Restitution in America: Why the US refuses to join the global restitution party

Oxford Journal of Legal Studies

Volumn 28, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 99-126

  Saiman, Chaim ^a  

^a VILLANOVA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 41349122074     PISSN: 01436503     EISSN: 14643820     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/ojls/gqn003     Document Type: Article

References (299)

1. See e.g. J. Beatson and E. Schrage (eds), Cases, Materials and Texts on Unjustified Enrichment (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2003)
2. D. Johnston and R. Zimmermann (eds), Unjustified Enrichment: Key Issues in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002)
3. P. Russell (ed.), Unjustified Enrichment: A Comparative Study of the Law of Restitution (VU University Press, Amsterdam, 1996).
4. An incomplete and unorganized list of recent books includes, J. Neyers, M. McInnes and S. Pitel (eds), Understanding Unjust Enrichment (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2004)
5. W. Cornish et al (eds), Restitution: Past, Present and Future: Essays in Honour of Gareth Jones (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1998)
6. G. Jones and W. Swadling (eds), The Search for Principle: Essays in Honour of Lord Goff of Chieveley (Oxford University Press, New York, 1999); L. Smith (ed), Restitution (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2001)
7. A. Burrows, The Law of Restitution (Butterworths, London, 2nd edn, 2002; 1st edn, 1993)
8. R. Stevens, Restitution in Private International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002)
9. H. Dagan, The Law and Ethics of Restitution (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004)
10. J. E. du Plessis, Compulsion and Restitution: A Historical and Comparative Study of the Treatment of Compulsion in Scottish Private Law with Particular Emphasis on its Relevance to the Law of Restitution or Unjustified Enrichment (Stair Society, Edinburgh, 2004)
11. P. Gilker (ed.), Re-examining Contract and Unjust Enrichment: Anglo-Canadian Perspectives (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/ Boston, 2007)
12. P. Russell (ed.), Unjustified Enrichment: A Comparative Study of the Law of Restitution (VU University Press, Amsterdam, 1996)
13. G. Kippert, Unjust Enrichment (Butterworths, Scarborough/Toronto, 1983)
14. E. Schrage (ed.), Unjust Enrichment: The Comparative Legal History of the Law of Restitution (Duncker & Humbler, Berlin, 1995; 2nd edn 1999)
15. M. McInnes (ed.), Restitution: Developments in Unjust Enrichment (LBC Information Services in association with Deakin Law School Legal Resources Project, Sydney, 1996)
16. A. Burrows, E. McKendrick and J. Edelman, Cases and Materials on the Law of Restitution (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2nd edn, 2007)
17. P. Birks and R. Chambers, The Restitution Research Resource (Mansfield Press, Oxford, 1994)
18. P. Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1985)
19. J. Beatson, The Use and Abuse of Unjust Enrichment: Essays on the Law of Restitution (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991)
20. Law Commission of England and Wales, Restitution of Payments Made Under a Mistake of Law (H.M.S.O., London, 1991)
21. G. Virgo, The Principles of the Law of Restitution, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2nd edn, 2006; 1st edn, 1999)
22. P. Birks, Restitution: The Future (Federation Press, Annandale, New South Wales, 1992)
23. New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Restitution of Benefits Conferred Under Mistake of Law (New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Sydney, 1987)
24. Scottish Law Commission, Recovery of Benefits Conferred Under Error of Law (Scottish Law Commission, Edinburgh, 1993)
25. F. Rose (ed.), Restitution and Banking Law (Mansfield Press, Oxford, 1998)
26. F. Rose (ed.), Restitution and Insolvency (Mansfield Press, London, 2000)
27. A. Skelton, Restitution and Contract (Mansfield Press, Oxford, 1998)
28. I. M. Jackman, The Varieties of Restitution (Federation Press, Sydney, 1998)
29. R. Goff & G. Jones, The Law of Restitution (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 3d edn, 1986) (now in its 7th edn)
30. P. Birks, Unjust Enrichment (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2nd edn, 2005)
31. L. Smith, The Law of Tracing (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997)
32. C. Rotherham, Proprietary Remedies in Context: A Study in the Judicial Redistribution of Property Rights (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2002)
33. S. Hedley, Restitution: Its Division and Ordering (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2001)
34. S. Hedley and M. Halliwell, The Law of Restitution (Butterworths, London, 2nd edn, 2002).
35. See H. Dagan, The Law and Ethics of Restitution (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004).
36. G. Palmer, The Law of Restitution (Little, Brown & Company, Boston, 1978 & Supp 2007). Professor Andrew Kull is of the opinion that while Palmer published his treatise in 1978, the bulk of the work was done at least twenty years earlier. (Telephone interview, February 2007).
37. To the best of my knowledge, the most recent casebook devoted exclusively to restitution is the 1969 edn of J. Dawson and G. Palmer's Cases on Restitution (Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 2nd edn, 1969), this in a country that has numerous casebooks devoted to Art law, Animal law, Elder law, Sports law and others. Commonwealth scholars by contrast have produced several casebooks for use in courses dedicated exclusively to restitution, see A. Burrows, E. McKendrick and J. Edelman, Cases and Materials on the Law of Restitution (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2nd edn, 2007)
38. S. Eiselen and G. Pienaar, Unjustified Enrichment: A Casebook (Butterworths, Durban, 2nd edn, 1999).
39. See Symposium: Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, 79 Tex L Rev 1763-2197, 1763 (2001)
40. Second Remedies Discussion Forum: Restitution, 36 Loy LA L Rev 991-1015, 991 (2003).
41. For example, E. A. Farnsworth et al., Contracts: Cases and Materials (Foundation Press, New York, 6th edn, 2001). The casebook contains separate sections for unjust enrichment/quasi contracts, precontractual liability and restitution-based remedies, and makes no serious attempt at connecting the underlying rationales.
42. The same organizational structure dominates Farnsworth's influential three volume treatise, see E. A. Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts (Aspen Publishers, New York, 3rd edn, 2004).
43. See for example the opening paragraph of M. S. Quinn's book review, 'Subrogation, Restitution, and Indemnity', 74 Tex L Rev 1361-1400, 1361 (1996), of C. Mitchell's The Law of Subrogation (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994). The American author apologizes to his US audience for reviewing a dense analytical English book on the 'sleepy' law of subrogation. His justification: It has bearing on a redistributional topic. See below at 113-17.
44. W. Keener, A Treatise on the Law of Quasi-Contracts (Baker, Voorhis and Company, New York, 1893).
45. The development of the doctrinal field is sketched out in A. Kull, 'James Barr Ames and the Early Modern History of Unjust Enrichment', (2005) 25 OJLS 297-319
46. see also D. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Classical Legal Thought (1975) (unpublished manuscript) (Beard Books, Cambridge, 1975) at 177-81, available at
47. J. Perillo, 'Restitution in a Contractual Context', 73 Colum L Rev 1208-1226 (1973)
48. R. M. Jackson, The History of Quasi-Contract in English Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1936)
49. J. B. Ames, 'The History of Assumpsit', 2 Harv L Rev 1-19 (1888).
50. For an early contrast of English and American approaches to the topic see Lord Wright, 'Book Review: Restatement of the Law of Restitution', 51 Harv L Rev 369 383 (1937) (reviewing the Restatement (First) of Restitution).
51. Seavey and Scott saw themselves as introducing restitution to the world, see W. Seavey & A. Scott, 'Restatement', 54 L Q R 29-45, 31 (1938)
52. see also P. Birks, 'A Letter to America: The New Restatement of Restitution', 3 Global Yurist Frontiers (2003) Vol. 2, Iss. 2., Art. 2, available at (discussing the significance of the names of the First and Third Restatements).
53. J. P. Dawson, Unjust Enrichment: A Comparative Analysis (Little, Brown & Company, Boston, 1951).
54. G. Palmer, above n 4.
55. J. W. Wade, Cases and Materials on Restitution (Foundation Press, Brooklyn, 1958; 2nd edn, 1966)
56. J. Perillo, above n 9, 1210-11 n 19 (citations omitted).
57. See P. Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1985) at 3 ('In America, where lawyers have undoubtedly been more alive to [restitution]...').
58. See J. Langbein, "The Later History of Restitution' in W. Cornish et al. (eds), Restitution: Past, Present and Future: Essays in Honour of Gareth Jones (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1998) at 57-62.
59. See E. A. Farnsworth et al., Contracts: Cases and Materials (Foundation Press, New York, 6th edn, 2001).
60. See J. Rogers, 'Restitution for Wrongs and the Restatement (Third) of the Law of Restitution', 42 Wake Forest L Rev 55-92 (2007).
61. See e.g. D. Laycock, Modern American Remedies: Cases and Materials (Aspen Law & Business, New York, 3rd edn, 2002)
62. R. Weaver et al., Remedies: Cases, Practical Problems, and Exercises (Thomson/West, St. Paul, 2004)
63. D. Rendleman, Remedies: Cases and Materials (Thomson/West, St. Paul, 6th edn, 1999; 7th edn, 2006)
64. R. Leavell et al., Cases and Materials on Equitable Remedies, Restitution, and Damages (Thomson/West, St. Paul, 7th edn, 2005).
65. See e.g. XL/Datacomp, Inc v Wilson (In re Omegas Group Inc), 16 F3d 1443 (6 th Cir 1994) (Bankruptcy Code)
66. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins Cc v Knudson, 534 US 204 (2002) (ERISA)
67. 1st Nat'l Bank of Boston v Fid Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, 724 F Supp 1168 (ED Pa 1989) (UCC). More generally, UCC Articles 4 and 4A govern cases of mistaken bank payment and wire transfers, the scenarios which Birks treated as the 'core' restitution cases.
68. See below at 117-19.
69. The House of Lord's restitution canon contains an unusual number of citations to the scholarship of the English academy. See e.g. Woolwich Equitable Building Society v IRC [1993] AC 70 (citing Professor Birks)
70. In Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd [1995] 1 AC 74 (citing Professors Goode and Birks)
71. Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council [1996] AC 669 (extensive discussions of Professors Birks and Burrows and Mr Swadling)
72. Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council [1999] 2 AC 349 (citing Professors Beatson and Burrows)
73. Foskett v McKeown [2001] 1 AC 102 (citing Professors Hayton and Birks, and the American scholars Austin Scott and George Palmer)
74. Deutsche Morgan Grenfell Group v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, [2007] 1 AC 558 (Professors J. Beatson, P. Birks, A. Burrows, S. Hedley, G. Jones, R. Evans-Jones, E. McKendrick, and Mr W. Swadling).
75. Contra P. Atiyah and R. Summers, Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law: A Comparative Study of Legal Reasoning, Legal Theory, and Legal Institutions (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987) at 398-403; (arguin that, as compared to American courts, English courts rarely cite academic scholarship).
76. E.g. Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548
77. Woolwich Equitable Building Society v IRC [1993] AC 70
78. In Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd [1995] 1 AC 74
79. Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council [1996] AC 669
80. Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council [1999] 2 AC 349
81. Foskett v McKeown [2001] 1 AC 102
82. Deutsche Morgan Grenfell Group v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, [2006] UKHL 49, [2007]1 AC 558,
83. Sempra Metals Ltd v. Inland Revenue, [2007] UKHL 34, [2007] 3 WLR 354.
84. Compare e.g. Lackey v Lackey, 691 So 2d 990 (Miss 1997)
85. with Foskett v McKeown [2001] 1 AC 102.
86. E.g. Lionel Smith (Canada); Robert Chambers (Canada); James Edelma (Australia and Oxford); Kit Barker (Australia); Ross Grantham (Australia); Yeo Tiong Min (Singapore); Kelvin Low (Hong Kong); Eoin O'Dell (Ireland); Andrew Burrows (United Kingdom); Robert Stevens (United Kingdom): See also S. Hedley, Restitution: Its Division and Ordering (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2001) at 207-8.
87. See P. Birks, above n 15 at 4-5.
88. See P. Birks 'English Private Law' in P. Birks and F. Rose (eds), Lessons of the Swaps Litigation (Mansfield Press, London, 2000) at 5.
89. P. Birks, "The Concept of a Civil Wrong' in D. Owen (ed), Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995) at 31-51.
90. Over the years, Birks changed his mind on several key points in the analysis of restitution. See e.g. P. Birks, 'Misnomer' in W. Cornish et al. (eds), Restitution: Past, Present and Future: Essays in Honour of Gareth Jones (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1998) at 1-29 (retracting the idea that restitution is limited to the legal response to unjust enrichment and that the sole remedy for unjust enrichment is restitution);
91. P. Birks, Unjust Enrichment, above n 2 (rejecting the common law 'four factors' analysis in favour of civilian 'lack of basis' approach)
92. S. Hedley, above n 2 (explaining that Birks attempted to maintain the validity of his thesis by (i) differentiating between unjust enrichment and the law of wrongs, (ii) arguing that fault has only a minimal function in restitution, and (iii) continually reducing the coverage of unjust enrichment as a legal explanation). In addition to these scholarly debates, Commonwealth Courts have similarly grappled with the implications of Birks' taxonomic about face, see e.g. Deutsche Morgan Grenfell Group v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, [2006] UKHL 49, [2007] 1 AC 558
93. Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd, [2007] HCA 22
94. Garland v Consumers' Gas Co. [2004] 1 SCR 629.
95. Whatever the significance of these shifts, Birks' methodology remained fairly constant throughout his career, and at all points his analysis contrasts sharply with the US-based approaches. See 104-17.
96. See e.g. In Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd [1995] 1 AC 74
97. In Re Polly Peck Intl Plc (No 5) [1998] 3 All ER 812 (CA)
98. Fortex Group Ltd v. Macintosh [1998] 3 NZLR 171 (NZCA)
99. XL/Datacomp, Inc v Wilson (In re Omegas Group Inc) 16 F3d 1443 (6th Cir 1994).
100. See C. Rotherham, Proprietary Remedies in Context: A Study in the Judicial Redistribution of Property Rights (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2002) at 33-40 (associating Birks with the 'absolutist' view of property).
101. P. Birks, 'The End of the Remedial Constructive Trust?' (1998) 12 Trust Law Int'l 202 215, 208.
102. P. Birks, Unjust Enrichment (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2nd edn, 2005) at 3-19.
103. See e.g. P. Birks 'Equity in the Modern Law: An Exercise in Taxonomy', 26 Western Australian Law Review 1-99, 22-25 (1996)
104. See also M. McInnes, 'Unjust Factors, Juristic Reasons and Contracts in Anglo-Canadian Law,' in P. Gilker (ed.), Re-examining Contract and Unjust Enrichment: Anglo-Canadian Perspectives (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston, 2007).
105. See P. Birks, above n 33 at 3 (comparing the restitution project to the late 19th century rationalization of contract and tort).
106. See P. Birks, above n 32 at 214-5.
107. This passage is cited and critiqued in C. Rotherham, above n 31 at 38-9.
108. E.g. H. Dagan, 'The Realist Conception of Law', 57 U Toronto LJ 607-660 (2007).
109. E.g. M. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1870-1960 (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992) at 198-208.
110. See ibid.
111. See D. Kennedy 'From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller's "Consideration and Form"', 100 Colum L Rev 94-175 (2000).
112. The text itself was written by John Gardner in an unpublished 1934 writing titled, Observations on the Course in Contracts. While in the first (1947) edition of the Fuller casebook this statement appears in a section titled The Basis of Contractual Liability (pp. 297-8), in more recent editions this observation secures a more prestigious spot in the introduction to the entire course, on p. 4.
113. See L. Fuller and M. Eisenberg, Basic Contract Law (West Publishing, St. Paul, 8th edn, 2006).
114. Formalism of course exists in the United States. However, at present it seems to be anchored in a discussion about the role of texts, particularly as related to public law. There seems to be little equivalent to Birks' conceptual mapping of private law, as even Justice Scalia, America's most celebrated essentialist-formalist maintains a post-realist vision of the common law. See A. Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1997) at 10-14.
115. The most comprehensive attempt to address this issue remains P. Atiyah and R. Summers, above n 32
116. see also R. Posner, Law and Legal Theory in England and America (Oxford University Press, New York, 1996)
117. N. Duxbury 'Why English Jurisprudence is Analytical', [2004] Current Legal Problems 1-51.
118. 'These voices do exist, and from this side of the Atlantic, the Birkbeck school appears to lead the field in the UK.
119. See e.g. A. Burrows, 'Contract, Tort and Restitution - A Satisfactory Division or Not?' (1983) 99 LQR 217-267.
120. See Farah Constructions Pty Ltd. v Say-Dee Pty Ltd, [2007] HCA 22 at 154 ('The restitution basis reflects a mentality in which considerations of ideal taxonomy prevail over a pragmatic approach to legal development.')
121. Roxborough v Rothmans, (2001) 208 CLR 516 at 544: Considerations such as these, together with practical experience, suggest caution in judicial acceptance of any all-embracing theory of restitutionary rights and remedies founded upon a notion of 'unjust enrichment'. To the lawyer whose mind has been moulded by civilian influences, the theory may come first, and the source of the theory may be the writing of jurists not the decisions of judges. However, that is not the way in which a system based on case law develops; over time, general principle is derived from judicial decisions upon particular instances, not the other way around.
122. See also Roxborough v. Rothmans, (2001) 208 CLR 516 n 112, citing scholarly commentary to the same effect.
123. E.g. Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council [1996] AC 669 (HL).
124. Above n 29.
125. P. Atiyah, 'Fuller and the Theory of Contract', Essays on Contract (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986) 73.
126. L. Fuller and W Purdue Jr, 'The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages', 46 Yale LJ 52-96 (1936-1937).
127. See T. Rakoff, 'Fuller and Perdue's The Reliance Interest as a Work of Legal Scholarship', 1991 Wis L Rev 203-246, 204 n 7 and sources cited therein.
128. See Restatement of the Law (Second) of Contracts (American Law Institute Publishers, St. Paul, 1981) at §344 (outlining the three interests articulated by Fuller)
129. see also R. Hudec, 'Restating the "Reliance Interest"', 67 Cornell L Rev 704-734 (1982) (documenting the influence of Fuller's article on the Restatement (Second) of Contracts).
130. L. Fuller and W Perdue, Jr, above n 50.
131. Ibid at 56, 67-8.
132. Ibid at 70.
133. Ibid at 72 (emphasis added).
134. See for example, the discussion in J. Perillo, above n 9 at 1210.
135. See above n 52.
136. G. Gilmore, The Death of Contract (Ohio State University Press, Columbus, 1974) at 67.
137. See ibid at 62
138. (citing and crediting Fuller's Reliance Interest in unsettling the bargain theory of contract), and ibid at n 147
139. see also Restatement Second of Contracts, which presents reliance as an alternate to the bargain principle under the heading of 'Contracts without Consideration'. Restitution by contrast, is analyzed under the heading of "Remedies" where it resides alongside measurement of damages, injunctions and specific performance. See also R. Hudec, above n 52 at 711-18.
140. See e.g. E. A. Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts, n 7 above, chapter 2 where reliance is given more extensive coverage than restitution; M. Chirelstein, Concepts and Case Analysis in the Law of Contracts, chapters 2 & 8 (Foundation Press, 5th edn, 2006)
141. L. Fuller and M. Eisenberg, above n 41 chapters 1, 2 & 8)
142. J. Calamari & J. Perillo, Calamari and Perillo on Contracts (West Publishing, St. Paul, 5th edn, 2003).
143. See J. Dawson, 'Restitution Without Enrichment', 61 BU L Rev at 563-621, 577-85 (1981).
144. See G. Gilmore, above n 59
145. S. Macaulay, 'Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study,' 28 Am Soc Rev 55 00 (1963)
146. I. Macneil, The New Social Contract (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1980).
147. See also E. A. Farnsworth, 'Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations', 87 Colum L Rev 217-294, 231-33 (1987) (Few courts have entertained claims for restitution of benefits conferred during failed negotiations... For this reason, claimants have usually made claims based on contracts implied-in-fact in addition to or instead of demands for restitution, and courts...have generally favored the former ground.')
148. see also D. Kennedy, n 40 above at 144-150.
149. See e.g. E. A. Farnsworth et al., Cases and Materials on Contracts n 7 above at 103-112; 486-88.
150. See D. Kennedy, n 40 above at 144-150.
151. See C. Rotherham, above n 31 at 33-40
152. Birks, above n 32 at 208.
153. M. Horowitz, The Transformation of American Law 1870-1960, at 146-167 (1992).
154. Village of Euclid v Ambler Realty Co., 272 US 365 (1926).
155. See M. Cohen, 'Property and Sovereignty', 13 Cornell L Q 8-30 (1927).
156. J. Singer, 'The Disintegration of Property', 40 Stan L Rev 611-751 (1988).
157. Reprinted in PROPERTY: Nomos XXII 69 (1980)
158. 394 U.S. 971 (1969).
159. See also C. Reich's influential article The New Property, 73 Yale L J 733-787 (1964).
160. M. Horowitz, above n 67 at 163-7.
161. Beatty v Guggenheim Exploration Co, 122 NE 378 (1919).
162. See e.g. US v Durham, 86 F3d 70, 73 (5th Cir 1996)
163. Rogers v Rogers, 63 NY2d 582, 586 (NY 1984) ('In general, it is necessary to trace one's equitable interest to identifiable property in the hands of the purported constructive trustee.... But in view of equity's goal of softening where appropriate the harsh consequences of legal formalisms, in limited situations the tracing requirement may be relaxed.') (internal citations omitted).
164. Similarly, a recent federal district court explained as follows:
165. District courts sit as courts of equity in federal receivership proceedings. As courts of equity, district courts have 'broad powers and wide discretion' to fashion appropriate relief in federal receivership proceedings. In ruling on a plan of distribution, the standard is simply that the district court must 'use[] its discretion in a logical way to divide the money.'
166. (citing SEC v Basic Energy & Affiliated Resources, Inc, 273 F3d 657, 668 (6th Cir 2001)
167. SEC v Elliott, 953 F2d 1560, 1566 (11 th Cir 1992)
168. US v Durham, 86 F3d 70, 73 (5th Cir 1996)).
169. See Quilling v Trade Partners, Inc, 2007 WL 107669, *1 (WD Mich. 9 January 2007).
170. See E. Sherwin, 'Restitution and Equity: An Analysis of the Principle of Unjust Enrichment', 79 Tex L Rev 2083-2113 (2001) (discussing different definitions of equity).
171. Take for example the debate regarding how to conceptualize the law of tracing within orthodox understandings of property, equity and unjust enrichment. See e.g. P. Birks: 'Overview: Tracing, Claiming and Defences', in P. Birks, Laundering and Tracing (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995)
172. L. Smith, The Law of Tracing (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997).
173. For a critique of these views, see Rotherham, above n 31 at 96-106.
174. E.g. Birks, n 15 above at 39
175. P. Birks, n 34 above at 22-25.
176. S. Macaulay, 'Comment, Restitution in Context', 107 U Pa L Rev 1133-1148, 1134 (1959) ('[R]estitution presents many of the favorite problems of realistic jurisprudence insofar as that brand of legal thought centers upon the tension between decision based on rule and decision based on reaction to individual cases.')
177. P. Linzer, 'Rough justice: A Theory of Restitution and Reliance, Contracts and Torts', Wis L Rev 695-775 (2001) (making the case for a broad understanding of restitution)
178. see E. Sherwin, n 76 above (discussing different views of equity)
179. see also the illuminating contrast of English and American rhetoric surrounding subrogation, in M. Quinn, above n 8 at 1373-74.
180. See E. Sherwin, 'Love, Money, and Justice: Restitution Between Cohabitants', 77 Colorado L Rev 711-713, 713 (2006) (contrasting the vision of unjust enrichment inspired by the legal realists, with a tighter, more analytic view represented by Birks).
181. See also Restatement Third of Restitution §1 cmt. b.
182. On Holocaust reparations, see generally, 'Stefan A. Riesenfeld Symposium on Holocaust Reparations', 20 Berkeley J of Intl L 1-357 (2000)
183. 'Symposium, Holocaust Restitution', 25 Fordham Int'l L J 1-493 (2001).
184. See, e.g. Kelberine v Societe Internationale, 363 F2d 989 (DC Cir 1966) (slave labour class action lawsuit by Holocaust survivor dismissed)
185. Handel v Artukovic, 601 F Supp 1421 (CD Cal 1985) (class action lawsuit brought by Holocaust survivors dismissed)
186. Princz v Federal Rep of Germany, 26 F3d 1166 (DC Cir 1994)
187. see generally, M. Bazyler, 'Nuremberg in America: Litigating the Holocaust in the United States Courts, 34 U Rich L Rev 1-256 (2000)
188. In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, 105 F Supp 139 (EDNY 2000).
189. M. Bazyler, 'The Holocaust Restitution Movement in Comparative Perspective', 20 Berkeley J. of Int'l Law 11-44, at 12 (2002).
190. A number of Commonwealth perspectives on these issues are presented in D. Dyzenhaus and M. Moran (eds), Calling Power to Account: Law, Reparations, and the Chinese Canadian Head Tax Case (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2005),
191. reviewd by M. Chowdry and C. Mitchell, 'Responding to Historic Wrongs: Practical and Theoretical Problems' (2007) 27 OJLS 339-354.
192. See Bazyler, above n 83.
193. See M. Bazyler, above n 81 at 62-70.
194. This is Birks' formulation of the core case of restitution. P. Birks, above n 33 at 1 ('The law of unjust enrichment is the law of all events materially identical to the mistaken payment of a non-existent debt.').
195. The classic work is B. Bittker, The Case for Black Reparations (New York, Random House, 1973),
196. and more recently, R. Robinson, The Debt: What America Owes to Blacks (Dutton, 1999).
197. See In Re African-American Slave Descendants Litigation, 304F Supp 2d 1027, 1056 (ND I11 2004) (explaining that the 'bulk of this relief centers on plaintiffs' claim for restitution')
198. aff'd in part and reversed in part, In re African-American Slave Descendants Litigation, 471 F3d 754 (7th Cir 2006) (Posner, J.).
199. See E. Posner and A. Vermule, 'Reparations for Slavery and other Historical Injustices', 103 Colum L Rev 689 747, 700-3 (2003) (arguing that restitution has several advantages over tort in this context)
200. B. Boxhill, 'The Morality of Reparation', in B. Gross (ed.) Reverse Discrimination 270, 275-77 (1977) (unjust enrichment as basis for reparations)
201. A. Sebok, Should Claims Based on African American Slavery be Litigated in the Courts?, (discussing the centrality of unjust enrichment claims in slavery litigation)
202. H. Dagan, 'Restitution and Slavery', 84 BU L Rev 1139-76 (2004) (expressing openness to the idea that restitution can be used for correcting historic injustices).
203. See E. Sherwin, 'The Jurisprudence of Slavery Reparations: Reparations and Unjust Enrichment', 84 BU L Rev 1443-1465 (2004).
204. See D. Rendleman, 'Common Law Restitution in the Mississippi Tobacco Settlement: Did the Smoke Get in Their Eyes?', 33 Ga L Rev 847-933 (1999)
205. H. Dagan and J. White, 'Governments, Citizens, and Injurious Industries', 75 NYU L Rev 354-428 (2000).
206. D. Rendleman, above n 91 at 848-58.
207. Ibid at 852-86.
208. Ibid at 853.
209. Ibid at 852-55.
210. In the United States these questions proceed under a variety of statutory and common law principles, most probably this is because restitution is not a compelling enough framework to serve as a doctrinal rallying point for this area of law. A comprehensive summary of cases that demonstrates the lack of any cohering principle in US law can be found at G. Blum, Property Rights Arising ftom Relationship of Couple Cohabiting without Marriage, 69 ALR 219 (5th edn, 2004).
211. The House of Lords last spoke to this issue in Stack v Dowden, [2007] UKHL 17, [2007] 2 AC 432.
212. See below at pp 120-122 for a discussion regarding Section 28 of the American Restatement.
213. See Pettkus v Becker, (1980) 117 DLR. (3d) 257
214. Sorochan v. Sorochan, (1986) 2 SCR 38 (household work included as enrichment; restitution extends even to property acquired before the couple moves in together)
215. Peter v Beblow, (1993) 101 DLR (4th) 621 (establishing the presumption that domestic service gives rise to claims of unjust enrichment; since plaintiff rendered domestic services under 'no obligation' she is entitled to restitution.).
216. See J. Mee, The Property Rights of Cohabitees: An Analysis of Equity's Response in Five Common Law Jurisdictions (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1999) (discussing how the Canadian approach extends beyond Commonwealth norms).
217. See J. Mee, above n 97 at 188 (discussing the impact of the wide ranging US-styled constructive trust on Canadian jurisprudence).
218. See P. Parkinson 'Beyond Pettkus v. Becker', 43 U Toronto L F 1217 256, 220 3 (1993) (unjust enrichment, as understood by the Canadian courts bears little resemblance to the commercial law doctrines from which it is allegedly derived)
219. E. Sherwin, above n 80
220. J. Mee, above n 97.
221. P. Birks, 'Editors Preface', in P. Birks (ed.) The Frontiers of Liability Vol 2 (Oxford University Press, 2000) at iv;
222. see also P. Birks, 'Restitution and Resulting Trusts', in Goldstein (ed.) Equity and Contemporary Legal Developments (Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem 1992) at 372 n 82 (critique of Pettkus/Sorochan line as giving too broad a definition of unjust enrichment).
223. E. Sherwin, Legal Taxonomy, (2006).
224. This is not to suggest that there is no technical analysis in American cases, but only that the technical analysis does not revolve around the analytics of restitution. Rather, the analysis more typically focuses on procedural issues: E.g., standing, subject matter jurisdiction, diversity jurisdiction, federal question, forum non conveniens, failure to join necessary parties, and a host of discovery related issues.
225. See e.g. In Re African-American Slave Descendants Litigation, 304F Supp 2d 1027, 1056 (ND I11 2004). This seems to be part of a broader division where American courts focus more on procedural doctrines while English and Commonwealth courts expend more energy articulating substantive points. I hope to develop this point further through future research.
226. See E. Sherwin, above n 90
227. P. Birks, above n 100 at 372 n 82
228. A. Kull, 'Symposium on the Jurisprudence of Slavery Reparations: Restitution in Favor of Former Slaves', 84 BU L Rev 1277-1290 (2004).
229. See A. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (Belknap Press, 1993) at 209-264.
230. S. Levmore, 'Explaining Restitution', 71 Va L Rev 65-124 (1985).
231. See ibid at 121-4.
232. Ibid at 99, 117.
233. But see H. Dagan, above n 3.
234. S. Levmore, 79-80.
235. R. Craswell, 'Against Fuller and Purdue', 67 U Chi L Rev 99-161, 107-111 (2000).
236. Ibid.
237. P. Birks, above n 33.
238. See P. Birks, 'Establishing a Proprietary Base,' 1995 Restitution L Rev 83-93, 84.
239. G. Calabresi & A. Melamed, 'Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral', 85 Harv L Rev 1089-1128 (1972).
240. Ibid. More recent expositions of this idea found in I. Ayres and E. Talley, 'Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade', 104 Yale L J 1027-1117 (1995)
241. L. Kaplow & S. Shavell, 'Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis', 109 Harv L Rev 713 790 (1996)
242. J. Krier & S. Schwab, 'Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light', 70 NYU L Rev 440-483 (1995).
243. P. Birks, above n 33.
244. Ex Parte AmSouth Mortgage Co., 679 So 2d 251, 255 (Ala 1996)
245. See also Restatement (Third) of Restitution, Tentative Draft No. 1 §5 5 cmt f (discussing the role of negligence in restitution claims).
246. See Banque Worms v BankAmerica Int'l., 570 NE 2d 189, 192 (NY 1991)
247. see also Credit Lyonnais v. Koval, 745 So2d 837 (Miss 1999).
248. Gen Electric Capital Corp v Centr Bank, 49 F3d 280 (7th Cir 1995) (Easterbrook, J.).
249. See Restatement (Third) of Restitution, Discussion Draft §1. At present Restatement (Third) of Restitution is still in draft form. The ALI is careful to note that 'As of the date of publication, this Draft has not been considered by the members of The American Law Institute and does not represent the position of the Institute on any of the issues with which it deals.' Tentative Draft No. 4, at i.
250. As used in this article, the term 'Restatement' represents the views of
251. C. Saiman, 'Restating Restitution' 53 Villa L Rev 487-531 (2007).
252. For an overview of the debates and criticisms regarding the ALI's Restatement projects more generally, see K. D. Adams, 'Blaming the Mirror: The Restatements and the Common Law', 40 Ind L R 205-270 (2007).
253. Restatement (Third) of Restitution, Discussion Draft, at §1 cmt. b;
254. see also, C. Saiman, above n 119.
255. See e.g. A. Kull, 'Unilateral Mistake: 'Ibe Baseball Card Case', 70 Wash U Q 57-84, 74 77 (1992) (critiquing both left-leaning redistributionalists as well as law and economics neo-libertarians).
256. See e.g. S. Meier, 'Restitution after Executed Void Contracts' in P. Birks and F. Rose (eds), Lessons from the Swaps Litigation (Mansfeld Press, London, 2000) at 168, 206-213
257. S. Meier, 'Unjust Factors and Legal Grounds' in D. Johnston and R. Zimmermann (eds), Unjustified Enrichment: Key Issues in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002) at 37, 67 75
258. M. Chen-Wishart, 'In Defence of Unjust Factors: A Study of Rescission for Duress, Fraud and Exploitation' in D. Johnston and R. Zimmermann (eds), Unjustified Enrichment: Key Issues in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002) at 159
259. T Krebs, 'In Defence of Unjust Factors' in D. Johnston and R. Zimmermann (eds), Unjustified Enrichment: Key Issues in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002) 76
260. A. Burrows et al., The New Birksian Approach to Unjust Enrichment', 12 Restitution L Rev 260, 260-89 (2004)
261. S. Hedley,'The Empire Strikes Back? A Restatement of the law of Unjust Enrichment', Melbourne University L Rev 26 (2004)
262. J. Du Plessis, 'Toward a Rational Structure of Liability for Unjustified Enrichment: Thoughts from Two Mixed Jurisdictions', 122 South African L J 142, 159-172 (2005)
263. G. Dannemann, 'Unjust Enrichment as an Absence of Basis' in A. Burrows and L. Roger of Earlsferry (eds), Mapping the Law: Essays in Memory of Peter Birks (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006) at 363
264. H. Scott, 'Restitution of Extra-Contractual Transfers: Limits of the Absence of Legal Ground Analysis', (2006) Restitution L Rev 93 at 98-103
265. T. Baloch The Unjust Enrichment Pyramid', LQR 2007 (October), 123, 636-653
266. L. Smith, 'Demystifying juristic Reasons', 45 Canadian Business Law Journal 24-47 (2007).
267. See Restatement (Third) of Restitution §1 cmt b and Reporter's notes.
268. Comments of (American) Professor A. Kull, Reporter of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution, in an exchange with (Canadian) Professor J. Neyers at the Restitution Roundtable held at Washington and Lee Law School, 13 December, 2007.
269. See e.g, Paschall's, Inc v. Dozier, 407 SW2d 150, 154 (Tenn 1966) ('Actions brought upon theories of unjust enrichment, quasi contract, contracts implied in law, and quantum meruit are essentially the same. Courts frequently employ the various terminology interchangeable to describe that class of implied obligations where, on basis of justice and equity, law will impose contractual relationship between parties, regardless of their assent thereto.')
270. Puttkammer v Minth, 266 NW2d 361, 363 (Wise 1978) ('The elements of such a cause of action [in equity for unjust enrichment] are: (1) a benefit conferred upon defendant by plaintiff, (2) an appreciation or knowledge by defendant of benefit, and (3) acceptance or retention by defendant of benefit under circumstances making it inequitable for defendant to retain benefit without payment of its value.'); First Nat Bank of St Paul v Ramier, 311 NW2d 502, 504 (Minn 1981) ('[U]njust enrichment claims do not lie simply because one party benefits from efforts or obligations of others, but instead it must be shown that party was unjustly enriched in sense that term 'unjustly' could mean illegally or unlawfully.')
271. HPI Health Care Services, Inc v Mt. Vernon Hosp, Inc, 545 NE2d 672, 679 (111 1989) ('To state cause of action based on theory of unjust enrichment, plaintiff must allege that defendant has unjustly retained a benefit to plaintiff's detriment and that defendant's retention of benefit violates fundamental principles of justice, equity, and good conscience.')
272. Timothy F. Kelly and Associates v. Illinois Farmers Ins Co, 640 N.E.2d 82, 85 (Ind App 1994) ('The phrases contract implied in law, quasi contract, and quantum meruit... are all legal fictions, created by courts of law, to provide remedy that prevents unjust enrichment and thereby promotes justice and equity.')
273. Iowa Waste Systems, Inc. v. Buchanan County, 617 NW2d 23, 30 (Iowa App 2000) ('To recover on the basis of unjust enrichment, [plaintiff] must show: (1) it conferred a benefit upon [defendant] to [plaintiff's] own detriment; (2) [defendant] had an appreciation of receiving the benefit; (3) [defendant] accepted and retained the benefit under circumstances making it inequitable for there to be no return payment for its value; and (4) there is no at-law remedy that can appropriately address the claim.')
274. Gagne v Vaccaro, 766 A2d 416, 427 (Conn. 200 1) ('Right of recovery under the doctrine of unjust enrichment is essentially equitable, its basis being that in a given situation it is contrary to equity and good conscience for one to retain a benefit which has come to him at the expense of another.').
275. See e.g. McGhee v Mergenthal, 735 NW2d 867, 872 (ND 2007) ('Five elements must be established to prove unjust enrichment: (1) an enrichment; (2) an impoverishment; (3) a connection between the enrichment and the impoverishment; (4) absence of a justification for the enrichment and impoverishment; and (5) an absence of a remedy provided by law.')
276. Jackson Nat. Life Ins Co v. Kennedy, 741 A2d 377, 393-94 (Del Ch 1999) (same)
277. Trustmark Ins Co v Bank One, Arizona, NA, 48 P3d 485, 491 (Ariz App 2002) (same).
278. Restatement (Third) of Restitution §28 states that: 'At the termination of a period in which two persons, not married to each other, have lived together in a relationship resembling marriage, if one of the former cohabitants owns a specific asset to which the other has made substantial, uncompensated contributions in the form of property or services, the person making such contributions has a claim in restitution against the owner of the asset as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment.'
279. See ibid. In a more caustic vein, commentators have noted that the authorization of these claims 'is inconsistent with the premises of the new Restatement and jeopardizes the task of rationalizing and taming the field,' which threatens to 'set the field on a dangerous course.'
280. E. Sherwin, above n 80 at 732.
281. See e.g. P. Parkinson, above n 99, 220-23
282. E. Sherwin, above n 80.
283. See also P. Birks, above n 100, 372 n 82.
284. Observers have noted that as Reporter, Andrew Kull has been able to exert an unusual amount of influence over the form and substance of the Restatement. See M. Gergen, above n 119, 291 n 10.
285. A. Kull, 'Restitution and the Noncontractual Transfer', (1997) 11 J Contract Law 93-110, 95.
286. Ibid at Lexis 19.
287. Ibid at Lexis 4 (citing S. Levmore, above n 108).
288. Ibid.
289. Ibid at Lexis 9. Kull's academic analysis works its way into Restatement's section 2 which claims that 'transactions that give rise to a liability in restitution... take place outside the framework of an enforceable contract or otherwise without the effective consent of one or both of the parties.'
290. See S. Hedley, 'Restitution: Contract's Twin' in Failure of Contracts at 272 n 136 (F. D. Rose ed 1997) (pointing out that as compared with most restitution scholars, Professor Kull insists on the primacy of contract over restitution)
291. M. Gergen, 'Restitution and Contract: Reflections on the Third Restatement', 13 Rest L Rev 224-240 (2004) (noting that the Restatement's commitment to the independence of contract law and its preference over restitution claims is significantly stronger than the position of Peter Birks and other leading Commonwealth scholars).
292. P. Birks, above n 33.
293. See Restatement of Restitution §33 cmt g; M. Gergen, n 131 above.
294. See A. Kull, 'Rationalizing Restitution', 83 Cal L Rev 1191, 1195 (1995) ('To put it bluntly, American lawyers today (judges and law professors included) do not know what restitution is. The subject is no longer taught in law schools, and the lawyer who lacks an introduction to its basic principles is unlikely to recognize them in practice. The technical competence of published opinions in straightforward restitution cases has noticeably declined; judges and lawyers sometimes fail to grasp the rudiments of the doctrine even when they know where to find it.').
295. Interestingly, a recent meeting of the American Association of Law Schools (January 2007) featured a daylong workshop dedicated to remedies. One of the session panels was dedicated to restitution and the emerging Restatement. However, despite featuring the leading US restitution scholars (A. Kull, M. Gergen, E. Sherwin & C. Kovacic-Fleischer), this session only drew an attendance of approximately 15 people. By contrast, a parallel panel titled 'remedies for contract' drew a significantly larger crowd of about 60 American law professors.
296. See the Harvard Law School's course catalogue (2006). For example, with respect to animal law, see (announcing Harvard Law School's receipt of endowment to support teaching and research in the emerging field of animal rights law)
297. (describing University of Michigan Law School's course in animal law)
298. see also e.g. C. Sunstein and M. Nussbaum (eds) Animal Rights (Oxford University Press, 2004).
299. See C. Saiman, above n 119.