Property as the law of things

Harvard Law Review

Volumn 125, Issue 7, 2012, Pages 1691-1726

  Smith, Henry E ^a  

^a HARVARD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

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EID: 84861370985     PISSN: 0017811X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Note

References (233)

1. See, e.g., Nigel Foster & Satish Sule, German Legal System and Laws 493 (4th ed. 2010) (explaining Sachenrecht in accordance with its name as the law of things).
2. A.N. Yiannopoulos, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise: Property §§ 12, 15 (4th ed. 2011).
3. Yunchien Chang & Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Civil Versus Common Law Property, Notre Dame L. Rev. (manuscript at 37-39), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2017816.
4. See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 809, 815 (1935) ("The circularity of legal reasoning in the whole field of unfair competition is veiled by the 'thingification' of property. ").
5. Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in NOMOS XXII: Property 69 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980).
6. Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in NOMOS XXII: Property 69 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980).
7. See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 809, 815 (1935) ("The circularity of legal reasoning in the whole field of unfair competition is veiled by the 'thingification' of property. ").
8. see also Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 Yale L.J. 357, 357-58, 365 (2001).
9. J.E. Penner, The Idea of Property in Law 70 (1997).
10. Christopher M. Newman, Transformation in Property and Copyright, 56 Vill. L. Rev. 251, 260 (2011).
11. Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 Yale L.J. 1742, 1751-53 (2007).
12. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Making Coasean Property More Coasean, 54 J.L. & Econ. (forthcoming 2012) (Harvard Law & Econ. Discussion Paper No. 688, 2011.
13. Columbia Pub. Law Research Paper No. 11-262, 2011) (manuscript at 25-27), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1758846.
14. Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 Yale L.J. 1742, 1751-53 (2007).
15. See Steven N.S. Cheung, The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of a Non-Exclusive Resource, 13 J.L. & Econ. 49, 64 (1970).
16. Barry C. Field, The Evolution of Property Rights, 42 Kyklos 319, 321-29 (1989).
17. Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for Common Resources, 1991 Duke L.J. 1, 9-36.
18. Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 711, 739-49 (1986) (describing simple regimes employed by a self-organizing public to manage openaccess resources).
19. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, Private Property and the Constitution 26-31, 97-103 (1977) (contrasting the "scientific" perspective that views property as a bundle of rights with the "layman's" perspective that persists in thinking of property as rights to things).
20. See Bas C. van Fraassen, The Scientific Image 87 (1980) ("When a theory is advocated, it is praised for many features other than empirical adequacy and strength: it is said to be mathematically elegant, simple, of great scope, complete in certain respects: also of wonderful use in unifying our account of hitherto disparate phenomena, and most of all, explanatory. ");
21. see also Richard S. Rudner, Philosophy of Social Science 11 (1966).
22. For a strong version of this criterion, see Karl R. Popper, The Logic of ScientificDiscovery 41 (1959) ("I shall require [of a scientific system] that its logical form shall be such that it can be singled out, by means of empirical tests, in a negative sense: it must be possible for an empirical scientific system to be refuted by experience. ").
23. See generally 1 Imre Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific ResearchProgrammes (John Worrall & Gregory Currie eds., 1978) (discussing progressive and degenerating research programs).
24. The roots of this conception of property can be traced to Hohfeld's work, although he did not use the metaphor of a bundle of sticks. See Max Radin, A Restatement of Hohfeld, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1141, 1146-63 (1938) (interpreting the Hohfeldian scheme from a legal realist's point of view). Gregory Alexander has traced the first known use of the bundle-picture metaphor to a late nineteenth-century treatise on eminent domain. See Gregory S. Alexander, Commodity& Propriety: Competing Visions of Property in American Legal Thought, 1776-1970, at 455 n.40 (1997) (citing John Lewis, A Treatise on the Law of Eminent Domain in the United States 43 (Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1888);
25. see also James W. Ely, Jr., The Guardian of Every Other Right: A Constitutional History of PropertyRights 3-9 (3d ed. 2008).
26. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 Yale L.J. 16, 28-59 (1913).
27. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 Yale L.J. 710, 718-33 (1917). The problem with reducing property's in rem aspect to numerosity of duty bearers is that it fails to capture the indefiniteness and open-endedness of the class of duty bearers.
28. See Albert Kocourek, Rights in Rem, 68 U. Pa. L. Rev. 322, 335 (1920);
29. see also Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 773, 780-89 (2001).
30. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1, 7 (1960).
31. See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 809, 815 (1935) ("The circularity of legal reasoning in the whole field of unfair competition is veiled by the 'thingification' of property. ").
32. See, e.g., Arthur L. Corbin, Comment, Taxation of Seats on the Stock Exchange, 31 YaleL.J. 429, 429 (1922) ("Our concept of property has shifted.... '[P]roperty' has ceased to describe any res, or object of sense, at all, and has become merely a bundle of legal relations-rights, powers, privileges, immunities. ").
33. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 Calif. L. Rev. 1044, 1086 (1984) ("[P]roperty is simply a label for whatever 'bundle of sticks' the individual has been granted. ").
34. Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 Iowa L. Rev. 277, 297 (1998) ("Labeling something as property does not predetermine what rights an owner does or does not have in it. ").
35. Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in NOMOS XXII: Property 69 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980).
36. Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 Yale L.J. 1742, 1751-53 (2007).
37. See, e.g., J.W. Harris, Property and Justice 30-32 (1996).
38. J.E. Penner, The "Bundle of Rights" Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 711, 724-25 (1996).
39. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of Property, Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions, 31 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 593, 593 (2008).
40. Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 Neb. L. Rev. 730, 731 (1998).
41. Eric R. Claeys, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Gridlock, 53 Ariz. L. Rev. 9, 17-28 (2011) (book review).
42. See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Jefferson Meets Coase: Land-Use Torts, Law and Economics, and Natural Property Rights, 85 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1379, 1398-1420 (2010).
43. Adam Mossoff, What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 Ariz. L. Rev. 371, 395-97 (2003).
44. See, e.g., Benito Arruñada, Property Titling and Conveyancing, in Research Handbook on the Economics of Property Law 237, 237-40 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 2011).
45. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1, 8 (2000).
46. Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 Yale L.J. 1742, 1751-53 (2007).
47. see also Peter Lee, The Accession Insight and Patent Infringement Remedies, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 175, 190, 199-200 (2011).
48. Christopher M. Newman, Patent Infringement as Nuisance, 59 Cath. U. L. Rev. 61, 93-120 (2009).
49. Note, A Justification for Allowing Fragmentation in Copyright, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 1751, 1755-63 (2011).
50. See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 61 Vand. L. Rev. 1597, 1597-1603 (2008).
51. Avihay Dorfman, Property and Collective Undertaking: The Principle of Numerus Clausus, 61 U. Toronto L.J. 467, 491-95 (2011).
52. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. Legal Stud. S373, S416-17 (2002).
53. Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 Yale L.J. 1163, 1193-94 (1999).
54. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1, 8 (2000).
55. Francesco Parisi, Entropy in Property, 50 Am. J. Comp. L. 595, 595-96 (2002).
56. Joseph William Singer, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic Society, 94 CornellL. Rev. 1009, 1023-29 (2009).
57. See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 61 Vand. L. Rev. 1597, 1597-1603 (2008).
58. Yunchien Chang & Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Civil Versus Common Law Property, Notre Dame L. Rev. (manuscript at 37-39), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2017816.
59. J.E. Penner, The "Bundle of Rights" Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 711, 737 (1996) ("Honoré was concerned to show that there were common features or standard incidents of ownership that did not 'vary from system to system in the erratic, unpredictable way implied by some writers but, on the contrary, have a tendency to remain constant from place to place and age to age. "
60. For example, the approach aims to be less language-specific. See, e.g., William Croft, Syntactic Categories and Grammatical Relations (1991).
61. Gerald Gazdar et al., Generalized Phrase Structure Grammar (1985).
62. Noam Chomsky, Remarks on Nominalization, in Readings in English Transformational Grammar 184 (Roderick A. Jacobs & Peter S. Rosenbaum eds., 1970).
63. András Kornai & Geoffrey K. Pullum, The X-bar Theory of Phrase Structure, 66 Language 24 (1990).
64. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1, 7 (1960).
65. See generally R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386 (1937).
66. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1, 8 (2000).
67. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1, 8 (2000).
68. Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2083, 2090-2103 (2009).
69. See, e.g., H. Clark Barrett & Robert Kurzban, Modularity in Cognition: Framing the Debate, 113 Psychol. Rev. 628, 629-30 (2006) (reviewing the modularity-of-mind debate).
70. Carliss Y. Baldwin & Kim B. Clark, Design Rules: The Power of Modularity58-59, 236-37, 257 (2000).
71. Herbert A. Simon, The Sciences of the Artificial 210 (2d ed. 1981).
72. Herbert A. Simon, The Sciences of the Artificial 210 (2d ed. 1981).
73. Herbert A. Simon, The Sciences of the Artificial 210 (2d ed. 1981).
74. These examples are drawn from Carliss Y. Baldwin, Where Do Transactions Come From? Modularity, Transactions, and the Boundaries of Firms, 17 Indus. & Corp. Change 155, 166-74 (2007).
75. These examples are drawn from Carliss Y. Baldwin, Where Do Transactions Come From? Modularity, Transactions, and the Boundaries of Firms, 17 Indus. & Corp. Change 155, 166-74 (2007).
76. These examples are drawn from Carliss Y. Baldwin, Where Do Transactions Come From? Modularity, Transactions, and the Boundaries of Firms, 17 Indus. & Corp. Change 155, 166-74 (2007).
77. These examples are drawn from Carliss Y. Baldwin, Where Do Transactions Come From? Modularity, Transactions, and the Boundaries of Firms, 17 Indus. & Corp. Change 155, 166-74 (2007).
78. These examples are drawn from Carliss Y. Baldwin, Where Do Transactions Come From? Modularity, Transactions, and the Boundaries of Firms, 17 Indus. & Corp. Change 155, 166-74 (2007).
79. These examples are drawn from Carliss Y. Baldwin, Where Do Transactions Come From? Modularity, Transactions, and the Boundaries of Firms, 17 Indus. & Corp. Change 155, 166-74 (2007).
80. These examples are drawn from Carliss Y. Baldwin, Where Do Transactions Come From? Modularity, Transactions, and the Boundaries of Firms, 17 Indus. & Corp. Change 155, 166-74 (2007).
81. See generally Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1719 (2004).
82. Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2083, 2090-2103 (2009).
83. J.E. Penner, The "Bundle of Rights" Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 711, 724-25 (1996).
84. Michael J. Madison, Law as Design: Objects, Concepts, and Digital Things, 56 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 381, 417-19 (2005).
85. Emily Sherwin, Two-and Three-Dimensional Property Rights, 29 Ariz. St. L.J. 1075, 1080-92 (1997).
86. Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2083, 2090-2103 (2009).
87. Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2083, 2090-2103 (2009).
88. J.E. Penner, The "Bundle of Rights" Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 711, 724-25 (1996).
89. Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2083, 2090-2103 (2009).
90. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1, 8 (2000).
91. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1, 8 (2000).
92. Cf. Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 Va. L. Rev. 965, 1023-24 (2004) (explaining how the shift from exclusion to governance occurs within the law of nuisance).
93. See generally Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1849, 1852, 1890-94 (2007).
94. See Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J. Legal Stud. 131, 131-34 (2000).
95. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1, 8 (2000).
96. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1, 8 (2000).
97. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1, 8 (2000).
98. On how these features fit into a communicative trade-off between intensity of information and extensiveness of audience, see Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1105, 1148-57 (2003).
99. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1, 8 (2000).
100. For a discussion of a range of further examples relating to property protection of contract rights that show this pattern of intermediate standardization in situations between the in rem and in personam, see generally P.G. Turner, Proprietary Modes of Protecting the Performance Interest in Contract (July 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
101. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1, 8 (2000).
102. See Henry E. Smith, Modularity and Morality in the Law of Torts, J. Tort L., no. 2, art. 5, Oct. 2011, at 25-28.
103. For an engaging introduction to recursion, see Douglas R. Hofstadter, Gödel, Escher, Bach 127-57 (1979). See also, e.g., Joseph R. Shoenfield, Recursion Theory(photo. reprint 2001) (1993).
104. See, e.g., Ivan A. Sag & Thomas Wasow, Syntactic Theory: A Formal Introduction36, 259 (1999). Despite the conventional wisdom to the contrary, infinitude is not an empirically demonstrated fact about natural language, and the need for recursion in syntax is loosely related at best to the creativeness of language. See Geoffrey K. Pullum & Barbara C. Scholz, Recursion and the Infinitude Claim, in Recursion and Human Language 113 (Harry van der Hulst ed., 2010).
105. Herbert A. Simon, The Sciences of the Artificial 210 (2d ed. 1981).
106. Carliss Y. Baldwin & Kim B. Clark, Design Rules: The Power of Modularity58-59, 236-37, 257 (2000).
107. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1, 8 (2000).
108. See Henry E. Smith, Modularity and Morality in the Law of Torts, J. Tort L., no. 2, art. 5, Oct. 2011, at 25-28.
109. Yunchien Chang & Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Civil Versus Common Law Property, Notre Dame L. Rev. (manuscript at 37-39), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2017816.
110. Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2083, 2090-2103 (2009).
111. Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2083, 2090-2103 (2009).
112. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1, 8 (2000).
113. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1, 8 (2000).
114. Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2083, 2090-2103 (2009).
115. See, e.g., J.W. Harris, Property and Justice 30-32 (1996).
116. J.E. Penner, The "Bundle of Rights" Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 711, 724-25 (1996).
117. Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. Toronto L.J. 275, 289-90 (2008).
118. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1, 8 (2000).
119. Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2083, 2090-2103 (2009).
120. Eric R. Claeys, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Gridlock, 53 Ariz. L. Rev. 9, 17-28 (2011) (book review).
121. Adam Mossoff, What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 Ariz. L. Rev. 371, 395-97 (2003).
122. See, e.g., Yoram Barzel, Economic Analysis of Property Rights 3 (2d ed. 1997).
123. Cf. Francis Heylighen, Advantages and Limitations of Formal Expression, 4 Found. Sci. 25, 27, 49-53 (1999) (defining formalism in language).
124. Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2083, 2090-2103 (2009).
125. See Henry E. Smith, Governing Water: The Semicommons of Fluid Property Rights, 50 Ariz. L. Rev. 445, 448-49 (2008).
126. Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2083, 2090-2103 (2009).
127. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Obligatory Structure of Copyright Law: Unbundling the Wrong of Copying, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1664 (2012). Tort law also attends to basic social virtues that do not reduce down to questions of distributive justice. One of its main points is to identify, articulate, and reinforce certain responsibilities that we owe to one another, responsibilities that are sensitive to distinct social roles and relationships and to the myriad ways in which persons interact with one another. In doing so, it helps achieve various goods, including the good of holding people accountable to one another.
128. See Robert A. Heverly, The Information Semicommons, 18 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1127, 1164-83 (2003).
129. Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2083, 2090-2103 (2009).
130. see also James Grimmelmann, The Internet Is a Semicommons, 78 Fordham L. Rev. 2799, 2799-2800 (2010).
131. Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2083, 2090-2103 (2009).
132. See Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment § 59 (2011).
133. Yunchien Chang & Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Civil Versus Common Law Property, Notre Dame L. Rev. (manuscript at 37-39), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2017816.
134. See Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 Geo. L.J. 885, 943-46 (2008);
135. see also Niva Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in Facilitating a Creative Commons, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 375, 413-14 (2005).
136. Zachary Katz, Pitfalls of Open Licensing: An Analysis of Creative Commons Licensing, 46 IDEA 391, 391 (2006).
137. See Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 Geo. L.J. 885, 943-46 (2008);
138. Where this compatibility is not present, major problems can ensue.
139. For example, the law seeks to prevent manipulation of riparian parcels to maximize the benefits of "reasonable use. "
140. Cf. Gary D. Libecap & Dean Lueck, Land Demarcation Systems, in Research Handbook on the Economics of Property Law, at 257, 285-87 (describing the establishment and coordination advantages of the rectangular survey).
141. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers & Proc.) 347, 350 (1967).
142. For background on law and social norms, see generally Robert C. Ellickson, OrderWithout Law (1991).
143. Carliss Y. Baldwin & Kim B. Clark, Design Rules: The Power of Modularity58-59, 236-37, 257 (2000).
144. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Property: Principles and Policies938-48 (2007).
145. The full maxim, cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos, translates as "one who owns the soil owns also to the sky and to the depths. " See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260-61 (1946) (discussing how high-altitude flights do not violate landowners' rights under ad coelum doctrine).
146. Brown v. United States, 73 F.3d 1100, 1103-04 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (reversing grant of summary judgment for the government in case of military overflights because of genuine issue about substantial interference with owner's recreational use of land).
147. Edwards v. Sims, 24 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Ky. 1929) (applying ad coelum doctrine to cave);
148. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1, 8 (2000).
149. Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property Rights, 14 J. Legal Stud. 13, 35-36 (1985).
150. Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2083, 2090-2103 (2009).
151. see also Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. Legal Stud. 49, 53-56 (1979).
152. See, e.g., Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 156 (Wis. 1997).
153. Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2083, 2090-2103 (2009).
154. Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2083, 2090-2103 (2009).
155. Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2083, 2090-2103 (2009).
156. Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2083, 2090-2103 (2009).
157. Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2083, 2090-2103 (2009).
158. Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2083, 2090-2103 (2009).
159. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Neglected Defense of Undue Hardship (and the Doctrinal Train Wreck in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement), 4 J. Tort L. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 2-7);
160. see also Mark P. Gergen, John M. Golden & Henry E. Smith, The Supreme Court's Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 203, 226 (2012).
161. For a development of the safety valve idea in the context of accession doctrine, see Yun-chien Chang, An Economic Analysis of the Accession Doctrine: A Case for the Property Rule 4, 16 (Feb. 11, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1576426.
162. Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Law Versus Equity 3-6 (Oct. 22, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/LEO/Hsmith_LawVersusEquity7.pdf.
163. For an argument in favor of use of damages based on excessive private benefits of inquiry into boundaries, see Stewart E. Sterk, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Uncertainty about Property Rights, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 1285, 1288 (2008).
164. Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2083, 2090-2103 (2009).
165. 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).
166. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1106 & n.34 (1972).
167. See Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules, 106 Yale L.J. 2091, 2102 (1997) ("[E]ssentially the appropriate solution is to allow injunctive relief when the relative balance of convenience is anything close to equal, but to deny it (in its en tirety if necessary) when the balance of convenience runs strongly in favor of the defendant. The usual presumption is that the exploitation risk is greater than the holdout risk. This presumption can be reversed by a showing of the dramatic difference in values.... ").
168. Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2083, 2090-2103 (2009).
169. See Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 681, 728-33 (1973);
170. Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2083, 2090-2103 (2009).
171. See Daniel B. Kelly, Strategic Spillovers, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 1641, 1660-63 (2011).
172. Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2083, 2090-2103 (2009).
173. Univ. of S. Cal. Legal Studies Research Paper Ser. No. 11-19), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1924519.
174. See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan, Property: Values and Institutions (2011).
175. Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 745, 753-73 (2009).
176. Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 61 Vand. L. Rev. 1597, 1624-55 (2008).
177. Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 745, 753-73 (2009).
178. Eric R. Claeys, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Gridlock, 53 Ariz. L. Rev. 9, 17-28 (2011) (book review).
179. See Ben Depoorter, Fair Trespass, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 1090, 1114 (2011).
180. See Jerry L. Anderson, Britain's Right to Roam: Redefining the Landowner's Bundle of Sticks, 19 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 375, 404-09 (2007).
181. John A. Lovett, Progressive Property in Action: The Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003, 89 Neb. L. Rev. 739, 777-90 (2011).
182. See Joseph Cooper, The Scottish Right of Access: Symmetry, Reciprocal Causation and Compromise in the Context of an Atypical Rule 3 Property Rule 25-26 (May 2011) (unpublished student paper, Harvard Law School) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
183. Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2083, 2090-2103 (2009).
184. Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2083, 2090-2103 (2009).
185. 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997).
186. 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997).
187. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1, 8 (2000).
188. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1, 8 (2000).
189. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1, 8 (2000).
190. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1, 8 (2000).
191. Hanoch Dagan, The Limited Autonomy of Private Law, 56 Am. J. Comp. L. 809, 809-18 (2008).
192. The alternative is to invoke a plethora of general principles to be balanced as specific situations present themselves.
193. For a famous but unusual example of such an approach, see State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372-75 (N.J. 1971).
194. See also Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Ends and Means in American Property Law, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 959, 982-84 (2009) (discussing Shack).
195. Hanoch Dagan, The Limited Autonomy of Private Law, 56 Am. J. Comp. L. 809, 809-18 (2008).
196. Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2083, 2090-2103 (2009).
197. Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2083, 2090-2103 (2009).
198. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1, 8 (2000).
199. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1, 8 (2000).
200. Amnon Lehavi & Amir N. Licht, Eminent Domain, Inc., 107 Colum. L. Rev. 1704, 1706-07 (2007).
201. City of Milwaukee Post No. 2874 Veterans of Foreign Wars v. Redev. Auth. of Milwaukee, 768 N.W.2d 749, 751 (Wis. 2009).
202. Thomas W. Merrill & David A. Dana, Takings 169-79, 185-90 (2002).
203. Crane v. City of Elizabeth, 36 N.J. Eq. 339, 343 (Ct. Err. & App. 1882) ("[Condemnation] has thus the distinctive qualities of... a taking, not of the rights of designated persons in the thing needed, but of the thing itself.... ").
204. Thomas W. Merrill & David A. Dana, Takings 169-79, 185-90 (2002).
205. Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in NOMOS XXII: Property 69 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980).
206. Adolf A. Berle, Jr. & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation andPrivate Property (1932).
207. Adolf A. Berle, Jr. & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation andPrivate Property (1932).
208. I also hypothesize that beneficial interests in trust and other equitable property rights can be captured as an iterative use of the recursive process of making a modular thing (reification). Cf. Ben McFarlane & Robert Stevens, The Nature of Equitable Property, 4 J. Equity 1 (2010) (attempting to analyze equitable rights as "rights against rights").
209. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 Yale L.J. 387, 390 (2000).
210. Carliss Y. Baldwin & Kim B. Clark, Design Rules: The Power of Modularity58-59, 236-37, 257 (2000).
211. Managing in the Modular Age (Raghu Garud et al. eds., 2003).
212. Richard N. Langlois, Modularity in Technology and Organization, 49 J. Econ. Behav. & Org. 19 (2002).
213. Ron Sanchez & Joseph T. Mahoney, Modularity, Flexibility, and Knowledge Management in Product and Organization Design, 17 Strategic Mgmt. J. (Special Issue) 63 (1996).
214. Cf. Daniel Friedmann, Restitution of Benefits Obtained Through the Appropriation of Property or the Commission of a Wrong, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 504 (1980) (presenting a property-based theory of restitution).
215. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Truth, Honesty and Corruption: Reflection on the State-Building Process 16 (Yale Law Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. for Studies in Law, Econ., & Pub. Policy, Working Paper No. 255, 2001);
216. see also Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 873, 875-82, 902-04, 917-19 (1987). Most of these authors assimilate the private to the public, but the public has sometimes been analyzed as a scaled-up version of the private.
217. See Richard A. Epstein, Playing by Different Rules? Property Rights in Land and Water, in Property in Land and Other Resources 317 (Daniel H. Cole & Elinor Ostrom eds., 2012).
218. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
219. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Constitutional Choices 259-60 (1985).
220. Robert J. Glennon, Jr. & John E. Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment "State Action" Requirement, 1976 Sup. Ct. Rev. 221, 228-31.
221. Louis Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 473, 490-91 (1962).
222. Louis H. Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 6-9 (1959).
223. Louis H. Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 6-9 (1959).
224. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1, 8 (2000).
225. See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 Am. Econ. Rev. 519, 524 (1945).
226. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1, 8 (2000).
227. See, e.g., Stefano Brusoni et al., The Value and Costs of Modularity: A Problem-Solving Perspective, 4 Eur. Mgmt. Rev. 121, 129-30 (2007).
228. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1, 8 (2000).
229. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Oxford Introductions to U.S. Law: Property 223-58 (2010).
230. See, e.g., Oliver Baumann & Nicolaj Siggelkow, Dealing with Complexity: Integrated vs. Chunky Search Processes (Sept. 29, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1104617 (modeling modular or "chunky" versus integrated search).
231. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1, 8 (2000).
232. Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2083, 2090-2103 (2009).
233. Herbert A. Simon, The Sciences of the Artificial 210 (2d ed. 1981).