The institution matching canon

Northwestern University Law Review

Volumn 106, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 417-466

  Huq, Aziz Z ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

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EID: 84864803217     PISSN: 00293571     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Note

References (269)

1. McNollgast, Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1631, 1639 (1995).
2. This is a point of agreement among scholars of very different normative commitments. See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 877, 904 (1996) ("What matters to most constitutional debates, in and out of court, is the doctrine the courts have created, not the text. ")
3. see also Charles Fried, Constitutional Doctrine, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1140, 1140 (1994) (making a case for the centrality of doctrine).
4. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 15-20 (2010) (developing doctrinal framework from first principles).
5. Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 Va. L. Rev. 1387, 1393-99 (1987) (deriving an alternative Commerce Clause framework from constitutional text and structure).
6. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Government Motive in First Amendment Analysis, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 413, 416 (1996) (seeking to explain "a wide range of First Amendment rules").
7. Frederick Schauer, The Aim and the Target in Free Speech Methodology, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 562, 564-65 (1989).
8. See, e.g., Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 Vand. L. Rev. 793, 798-801 (2006).
9. Aziz Z. Huq, Protecting Political Speech from Ourselves and Others, 112 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 16 (2012), http://www.columbialawreview.org/assets/sidebar/volume/112/16_Huq.pdf (exploring the use of strict scrutiny in the Roberts Court).
10. John F. Manning, Competing Presumptions About Statutory Coherence, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 2009, 2009 (2006).
11. Cf. Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 Va. L. Rev. 1, 51 (2004) (distinguishing "constitutional decision rules" from "constitutional operative propositions").
12. Cf. Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 Va. L. Rev. 1, 51 (2004) (distinguishing "constitutional decision rules" from "constitutional operative propositions").
13. IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975).
14. One important exception is the work of Professor Dan Coenen. Professor Coenen identifies what he calls a set of "constitutional 'who' rules" that "steer policy choices away from one decisionmaker to another, on account of institutional capacities with regard to particular constitutional choices. " Dan T. Coenen, The Rehnquist Court, Structural Due Process, and Semisubstantive Constitutional Review, 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1281, 1370 (2002) [hereinafter Coenen, Rehnquist Court].
15. 426 U.S. 88 (1976). It is arguable that the idea of institution matching can be linked to the institutional focus of the so-called "Princeton school" of constitutional theory. For an introduction to that approach, see generally the essays collected in Constitutional Politics (Sotirios A. Barber & Robert P. George eds., 2001). I am grateful to Professor Troy McKenzie for stressing this connection to me.
16. Cf. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954) (finding an equality rule in the Fifth Amendment).
17. See Gerald M. Rosberg, The Protection of Aliens from Discriminatory Treatment by the National Government, 1977 Sup. Ct. Rev. 275, 277-78 (explaining context of cases).
18. 426 U.S. 67, 70 & n.1 (1976).
19. 426 U.S. 67, 70 & n.1 (1976).
20. 426 U.S. 67, 70 & n.1 (1976).
21. 426 U.S. 67, 70 & n.1 (1976).
22. 426 U.S. 67, 70 & n.1 (1976).
23. 426 U.S. 88, 90 & n.1 (1976) (quoting 5 C.F.R. § 338.101 (1976) and explaining that it had been construed to permit the employment of American Samoans).
24. 426 U.S. 88, 90 & n.1 (1976) (quoting 5 C.F.R. § 338.101 (1976) and explaining that it had been construed to permit the employment of American Samoans).
25. 426 U.S. 88, 90 & n.1 (1976) (quoting 5 C.F.R. § 338.101 (1976) and explaining that it had been construed to permit the employment of American Samoans).
26. 426 U.S. 88, 90 & n.1 (1976) (quoting 5 C.F.R. § 338.101 (1976) and explaining that it had been construed to permit the employment of American Samoans).
27. 426 U.S. 88, 90 & n.1 (1976) (quoting 5 C.F.R. § 338.101 (1976) and explaining that it had been construed to permit the employment of American Samoans).
28. 426 U.S. 88, 90 & n.1 (1976) (quoting 5 C.F.R. § 338.101 (1976) and explaining that it had been construed to permit the employment of American Samoans).
29. 426 U.S. 88, 90 & n.1 (1976) (quoting 5 C.F.R. § 338.101 (1976) and explaining that it had been construed to permit the employment of American Samoans).
30. 426 U.S. 88, 90 & n.1 (1976) (quoting 5 C.F.R. § 338.101 (1976) and explaining that it had been construed to permit the employment of American Samoans).
31. 426 U.S. 88, 90 & n.1 (1976) (quoting 5 C.F.R. § 338.101 (1976) and explaining that it had been construed to permit the employment of American Samoans).
32. 426 U.S. 88, 90 & n.1 (1976) (quoting 5 C.F.R. § 338.101 (1976) and explaining that it had been construed to permit the employment of American Samoans).
33. Hampton, 426 U.S. at 105, 116.
34. The Court first examined a race-based federal action in Hirabayashi v. United States, in which it upheld a curfew applicable only to persons of Japanese ancestry on the ground that "circumstances within the knowledge of those charged with the responsibility for maintaining the national defense afforded a rational basis for the decision which they made. " 320 U.S. 81, 102 (1943). Only in Korematsu v. United States, a case concerning internment orders that followed the curfew, did the Court declare that it would apply "the most rigid scrutiny. " 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
35. For a general statement of this claim as applied to all constitutional rights, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Individual Rights and the Powers of Government, 27 Ga. L. Rev. 343, 344 (1993) ("[R]ights are conceptually interconnected with, and occasionally even subordinate to, governmental powers. ").
36. See Stephen Gardbaum, Limiting Constitutional Rights, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 789, 791-92 (2007) ("Rights are protective 'shields,' rather than peremptory 'trumps,' against conflicting, nonenumerated governmental interests, with courts balancing the two by applying one of several different presumptions and standards of review, such as strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and the rational basis test. "
37. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 Yale L.J. 943, 946 (1987) (asserting that compelling-state-interest tests "exemplify" a "form" of balancing).
38. Hampton, 426 U.S. at 115.
39. Hampton, 426 U.S. at 115.
40. In one later opinion, Justice Stevens suggested his abiding concern for the actual reasons for a government action. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 217-19, 223 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring).
41. Cf. Mark Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue 206 (1988) (criticizing Hampton on the ground that the invalidated rule was "undoubtedly produced after a study by members of the Commission's staff, who most certainly consulted both formally and informally with members of other staffs knowledgeable about foreign policy").
42. One might also query whether the canon should apply in different ways to liberty and equality interests. But Hampton provides little reason to believe that these should be separate lines of analysis. To the contrary, as Justice Rehnquist observed in dissent, the opinion conflates liberty and equality interests. 426 U.S. at 119 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
43. In one later opinion, Justice Stevens suggested his abiding concern for the actual reasons for a government action. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 217-19, 223 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring).
44. This is a point of agreement among scholars of very different normative commitments. See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 877, 904 (1996) ("What matters to most constitutional debates, in and out of court, is the doctrine the courts have created, not the text. ")
45. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 593, 597 (1992).
46. Cf. Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative Policymaking, 118 Yale L.J. 64, 89-96 (2008) (emphasizing the diverse ways in which canons operate).
47. For an overview of the Roberts Court's usage of the avoidance canon, see Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by the Roberts Court, 2009 Sup. Ct. Rev. 181, 189-95.
48. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2891 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring).
49. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 593, 597 (1992).
50. See, e.g., Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 291-92 (1981).
51. See, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003) (requiring a clear statement from Congress before concluding that jurisdiction to review an agency action had been eliminated).
52. See, e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 500-01 (1979) (requiring a clear statement of statutory authority for an agency action that impinged on First Amendment interests).
53. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006) (plurality opinion).
54. This assumes that the constitutional limitation was clear at the time a statute was enacted-which likely was not the case with the part of the Clean Water Act at issue in Rapanos. Cf. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 788 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
55. It is not clear why Congress would want more linguistic clarity as it approached the constitutional boundary, unless legislators were anticipating a judicial demand for such clarity. The Rapanos explanation for clear statement rules thus appears to be circular. See Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 Sup. Ct. Rev. 71, 74 ("[I]t is by no means clear that a strained interpretation of a federal statute that avoids a constitutional question is any less a judicial intrusion than the judicial invalidation on constitutional grounds of a less strained interpretation of the same statute. ").
56. John F. Manning, Competing Presumptions About Statutory Coherence, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 2009, 2009 (2006).
57. Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of "Hard Look" Judicial Review, 58 Admin. L. Rev. 753, 755 (2006).
58. For the idea of "underenforced norms, " see Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212, 1213 (1978).
59. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 593, 597 (1992).
60. Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 800, 816 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted).
61. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of the United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 3, 27 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
62. Cf. Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative Policymaking, 118 Yale L.J. 64, 89-96 (2008) (emphasizing the diverse ways in which canons operate).
63. Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 315 (2000).
64. See, e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 500-01 (1979) (refusing to allow agency to take an action that might have limited First Amendment free exercise rights).
65. Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of "Hard Look" Judicial Review, 58 Admin. L. Rev. 753, 755 (2006).
66. See, e.g., Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (noting the need for a "satisfactory explanation" for agency decisions).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562-63 (1995) (suggesting that congressional findings, though not required, may be useful in Commerce Clause cases when such findings "would enable [the Court] to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce, even though no such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye").
68. Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of "Hard Look" Judicial Review, 58 Admin. L. Rev. 753, 755 (2006).
69. Jonathan R. Macey, Separated Powers and Positive Political Theory: The Tug of War over Administrative Agencies, 80 Geo. L.J. 671, 675 (1992).
70. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 593, 597 (1992).
71. Bill Barnhart & Gene Schlickman, John Paul Stevens: An Independent Life 203 (2010) ("Stevens's opinion addressed a slightly different question than the one posed either by the U.S. Civil Service Commission in bringing the case or the other [J]ustices. ").
72. Bob Woodward &Scott Armstrong, The Brethren 402 (1979).
73. See Letter from Justice Lewis Powell to Justice John Paul Stevens 1 (Mar. 17, 1976) (in Library of Congress, Blackmun Papers, Box 212, Folder 3, No. 73-1596.
74. Letter from Justice Potter Stewart to Justice John Paul Stevens 2 (Apr. 14, 1976) (in Blackmun Papers Box 212 and on file with author).
75. Letter from Justice Potter Stewart to Justice John Paul Stevens 2 (Apr. 14, 1976) (in Blackmun Papers Box 212 and on file with author).
76. Letter from Justice John Paul Stevens to Justice Potter Stewart 1 (Apr. 16, 1976) (in Blackmun Papers Box 212 and on file with author).
77. Letter from Justice John Paul Stevens to Justice Potter Stewart 1 (Apr. 16, 1976) (in Blackmun Papers Box 212 and on file with author).
78. 41 Fed. Reg. 37,303-04 (Sept. 3, 1976).
79. Mow Sun Wong v. Hampton, 435 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
80. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 593, 597 (1992).
81. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 593, 597 (1992).
82. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 593, 597 (1992).
83. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 593, 597 (1992).
84. Lawrence Gene Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1373, 1417-18 (1978).
85. Lawrence Gene Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1373, 1417-18 (1978).
86. Lawrence Gene Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1373, 1417-18 (1978).
87. Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court 35 (1999).
88. For a brief overview of the literature, see Rosalind Dixon, The Supreme Court of Canada, Charter Dialogue, and Deference, 47 Osgoode Hall L.J. 235, 238 (2009).
89. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 308-09 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.).
90. Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 636 n.2 (1986) (citing Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100 (1976).
91. Cf. Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
92. 478 U.S. 714, 718, 736 (1986).
93. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, § 251, 99 Stat. 1038, 1063-72 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 901, 907, 922 (2006).
94. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 757 n.23 (Stevens, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).
95. Cf. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 100 n.3 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (recounting the post-history of Hampton as support for the proposition that the government has broad discretion as to employment decisions).
96. Lawrence Gene Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1373, 1417-18 (1978).
97. One important exception is the work of Professor Dan Coenen. Professor Coenen identifies what he calls a set of "constitutional 'who' rules" that "steer policy choices away from one decisionmaker to another, on account of institutional capacities with regard to particular constitutional choices. " Dan T. Coenen, The Rehnquist Court, Structural Due Process, and Semisubstantive Constitutional Review, 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1281, 1370 (2002) [hereinafter Coenen, Rehnquist Court].
98. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
99. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
100. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
101. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245 (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part).
102. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245 (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part).
103. Interview by Bill Kurtis with John Paul Stevens & Steven G. Breyer, Assoc. Justices, Supreme Court of the U.S., in Chi., Ill. (May 10, 2004) (audio tape on file with author).
104. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004).
105. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Max M. Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller, Policing Politics in Sentencing, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1371, 1372 (2009).
106. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476 (citing the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause).
107. See, e.g., Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can't Do Well: The Jury's Performance as a Risk Manager, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 901, 904-21 (1998) (reporting empirical research suggesting judges are less prone to certain cognitive biases than juries).
108. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 470 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968) (internal quotation mark omitted).
109. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 470 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968) (internal quotation mark omitted).
110. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 484-85.
111. While neither Apprendi nor its progeny are wholly clear as to whether or not the Court is speaking of actual as opposed to idealized jurors, the application of the principle to cases in which no jury in fact sat suggests the Court's logic is best understood as resting on a relatively abstract and idealized view of juries.
112. See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, Tweaking Booker: Advisory Guidelines in the Federal System, 43 Hous. L. Rev. 341, 342, 371-72 (2006) ("If writing on a blank slate, few would likely advocate the precise sentencing system resulting from the Supreme Court's decision in Booker. ").
113. See Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Making Sentencing Sensible, 4 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 37, 53 (2006) ("The [Booker] decision effectively endorsed the lax sentencing procedures that the federal system had used for two decades even while finding those procedures constitutionally problematic. "). The peculiar result in Booker is a result of Justice Ginsburg's decision to vote with Justice Stevens on the substantive holding and with Justice Breyer on the remedy.
114. Jonathan Masur, Booker Reconsidered, 77 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1091, 1109 (2010) (explaining that Booker's remedial effect is to shift sentencing policymaking from the centralized Sentencing Commission to the dispersed pool of federal district court judges, and concluding this change will be "costly in the net").
115. Max M. Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller, Reviewing the Sentencing Guidelines: Judicial Politics, Empirical Evidence, and Reform, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 715, 732-40 (2008) (finding post-Booker sentencing disparities based on the political affiliation of the judge and the particular circuit). The remedial holding of Booker might also be characterized as a form of institution matching: individual judges have greater competence to issue a sentence that conforms to the equities of a given case than the Sentencing Commission does. Of course, this reading is in tension with the original centralizing impulse of the Guidelines, which were meant to strip authority from sentencing judges.
116. Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533, 549-50 (1983). Judge Easterbrook's attribution to the framers of contemporary libertarians' constitutional vision is asserted but unsubstantiated.
117. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 Yale L.J. 969, 969-70 (1992) (describing sweeping consequences of varying the degree of judicial deference).
118. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. 833, 835-36 (2001) (describing some of these tests).
119. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
120. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
121. Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 Va. L. Rev. 597, 598 (2009).
122. The Court framed this question in a 2000-2002 trilogy of cases. See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001); Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
123. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 Va. L. Rev. 187, 207-19 (2006).
124. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587.
125. Interview by Bill Kurtis with John Paul Stevens & Steven G. Breyer, Assoc. Justices, Supreme Court of the U.S., in Chi., Ill. (May 10, 2004) (audio tape on file with author).
126. Many commentators have been critical of this uncertainty. See Sunstein, supra note 117, at 194 (arguing that that there are "much simpler and better ways" to achieve the Court's goal); Adrian Vermeule, Introduction: Mead in the Trenches, 71 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 347, 361 (2003) ("[T]he Court has inadvertently sent the lower courts stumbling into a no-man's land. ").
127. Lisa Schulz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 Vand. L. Rev. 1443, 1475 (2005).
128. 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
129. Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 127.800-.995 (2009).
130. 21 U.S.C. §§ 811-812 (2006).
131. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04a (2010).
132. See Dispensing of Controlled Substances To Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,607, 56,608 (Nov. 9, 2001).
133. See Dispensing of Controlled Substances To Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,607, 56,608 (Nov. 9, 2001).
134. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 254, 275 (2006).
135. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 254, 275 (2006).
136. I bracket here the Court's discussion of Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462-63 (1997), which held that agency constructions of the agency's own ambiguous regulations receive substantial deference. But see Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 255-58.
137. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 270-71 ("The structure and operation of the CSA presume and rely upon a functioning medical profession regulated under the States' police powers. ").
138. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 270-71 ("The structure and operation of the CSA presume and rely upon a functioning medical profession regulated under the States' police powers. ").
139. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 270-71 ("The structure and operation of the CSA presume and rely upon a functioning medical profession regulated under the States' police powers. ").
140. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 270-71 ("The structure and operation of the CSA presume and rely upon a functioning medical profession regulated under the States' police powers. ").
141. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 270-71 ("The structure and operation of the CSA presume and rely upon a functioning medical profession regulated under the States' police powers. ").
142. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 270-71 ("The structure and operation of the CSA presume and rely upon a functioning medical profession regulated under the States' police powers. ").
143. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 270-71 ("The structure and operation of the CSA presume and rely upon a functioning medical profession regulated under the States' police powers. ").
144. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 n.24 (1997).
145. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 249, 267 (citing Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735).
146. Lawrence Gene Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1373, 1417-18 (1978).
147. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 267-69.
148. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 267-69.
149. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 267-69.
150. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 267-69.
151. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 511 (2007).
152. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 511 (2007).
153. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 511 (2007).
154. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 511 (2007).
155. Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 Sup. Ct. Rev. 51, 52.
156. Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 Sup. Ct. Rev. 51, 52.
157. Note that politics does not always take second place to expertise. The Court will alternatively read a statute to exclude a delegation to an agency in cases where the Court believes the determination is better suited to resolution by elected officials. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000) ("In extraordinary cases... there may be reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended... an implicit delegation [to an agency]. ").
158. See Aziz Z. Huq, Against National Security Exceptionalism, 2009 Sup. Ct. Rev. 225, 225-26 (sketching problems generated by novel security policy responses).
159. See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During Wartime, 5 Theoretical Inquiries L. 1, 5 (2004) ("[C]ourts have developed a process-based, institutionally-oriented (as opposed to rightsoriented) framework for examining the legality of governmental action in extreme security contexts. ").
160. Aziz Z. Huq, Protecting Political Speech from Ourselves and Others, 112 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 16 (2012), http://www.columbialawreview.org/assets/sidebar/volume/112/16_Huq.pdf (exploring the use of strict scrutiny in the Roberts Court).
161. 548 U.S. 557, 568 (2006) (citing Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001).
162. 548 U.S. 557, 568 (2006) (citing Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001).
163. 548 U.S. 557, 568 (2006) (citing Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001).
164. 548 U.S. 557, 568 (2006) (citing Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001).
165. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
166. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
167. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
168. See, e.g., Curtis v. Peters, 107 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2000) (holding, in the course of a Chevron analysis, that "the actions of the Air Force are entitled to even greater deference than are other agency actions").
169. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
170. See Eric A. Posner, Boumediene and the Uncertain March of Judicial Cosmopolitanism, 2007-2008 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 23, 23-25 (2008).
171. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
172. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
173. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
174. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
175. See also Joshua E. Kastenberg, The Blackstone of Military Law: Colonel William Winthrop (2009).
176. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
177. Note a troubling feature of this logic: It flips the traditional understanding of civilian control of the military by making some civilian decisions contingent on the backing of military experts.
178. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
179. Boumediene v. Bush, 551 U.S. 1160 (2007) (granting certiorari).
180. 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008).
181. On the importance of the threshold decision as to which cases to hear, see H.W. Perry, Jr., Deciding to Decide: Agenda Setting in the United States Supreme Court 1-21 (1991).
182. Interview by Bill Kurtis with John Paul Stevens & Steven G. Breyer, Assoc. Justices, Supreme Court of the U.S., in Chi., Ill. (May 10, 2004) (audio tape on file with author).
183. See Eugene Gressman, Kenneth S. Geller, Stephen M. Shapiro, Timothy S. Bishop & Edward A. Hartnett, Supreme Court Practice 804 (9th ed. 2007) ("A petition for rehearing... will not be granted except by a majority of the Court. " (quoting Sup. Ct. R. 44) (internal quotation marks omitted).
184. 553 U.S. at 733-34 (describing Defense Department establishment of CSRTs).
185. 553 U.S. at 733-34 (describing Defense Department establishment of CSRTs).
186. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 509-10 (1986) (denying free exercise claim challenging military dress regulations).
187. Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus, Suspension, and Guantánamo: The Boumediene Decision, 2008 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 43.
188. William Glaberson, In Shift, Justices Agree to Review Detainees' Case, N.Y. Times, June 30, 2007, at A1 (drawing the same inference).
189. Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus, Suspension, and Guantánamo: The Boumediene Decision, 2008 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 43.
190. 553 U.S. at 783. To be precise, the Court here was paraphrasing the petitioners' argument; it went on to accept the basic force of that argument.
191. Such information may only rarely be available. Cf. Judith Resnick, Detention, The War on Terror, and the Federal Courts, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 579, 618 (2010) ("The Guantánamo cases are thus rare instances when participants-prosecutors and lower tier decisionmakers within the CSRT process-broke ranks to report failures in their own work. ").
192. See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008).
193. 555 U.S. at 12-13.
194. Nick Gillespie, Op-Ed., What Were Those Justices Smoking?, L.A. Times, June 7, 2005, at B13.
195. 553 U.S. at 700-01. Full disclosure: I was counsel for the habeas petitioners in this litigation.
196. 553 U.S. at 700-01. Full disclosure: I was counsel for the habeas petitioners in this litigation.
197. 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2724-30 (2010) (rejecting challenge to applications of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, one of several material support provisions).
198. 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2724-30 (2010) (rejecting challenge to applications of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, one of several material support provisions).
199. 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2724-30 (2010) (rejecting challenge to applications of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, one of several material support provisions).
200. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984).
201. HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2727.
202. HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2727.
203. HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2727.
204. HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2727.
205. Cf. Geoffrey R. Stone, Perilous Times: Free Speech in Wartime from the Sedition Act of 1798 to the War on Terrorism 530-50 (2004) (summarizing lessons from a study of wartime security panics since the early Republic).
206. I assume the same analysis would apply to equality interests.
207. I focus on its application to Executive Branch decisions and bracket questions related to the canon's application to state institutions.
208. Cf. Rachel Brewster, Stepping Stone or Stumbling Block: Incrementalism and National Climate Change Legislation, 28 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 245, 250 (2010) (drawing a distinction between the two kinds of analysis).
209. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Shepsle, Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions 159-70 (2d ed. 2010) (introducing concepts of rational foresight and strategic anticipation).
210. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Shepsle, Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions 159-70 (2d ed. 2010) (introducing concepts of rational foresight and strategic anticipation).
211. See Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis 44-48 (2004) (explaining the effects of sequencing and inertia on political institution design).
212. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 115-16 (1976).
213. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 115-16 (1976).
214. J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Public Agencies as Lobbyists, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 2217, 2220 (2005) ("Agencies frequently resolve... conflicts by prioritizing their primary mission and letting their secondary obligations fall by the wayside. ").
215. Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of "Hard Look" Judicial Review, 58 Admin. L. Rev. 753, 755 (2006).
216. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime, 2003 Wis. L. Rev. 273, 294. That Korematsu has become an aversive precedent in the constitutional law canon is no recompense for those harmed by the policy it endorsed.
217. Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of "Hard Look" Judicial Review, 58 Admin. L. Rev. 753, 755 (2006).
218. Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of "Hard Look" Judicial Review, 58 Admin. L. Rev. 753, 755 (2006).
219. See Gerald M. Rosberg, The Protection of Aliens from Discriminatory Treatment by the National Government, 1977 Sup. Ct. Rev. 275, 277-78 (explaining context of cases).
220. See Gerald M. Rosberg, The Protection of Aliens from Discriminatory Treatment by the National Government, 1977 Sup. Ct. Rev. 275, 277-78 (explaining context of cases).
221. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 275 (2006).
222. Cf. Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion,
223. Yale L.J. 1420, 1482 (2008) ("[Booker] reduc[es] the leverage of federal prosecutors by recharging the sentencing judge.... ").
224. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84, §§ 1801-07, 123 Stat. 2190, 2574-614 (2009).
225. Aziz Z. Huq, Protecting Political Speech from Ourselves and Others, 112 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 16 (2012), http://www.columbialawreview.org/assets/sidebar/volume/112/16_Huq.pdf (exploring the use of strict scrutiny in the Roberts Court).
226. Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 Sup. Ct. Rev. 51, 52.
227. Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 Sup. Ct. Rev. 51, 52.
228. In this regard, institution matching may be like the modification of Chevron proposed in David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 Sup. Ct. Rev. 201, 234-36 (urging Chevron deference only when "statutory delegatees" make a decision).
229. In this regard, institution matching may be like the modification of Chevron proposed in David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 Sup. Ct. Rev. 201, 234-36 (urging Chevron deference only when "statutory delegatees" make a decision).
230. For an introduction to weak-form review, see Mark Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and SocialWelfare Rights in Comparative Constitutional Law 24-33 (2008).
231. Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 Sup. Ct. Rev. 51, 52.
232. On this point, I am indebted to Saul Levmore's insightful paper on the interaction between interest group dynamics and incrementalist policy change, even though Levmore focuses on slightly different mechanisms. See Saul Levmore, Interest Groups and the Problem with Incrementalism, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 815, 817 (2010) (noting that "[t]he conventional view of incrementalism pays little attention to interest groups" and beginning to remedy the gap).
233. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Shepsle, Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions 159-70 (2d ed. 2010) (introducing concepts of rational foresight and strategic anticipation).
234. But see Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 405, 469 (1989) ("Judge Posner's [penumbra] objection becomes less forceful... in light of the fact that constitutional norms are often underenforced. ").
235. See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 831, 844 (2008) (concluding that "judicial policy preferences are only part of the picture" and noting the influence of other factors on judicial behavior).
236. See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1260, 1285 (2006) ("[E]xplanations [of agency capture] look to how agencies cooperate with interest groups in order to procure needed information, political support, and guidance; the more one-sided that information, support, and guidance, the more likely that agencies will act favorably toward the dominant interest group. ").
237. George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J. Econ. &Mgmt. Sci. 3, 12 (1971).
238. I am grateful to Jide Nzelibe for pressing this point in correspondence.
239. Ex ante uncertainty would be heightened if courts employed both formalist and functionalist versions of the canon promiscuously.
240. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2248 (2001).
241. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
242. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2248 (2001).
243. Aziz Z. Huq, Protecting Political Speech from Ourselves and Others, 112 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 16 (2012), http://www.columbialawreview.org/assets/sidebar/volume/112/16_Huq.pdf (exploring the use of strict scrutiny in the Roberts Court).
244. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Shepsle, Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions 159-70 (2d ed. 2010) (introducing concepts of rational foresight and strategic anticipation).
245. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 593, 597 (1992).
246. Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, The Choices Justices Make 23 (1998) ("[M]ost justices, in most cases, pursue policy; that is, they want to move the substantive content of law as close as possible to their preferred position. ").
247. See B. Dan Wood & Richard W. Waterman, The Dynamics of Political-Bureaucratic Adaptation, 37 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 497, 500, 524 (1993).
248. Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of "Hard Look" Judicial Review, 58 Admin. L. Rev. 753, 755 (2006).
249. Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of "Hard Look" Judicial Review, 58 Admin. L. Rev. 753, 755 (2006).
250. Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of "Hard Look" Judicial Review, 58 Admin. L. Rev. 753, 755 (2006).
251. If Congress decides to insulate the agency from political control, this may also have costs because it makes agencies more durable and less amenable to presidential influence, thereby increasing the risk of policy sclerosis. See David E. Lewis, The Adverse Consequences of the Politics of Agency Design for Presidential Management in the United States: The Relative Durability of Insulated Agencies, 34 Brit. J. Pol. Sci. 377, 377 (2004).
252. Aziz Z. Huq, Protecting Political Speech from Ourselves and Others, 112 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 16 (2012), http://www.columbialawreview.org/assets/sidebar/volume/112/16_Huq.pdf (exploring the use of strict scrutiny in the Roberts Court).
253. Aziz Z. Huq, Protecting Political Speech from Ourselves and Others, 112 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 16 (2012), http://www.columbialawreview.org/assets/sidebar/volume/112/16_Huq.pdf (exploring the use of strict scrutiny in the Roberts Court).
254. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Shepsle, Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions 159-70 (2d ed. 2010) (introducing concepts of rational foresight and strategic anticipation).
255. This argument is similar to the argument developed by Adrian Vermeule against the judicial use of legislative history. Adrian Vermeule, The Cycles of Statutory Interpretation, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 149, 151-52 (2001) (describing legislative and litigation cycles related to the use of legislative history).
256. Kathryn Watts has argued that courts can account for political considerations in the course of "arbitrary and capricious" review under the Administrative Procedure Act. See Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 Yale L.J. 2, 8 (2009) ("[W]hat count as 'valid' reasons under arbitrary and capricious review should be expanded to include certain political influences from the President, other executive officials, and members of Congress, so long as the political influences are openly and transparently disclosed in the agency's rulemaking record. "). It is not clear that this proposal translates into the institution matching context, where courts are (presumably) trying to distinguish valid, policy-based reasons for restricting a liberty or equality interest from political ones. I leave for another day the hard question of how to distinguish policy from political grounds.
257. See David E. Lewis, Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design: Political Insulation in the United States Government Bureaucracy, 1946-1997, at 21-38 (2003) (describing interaction of Congress and the presidency in matters of institutional design).
258. William G. Howell & David E. Lewis, Agencies by Presidential Design, 64 J. Pol. 1095, 1096-1101 (2004) (same)
259. Terry M. Moe, The Positive Theory of Public Bureaucracy, in Perspectives on Public Choice: A Handbook 455, 466-69 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997) (summarizing literature on congressional power to shape agencies).
260. See Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15 J. L. Econ. & Org. 132, 133 (1999) ("[P]residents have always acted unilaterally to make law.... [T]heir power to do so has grown over time and become more consequential. ").
261. Anne Joseph O'Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the Modern Administrative State, 94 Va. L. Rev. 889, 918 (2008) (describing presidential tools).
262. John F. Manning, Competing Presumptions About Statutory Coherence, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 2009, 2009 (2006).
263. See Douglas G. Baird, Robert H. Gertner & Randal C. Picker, Game Theory and the Law 37 (1994).
264. Adam M. Samaha, Randomization in Adjudication, 51 Wm. &Mary L. Rev. 1, 7, 28-29 (2009) ("[J]udges almost never overtly randomize their merits decisions, and those who do risk sanctions beyond reversal. ").
265. Consider, for example, the Court's application of a clear statement rule on federalism grounds in cases such as Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 467-70 (1991).
266. Aziz Z. Huq, Protecting Political Speech from Ourselves and Others, 112 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 16 (2012), http://www.columbialawreview.org/assets/sidebar/volume/112/16_Huq.pdf (exploring the use of strict scrutiny in the Roberts Court).
267. See Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis 44-48 (2004) (explaining the effects of sequencing and inertia on political institution design).
268. Letter from Justice John Paul Stevens to Justice Potter Stewart 1 (Apr. 16, 1976) (in Blackmun Papers Box 212 and on file with author).
269. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).