. See id. (linking the two canons); cf. United States V. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 453-55 (1988) (finding that the preclusion of other statutory remedies by a comprehensive legislative scheme does not violate the canon against implied repeal of statutes).
195. See, e.g., Jefferson B. Fordham & J. Russell Leach, Interpretation of Statutes in Derogation of the Common Law, 3 VAND. L. REV. 438 (1950).
196. Beaver V. Pelett, 705 P.2d 1149, 1151 (Or. 1985)
197. see also Ass'n of Unit Owners of Bridgeview Condos. V. Dunning, 69 P.3d 788, 796 n.3 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) ("We wish that parties would stop invoking that canon of [strict] construction. It is an anachronism reflecting a nineteenth century preference for case law over legislation.").
198. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461-62 (1897) ("You see how the vague circumference of the notion of duty shrinks and at the same time grows more precise when we wash it with cynical acid and expel everything except the object of our study, the operations of the law.").
199. See Crosby V. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363,373 (2000)
200. (quoting Hines V. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941))
201. cf. Clearfield Trust Co. V. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) (finding a federal common law rule that overrode state law to be necessary to protect federal interests).
202. Cf. Wyeth V. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 587 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring) (describing this practice as "expandfing] federal statutes beyond their terms").
203. See Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. V. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 387 (2002) (regarding this presumption)
204. Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 290 (2000) (arguing that this presumption can counterbalance obstacle preemption).
205. Compare CSX Transp., Inc. V. McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630, 2637 (2011) (noting that proximate cause is a doctrine of "convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice"
206. (quoting Palsgraf V. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting))), with id. at 2638-39 (invoking federal statute's remedial purpose to abrogate traditional proximate-cause requirement).
207. Cf. Am. Elec. Power Co. V. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2011) ("Legislative displacement of federal common law does not require the 'same sort of evidence of clear and manifest congressional purpose' demanded for the preemption of state law."
208. (quoting City of Milwaukee V. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304,317 (1981))).
209. Mobil Oil Corp. V. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 623 (1978).
210. see also Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 892, 905-07 (1982) (criticizing Higginbotham's assumption).
211. See ROBERT E. KEETON, VENTURING TO DO JUSTICE 13-15 (1969).
212. Cf. Aaron-Andrew P. Brühl & Ethan J. Leib, Elected Judges and Statutory Interpretation, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1215, 1258-67 (2012) (arguing thoughtfully that in some circumstances, judicial elections may justify different approaches to statutory interpretation).
213. See Caleb Nelson, A Re-evaluation of Scholarly Explanations for the Rise of the Elective Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 190, 210-13 (1993).
214. See Hans A. Linde, Elective Judges: Some Comparative Comments, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1995, 1997 (1988).
215. See Caperton V. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
216. One scholar has seen institutional competence as having constitutional valence. See Aziz Z. Huq, The Institution Matching Canon, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 417 (2012).
217. Cf. Carlson V. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 51 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[T]he fact that Congress has created a tort remedy against federal officials at all, as it has done here under the FTCA, is dispositive. The policy questions at issue in the creation of any tort remedies⋯ involve judgments as to diverse factors that are more appropriately made by the legislature than by this Court.").
218. See Rice V. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,230 (1947).
219. City of Milwaukee V. Illinois (Milwaukee IT), 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981) (treating a "comprehensive regulatory program supervised by an expert administrative agency" as "occup[ying] the field")
220. see Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Audi. V. Nat'l Sea Gammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 22 (1981) (same)
221. see also Am. Elec. Power Co. V. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527,2537 (2011).
222. See Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2537 (2011) ("Legislative displacement of federal common law does not require" a '"clear and manifest [congressional] purpose'⋯. '[I]t is primarily the office of Congress, not the federal courts, to prescribe national policy.'"
223. (quoting Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 317
224. Tenn. Valley Auth. V. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978)))
225. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 317 ("[W]e start with the assumption that it is for Congress, not federal courts, to articulate the appropriate standards to be applied as a matter of federal law.").
226. See Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2537
227. (citing and quoting Mobil Oil Corp. V. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618,625 (1978))
228. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 315 (same).
229. See Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2539 (finding there was no nuisance action for greenhouse gas because "as with other questions of national or international policy, informed assessment of competing interests is required")
230. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 313 (finding there was no nuisance action for water pollution because courts are not "better suited to develop national policy," especially in light of the "usual and important concerns of an appropriate division of functions between the Congress and the federal judiciary"); id. at 317 (refusing to assume that Congress has "left the formulation of appropriate federal standards to the courts through application of often vague and indeterminate nuisance concepts").
231. See Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2538 (rejecting the argument that "federal common law is not displaced until EPA actually exercises its regulatory authority" because "the field has been occupied" by Congress (quoting Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 324))
232. cf. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 351-52 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that common law nuisance actions would promote the statute's ecological aims and remedy inadequacies in the legislative regime).
233. See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 93, at 162 (noting Prosser's "explicitly Realist perspective"); Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1255 (1931) (stating legal realists have "a strong tendency" to approach tort questions as "matters of general policy" concerning the allocation and reduction of risks to those "not in court"); id. at 1252 & n.70 (citing tort instrumentalist Leon Green's book Judge and Jury as exemplifying the legal realist credo that "deduction" from "the authoritative legal tradition" "does not solve cases" and that judicial decisions are thus often a product "choice which can be justified only as a question of policy").
234. Cass R. Sunstein, Is Tobacco a Drug? Administrative Agencies As Common Law Courts, 47 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1057-58 (1998).
235. see also Fleming James, Jr., Statutory Standards and Negligence in Accident Cases, 11 LA. L. REV. 95, 119 (1950) (noting that because courts are "entering upon judicial law making" when they incorporate statutory standards, it is "mechanical and doctrinaire" for courts not to "exercis[e] their own judgment as to whether the transplanted standard is appropriate to the new purpose")
236. William L. Presser, Contributory Negligence As Defense to Violation of Statute, 32 MINN. L. REV. 105, 108 (1948) (similar).
237. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874A & cmt. d. (1979).
238. Perlman, supra note 228, at 850. Chancellor Perlman was an adviser for the most recent torts Restatement. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM, at v (2011).
239. see Philip P. Frickey, Honoring Hans: On Linde, Lawmaking, and Legacies, 43 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 157 (2007) (discussing Linde's accomplishments).
240. See Baker V. Bolton, (1808) 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B.) 1033
241. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 925 cmt. a (1979).
242. See 4 FOWLER V. HARPER, FLEMING JAMES JR. & OSCAR S. GRAY, HARPER, JAMES AND GRAY ON TORTS § 24.1, at 536 (3rd ed. 2006) (stating that the traditional rule "has been modified by statute in all of our states" and that "almost all civil remedies for wrongful death derive from statute")
243. see also Fatal Accidents Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93 (Eng.).
244. See Moragne V. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375,387-88 (1970).
245. See Haakanson V. Wakefield Seafoods, Inc., 600 P.2d 1087, 1092 n.11 (Alaska 1979)
246. Hun V. Ctr. Props., 626 P.2d 182, 187 n.3 (Haw. 1981)
247. Gaudette V. Webb, 284 N.E.2d 222,229 (Mass. 1972).
248. See MacPherson V. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916) (finding a duty to a nonpurchaser because the seller "knew also that the car would be used by persons other than the buyer. This was apparent from its size; there were seats for three persons"); Mussivand V. David, 544 N.E.2d 265, 270 (Ohio 1989) (finding that a defendant with a sexually transmittable disease has a duty not only to his immediate sexual partner, but also other highly foreseeable victims like the partner's spouse).
249. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 693 (1976)
250. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1, 37-38 (1998).
251. See, e.g., Bulloch V. United States, 487 F. Supp. 1078 (D.N.J. 1980) (deciding whether a loss-of-consortium action was available when a couple had divorced and reconciled, but not remarried).
252. Cf. Martin Stone, The Significance of Doing and Suffering, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 131, 131-32 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001) (positing that instrumentalism fails to provide the necessary "account of tort law which attaches direct normative significance to the relation that exists between two persons whenever it appropriately can be said, concerning a certain injury, that one person 'did it' and the other 'suffered it'").
253. See ANTHONY J. SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 132 (1998) (noting apparent circularity)
254. Ernest A. Young, Institutional Settlement in a Globalizing Judicial System, 54 DUKE L.J. 1143, 1150 (2005) (linking institutional competence with settlement).
255. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 364 (1978) (identifying the process of "presenting proofs and reasoned arguments" as "the distinguishing characteristic of adjudication").
256. Cf. Homemakers N. Shore, Inc. V. Bowen, 832 F.2d 408, 411 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J.) ("An ambiguous legal rule does not have a single 'right' meaning; there is a range of possible meanings; the selection from the range is an act of policymaking.").
257. Frank H. Easterbrook, What Does Legislative History Tell Us?, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 441, 443 (1990).
258. See John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524 (2005) (defending such a constitutional right). This Article takes no stance on such claims.
259. Cf. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. V. Nat'l Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453,458 (1974) ("This principle of statutory construction reflects an ancient maxim-expressio unius est exclusio alterius").
260. See Wyeth V. Levine, 555 U.S. 555,587 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring) (describing practice as illicitly "expanding] federal statutes beyond their terms"); Nelson, supra note 269, at 231 ("[Constitutional law has no place for the Court's fuzzier notions of 'obstacle' preemption⋯.").
261. Justice Thomas garnered a partial majority for this approach in Pliva, Inc. V. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011), where he found a conflict. Id. at 2577.
262. Whether his colleagues will join him when rejection of obstacle preemption protects state law is uncertain. See Daniel Meltzer, Preemption and Textualism, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2013) ("[I]t is possible, though far from clear, that Justice Thomas's approach will gain support from his colleagues.").
263. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 14 cmt. freporters' note, at 165 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1.2005) ("The task of understanding the purpose or purposes underlying a statute is often difficult. Even so, the theoretical debates that have marked the general project of legislative interpretation in recent years have not broken out in these negligence per se cases.").
264. Cf. Ronald Dworkin, Law As Interpretation, 9 CRITICAL INQUIRY 179 (1982).
265. Id at 724 (quoting Erie R.R. Co. V. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938)). Professor Nelson himself has concluded that the reports of the death of unwritten federal law have been greatly exaggerated. See generally Nelson, supra note 65.
266. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 14 cmt. freporters' note, at 165 (2011) ("[T]he theoretical debates that have marked the general project of legislative interpretation⋯ have not yet broken out [in torts].").