Statutes in common law courts

Texas Law Review

Volumn 91, Issue 3, 2012, Pages 479-541

  Pojanowski, Jeffrey A ^a  

^a NOTRE DAME LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

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EID: 84874345891     PISSN: 00404411     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (461)

1. See Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 Minn. L. Rev. 241, 250-56 (1992) (chronicling the rise of interpretation theory in the 1980s).
2. Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 731, 732 (2010).
3. Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 2 (2006).
4. Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 2 (2006).
5. For salutary exceptions, see Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 317, 318 (2005) (arguing that inferior courts have no sound basis for applying the Supreme Court's doctrine of statutory stare decisis)
6. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogenity: How to Read a Statute in a Lower Court, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 433, 433 (2012) (describing institutional differences between different courts in the appellate hierarchy and arguing that these differences "justify a heterogeneous regime in which courts at different levels of the judicial hierarchy use somewhat different interpretive methods")
7. Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, In the Shadow of the Legislature: The Common Law in the Age of the New Public Law, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 875, 875 (1991) (exploring how modern common law judges, in light of the role of statutes as the primary source of law, should view their role in relationship to the legislature).
8. See Nat'l Ctr. for State Courts, Examining the Work of State Courts: An Analysis of 2008 State Court Caseloads iv (2010) (noting that approximately 95% of all cases filed in the United States are filed in state court)
9. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1753 (2010) [hereinafter Gluck, Laboratories] ("The vast majority of statutory interpretation theory is based on a strikingly small slice of American jurisprudence, the mere two percent of litigation that takes place in federal courts-and, really, only the less-than-one percent of that litigation that the U.S. Supreme Court decides. ").
10. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1753 (2010) [hereinafter Gluck, Laboratories] ("The vast majority of statutory interpretation theory is based on a strikingly small slice of American jurisprudence, the mere two percent of litigation that takes place in federal courts-and, really, only the less-than-one percent of that litigation that the U.S. Supreme Court decides. ").
11. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogenity: How to Read a Statute in a Lower Court, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 433, 433 (2012) (describing institutional differences between different courts in the appellate hierarchy and arguing that these differences "justify a heterogeneous regime in which courts at different levels of the judicial hierarchy use somewhat different interpretive methods")
12. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as "Law" and the Erie Doctrine, 120 Yale L.J. 1898, 1991-92 (2011) [hereinafter Gluck, Intersystemic] (highlighting that federal and state courts do not consider whether they are required to apply one another's methodology when interpreting each other's statutes).
13. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312 (1981) ("Federal courts, unlike state courts, are not general common-law courts and do not possess a general power to develop and apply their own rules of decision. ").
14. Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 731, 732 (2010).
15. John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 Calif. L. Rev. 1287 (2010) [hereinafter Manning, Second-Generation].
16. John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 Calif. L. Rev. 1291-92 (2010) [hereinafter Manning, Second-Generation].
17. Richard Ekins, The Intention of Parliament, 2010 Pub. L. 709.
18. Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 2 (2006).
19. John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 70, 79-85 (2006) [hereinafter Manning, What Divides] (discussing modern textualists' use of extrastatutory context as a means of discerning the objective intent of a statutory text).
20. Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 2 (2006).
21. John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 70, 79-85 (2006) [hereinafter Manning, What Divides] (discussing modern textualists' use of extrastatutory context as a means of discerning the objective intent of a statutory text).
22. John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 70, 79-85 (2006) [hereinafter Manning, What Divides] (discussing modern textualists' use of extrastatutory context as a means of discerning the objective intent of a statutory text).
23. John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 70, 79-85 (2006) [hereinafter Manning, What Divides] (discussing modern textualists' use of extrastatutory context as a means of discerning the objective intent of a statutory text).
24. John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2387, 2457 (2003) [hereinafter Manning, Absurdity Doctrine] (discussing modern textualism's emphasis on understanding language in its social context).
25. John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 70, 79-85 (2006) [hereinafter Manning, What Divides] (discussing modern textualists' use of extrastatutory context as a means of discerning the objective intent of a statutory text).
26. John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 70, 79-85 (2006) [hereinafter Manning, What Divides] (discussing modern textualists' use of extrastatutory context as a means of discerning the objective intent of a statutory text).
27. John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 70, 79-85 (2006) [hereinafter Manning, What Divides] (discussing modern textualists' use of extrastatutory context as a means of discerning the objective intent of a statutory text).
28. John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 70, 79-85 (2006) [hereinafter Manning, What Divides] (discussing modern textualists' use of extrastatutory context as a means of discerning the objective intent of a statutory text).
29. Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, "Is That English You're Speaking?" Why Intention Free Interpretation Is an Impossibility, 41 San Diego L. Rev. 967, 982-84 (2004) (arguing that textualism is most plausibly understood as rule-restricted intentionalism).
30. John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 70, 79-85 (2006) [hereinafter Manning, What Divides] (discussing modern textualists' use of extrastatutory context as a means of discerning the objective intent of a statutory text).
31. John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 70, 79-85 (2006) [hereinafter Manning, What Divides] (discussing modern textualists' use of extrastatutory context as a means of discerning the objective intent of a statutory text).
32. John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 70, 79-85 (2006) [hereinafter Manning, What Divides] (discussing modern textualists' use of extrastatutory context as a means of discerning the objective intent of a statutory text).
33. Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 2 (2006).
34. Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 2 (2006).
35. Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 2 (2006).
36. John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 70, 79-85 (2006) [hereinafter Manning, What Divides] (discussing modern textualists' use of extrastatutory context as a means of discerning the objective intent of a statutory text).
37. John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 70, 79-85 (2006) [hereinafter Manning, What Divides] (discussing modern textualists' use of extrastatutory context as a means of discerning the objective intent of a statutory text).
38. See generally Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 593 (1995) (identifying a new "metademocratic" conception of statutory interpretation whereby courts assign meaning to contested statutory terms via interpretive rules designed to produce democratizing effects)
39. Robert Weisberg, The Calabresian Judicial Artist: Statutes and the New Legal Process, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 213 (1983) (characterizing Calabresi's activist conception of judges as artists capable of recasting the law).
40. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
41. Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454 (1989) (citing Church of the Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 459). The Court has, however, since invoked the absurdity doctrine to depart from textual meaning. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 429 (1998) (rejecting the government's novel reading of § 692 of the Line Item Veto Act because acceptance of such an interpretation would "produce an absurd and unjust result which Congress could not have intended").
42. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001) ("The judicial task is to interpret the statute Congress has passed to determine whether it displays an intent to create not just a private right but also a private remedy. ")
43. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283-86 (2002) (foreclosing the plaintiff's action for violation of a federal statute because the statute did not manifest an unambiguous intent to create individual rights enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
44. Frederick Liu, Astrue v. Ratliff and the Death of Strong Purposivism, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. PENNumbra 167, 173 (2011) ("Interpretive consensus on the Supreme Court is not impossible.... If Ratliff is any indication, strong purposivism is dead.... ").
45. 130 S. Ct. 2521 (2010).
46. 130 S. Ct. 2521 (2010).
47. 130 S. Ct. 2521 (2010).
48. See Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 107 n.3 (2007) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Church of the Holy Trinity to support his position that a literal reading of statutory text should give way when Congress's intent as to the precise issue before the Court is clear).
49. Frederick Liu, Astrue v. Ratliff and the Death of Strong Purposivism, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. PENNumbra 167, 173 (2011) ("Interpretive consensus on the Supreme Court is not impossible.... If Ratliff is any indication, strong purposivism is dead.... ").
50. See W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 101-03 (1991) (holding, based on plain language, that a federal statute conveyed no authority to shift expert fees, but with Justices Marshall and Stevens dissenting on the grounds that statutory interpretation should also involve extratextual considerations).
51. See Astrue, 130 S. Ct. at 2533 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 44 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("While I join the Court's opinion and agree with its textual analysis, the foregoing persuades me that the practical effect of our decision 'severely undermines the [statute's] estimable aim.... The Legislature has just cause to clarify beyond debate' whether this effect is one it actually intends. ").
52. Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1995).
53. Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1995).
54. Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1995).
55. Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1995).
56. Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1995).
57. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1753 (2010) [hereinafter Gluck, Laboratories] ("The vast majority of statutory interpretation theory is based on a strikingly small slice of American jurisprudence, the mere two percent of litigation that takes place in federal courts-and, really, only the less-than-one percent of that litigation that the U.S. Supreme Court decides. ").
58. Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1995).
59. Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1995).
60. See Eric Lane, How to Read a Statute in New York: A Response to Judge Kaye and Some More, 28 Hofstra L. Rev. 85, 86-87 (1999) (arguing that both federal and state courts use the "common law" method of interpretation Kaye describes).
61. Ellen A. Peters, Getting Away from the Federal Paradigm: Separation of Powers in State Courts, 81 Minn. L. Rev. 1543 (1997).
62. Ellen A. Peters, Getting Away from the Federal Paradigm: Separation of Powers in State Courts, 81 Minn. L. Rev. 1543 (1997).
63. Ellen A. Peters, Getting Away from the Federal Paradigm: Separation of Powers in State Courts, 81 Minn. L. Rev. 1543 (1997).
64. Ellen A. Peters, Getting Away from the Federal Paradigm: Separation of Powers in State Courts, 81 Minn. L. Rev. 1543 (1997).
65. Shirley S. Abrahamson & Robert L. Hughes, Shall We Dance? Steps for Legislators and Judges in Statutory Interpretation, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 1045, 1081-82, 1085 (1991) (observing that some state supreme courts offer advisory opinions, some state judges sit on law reform committees, and some informally lobby legislators)
66. Hans A. Linde, Observations of a State Court Judge, in Judges and Legislators: Toward Institutional Comity 117, 128 (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1988) (finding "no insurmountable legal obstacles to useful interaction between judges and legislators in the development of good policies" if there are "clear distinctions as to whether a judge speaks for the institutional concerns of the judicial branch, for the personal interests of judges as a group, or as an individual citizen").
67. See Robert P. Young, Jr., A Judicial Traditionalist Confronts Justice Brennan's School of Judicial Philosophy, 33 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 263, 268-69 (2008) (criticizing Judge Kaye's judicial philosophy, which views judges as having a "responsibility" to reshape society and to interpret statutes based on "perception[s] of the 'common good,'" as an "unfortunately... commonplace" notion).
68. See Eric Lane, How to Read a Statute in New York: A Response to Judge Kaye and Some More, 28 Hofstra L. Rev. 85, 86-87 (1999) (arguing that both federal and state courts use the "common law" method of interpretation Kaye describes).
69. See Robert P. Young, Jr., A Judicial Traditionalist Confronts Justice Brennan's School of Judicial Philosophy, 33 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 263, 268-69 (2008) (criticizing Judge Kaye's judicial philosophy, which views judges as having a "responsibility" to reshape society and to interpret statutes based on "perception[s] of the 'common good,'" as an "unfortunately... commonplace" notion).
70. See Robert P. Young, Jr., A Judicial Traditionalist Confronts Justice Brennan's School of Judicial Philosophy, 33 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 263, 268-69 (2008) (criticizing Judge Kaye's judicial philosophy, which views judges as having a "responsibility" to reshape society and to interpret statutes based on "perception[s] of the 'common good,'" as an "unfortunately... commonplace" notion).
71. See Robert P. Young, Jr., A Judicial Traditionalist Confronts Justice Brennan's School of Judicial Philosophy, 33 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 263, 268-69 (2008) (criticizing Judge Kaye's judicial philosophy, which views judges as having a "responsibility" to reshape society and to interpret statutes based on "perception[s] of the 'common good,'" as an "unfortunately... commonplace" notion).
72. See Robert P. Young, Jr., A Judicial Traditionalist Confronts Justice Brennan's School of Judicial Philosophy, 33 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 263, 268-69 (2008) (criticizing Judge Kaye's judicial philosophy, which views judges as having a "responsibility" to reshape society and to interpret statutes based on "perception[s] of the 'common good,'" as an "unfortunately... commonplace" notion).
73. See Robert P. Young, Jr., A Judicial Traditionalist Confronts Justice Brennan's School of Judicial Philosophy, 33 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 263, 268-69 (2008) (criticizing Judge Kaye's judicial philosophy, which views judges as having a "responsibility" to reshape society and to interpret statutes based on "perception[s] of the 'common good,'" as an "unfortunately... commonplace" notion).
74. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1753 (2010) [hereinafter Gluck, Laboratories] ("The vast majority of statutory interpretation theory is based on a strikingly small slice of American jurisprudence, the mere two percent of litigation that takes place in federal courts-and, really, only the less-than-one percent of that litigation that the U.S. Supreme Court decides. ").
75. William Popkin is an early exception. Yet in both his general theorizing and his close study of a state court's opinions, his work assumes that state and federal cases are interchangeable for purposes of his theoretical analysis. See William D. Popkin, Statutory Interpretation in State Courts-A Study of Indiana Opinions, 24 Ind. L. Rev. 1155, 1158 (1991) (arguing that "[t]wo of the issues prominent in contemporary literature [on statutory interpretation] can be profitably explored in the context of state cases"). See generally William D. Popkin, Statutes in Court: The History and Theory of Statutory Interpretation (1999) (providing a historical analysis of the evolution of statutory interpretation at the state and federal levels). This may be true, but, as we will see later, not obviously so.
76. Robert S. Summers, Statutory Interpretation in the United States, in Interpreting Statutes: A Comparative Study 407, 407 (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1991).
77. Alex B. Long, "If the Train Should Jump the Track... ": Divergent Interpretations of State and Federal Employment Discrimination Statutes, 40 Ga. L. Rev. 469, 475-76 (2006).
78. Alex B. Long, "If the Train Should Jump the Track... ": Divergent Interpretations of State and Federal Employment Discrimination Statutes, 40 Ga. L. Rev. 469, 475-76 (2006).
79. See generally Anthony J. Bellia Jr., State Courts and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 59 Vand. L. Rev. 1501, 1529-52 (2006) (analyzing the practices of state courts in interpreting federal statutes from 1789 to 1820).
80. See generally Anthony J. Bellia Jr., State Courts and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 59 Vand. L. Rev. 1501, 1529-52 (2006) (analyzing the practices of state courts in interpreting federal statutes from 1789 to 1820).
81. See generally Anthony J. Bellia Jr., State Courts and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 59 Vand. L. Rev. 1501, 1529-52 (2006) (analyzing the practices of state courts in interpreting federal statutes from 1789 to 1820).
82. John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 29-36 (2001) [hereinafter Manning, Equity of the Statute] (summarizing the origins and scope of the doctrine in English courts).
83. See generally Anthony J. Bellia Jr., State Courts and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 59 Vand. L. Rev. 1501, 1529-52 (2006) (analyzing the practices of state courts in interpreting federal statutes from 1789 to 1820).
84. See generally Anthony J. Bellia Jr., State Courts and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 59 Vand. L. Rev. 1501, 1529-52 (2006) (analyzing the practices of state courts in interpreting federal statutes from 1789 to 1820).
85. See generally Anthony J. Bellia Jr., State Courts and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 59 Vand. L. Rev. 1501, 1529-52 (2006) (analyzing the practices of state courts in interpreting federal statutes from 1789 to 1820).
86. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1753 (2010) [hereinafter Gluck, Laboratories] ("The vast majority of statutory interpretation theory is based on a strikingly small slice of American jurisprudence, the mere two percent of litigation that takes place in federal courts-and, really, only the less-than-one percent of that litigation that the U.S. Supreme Court decides. ").
87. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1753 (2010) [hereinafter Gluck, Laboratories] ("The vast majority of statutory interpretation theory is based on a strikingly small slice of American jurisprudence, the mere two percent of litigation that takes place in federal courts-and, really, only the less-than-one percent of that litigation that the U.S. Supreme Court decides. ").
88. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1753 (2010) [hereinafter Gluck, Laboratories] ("The vast majority of statutory interpretation theory is based on a strikingly small slice of American jurisprudence, the mere two percent of litigation that takes place in federal courts-and, really, only the less-than-one percent of that litigation that the U.S. Supreme Court decides. ").
89. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1753 (2010) [hereinafter Gluck, Laboratories] ("The vast majority of statutory interpretation theory is based on a strikingly small slice of American jurisprudence, the mere two percent of litigation that takes place in federal courts-and, really, only the less-than-one percent of that litigation that the U.S. Supreme Court decides. ").
90. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1753 (2010) [hereinafter Gluck, Laboratories] ("The vast majority of statutory interpretation theory is based on a strikingly small slice of American jurisprudence, the mere two percent of litigation that takes place in federal courts-and, really, only the less-than-one percent of that litigation that the U.S. Supreme Court decides. ").
91. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1753 (2010) [hereinafter Gluck, Laboratories] ("The vast majority of statutory interpretation theory is based on a strikingly small slice of American jurisprudence, the mere two percent of litigation that takes place in federal courts-and, really, only the less-than-one percent of that litigation that the U.S. Supreme Court decides. ").
92. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1753 (2010) [hereinafter Gluck, Laboratories] ("The vast majority of statutory interpretation theory is based on a strikingly small slice of American jurisprudence, the mere two percent of litigation that takes place in federal courts-and, really, only the less-than-one percent of that litigation that the U.S. Supreme Court decides. ").
93. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogenity: How to Read a Statute in a Lower Court, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 433, 433 (2012) (describing institutional differences between different courts in the appellate hierarchy and arguing that these differences "justify a heterogeneous regime in which courts at different levels of the judicial hierarchy use somewhat different interpretive methods")
94. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogenity: How to Read a Statute in a Lower Court, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 433, 433 (2012) (describing institutional differences between different courts in the appellate hierarchy and arguing that these differences "justify a heterogeneous regime in which courts at different levels of the judicial hierarchy use somewhat different interpretive methods")
95. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogenity: How to Read a Statute in a Lower Court, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 433, 433 (2012) (describing institutional differences between different courts in the appellate hierarchy and arguing that these differences "justify a heterogeneous regime in which courts at different levels of the judicial hierarchy use somewhat different interpretive methods")
96. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogenity: How to Read a Statute in a Lower Court, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 433, 433 (2012) (describing institutional differences between different courts in the appellate hierarchy and arguing that these differences "justify a heterogeneous regime in which courts at different levels of the judicial hierarchy use somewhat different interpretive methods")
97. Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1995).
98. Ellen A. Peters, Getting Away from the Federal Paradigm: Separation of Powers in State Courts, 81 Minn. L. Rev. 1543 (1997).
99. See generally Anthony J. Bellia Jr., State Courts and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 59 Vand. L. Rev. 1501, 1529-52 (2006) (analyzing the practices of state courts in interpreting federal statutes from 1789 to 1820).
100. Alex B. Long, "If the Train Should Jump the Track... ": Divergent Interpretations of State and Federal Employment Discrimination Statutes, 40 Ga. L. Rev. 469, 475-76 (2006).
101. Alex B. Long, "If the Train Should Jump the Track... ": Divergent Interpretations of State and Federal Employment Discrimination Statutes, 40 Ga. L. Rev. 469, 475-76 (2006).
102. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogenity: How to Read a Statute in a Lower Court, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 433, 433 (2012) (describing institutional differences between different courts in the appellate hierarchy and arguing that these differences "justify a heterogeneous regime in which courts at different levels of the judicial hierarchy use somewhat different interpretive methods")
103. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1753 (2010) [hereinafter Gluck, Laboratories] ("The vast majority of statutory interpretation theory is based on a strikingly small slice of American jurisprudence, the mere two percent of litigation that takes place in federal courts-and, really, only the less-than-one percent of that litigation that the U.S. Supreme Court decides. ").
104. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1753 (2010) [hereinafter Gluck, Laboratories] ("The vast majority of statutory interpretation theory is based on a strikingly small slice of American jurisprudence, the mere two percent of litigation that takes place in federal courts-and, really, only the less-than-one percent of that litigation that the U.S. Supreme Court decides. ").
105. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1753 (2010) [hereinafter Gluck, Laboratories] ("The vast majority of statutory interpretation theory is based on a strikingly small slice of American jurisprudence, the mere two percent of litigation that takes place in federal courts-and, really, only the less-than-one percent of that litigation that the U.S. Supreme Court decides. ").
106. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1753 (2010) [hereinafter Gluck, Laboratories] ("The vast majority of statutory interpretation theory is based on a strikingly small slice of American jurisprudence, the mere two percent of litigation that takes place in federal courts-and, really, only the less-than-one percent of that litigation that the U.S. Supreme Court decides. ").
107. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1753 (2010) [hereinafter Gluck, Laboratories] ("The vast majority of statutory interpretation theory is based on a strikingly small slice of American jurisprudence, the mere two percent of litigation that takes place in federal courts-and, really, only the less-than-one percent of that litigation that the U.S. Supreme Court decides. ").
108. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1753 (2010) [hereinafter Gluck, Laboratories] ("The vast majority of statutory interpretation theory is based on a strikingly small slice of American jurisprudence, the mere two percent of litigation that takes place in federal courts-and, really, only the less-than-one percent of that litigation that the U.S. Supreme Court decides. ").
109. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1753 (2010) [hereinafter Gluck, Laboratories] ("The vast majority of statutory interpretation theory is based on a strikingly small slice of American jurisprudence, the mere two percent of litigation that takes place in federal courts-and, really, only the less-than-one percent of that litigation that the U.S. Supreme Court decides. ").
110. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogenity: How to Read a Statute in a Lower Court, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 433, 433 (2012) (describing institutional differences between different courts in the appellate hierarchy and arguing that these differences "justify a heterogeneous regime in which courts at different levels of the judicial hierarchy use somewhat different interpretive methods")
111. Cf. Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Mother May I? Imposing Mandatory Prospective Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 20 Const. Comment. 97, 100 (2003) ("[I]f the goal is to understand the intentions of authors and speakers, one cannot be artificially constrained by fixed meanings or rules. ").
112. Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1995).
113. For a fascinating discussion on this, see Michael Steven Green, Erie's Suppressed Premise, 95 Minn. L. Rev. 1111, 1126-27 & nn.88-90 (2011).
114. Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1995).
115. Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 731, 732 (2010).
116. Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 731, 732 (2010).
117. Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1995).
118. Ellen A. Peters, Getting Away from the Federal Paradigm: Separation of Powers in State Courts, 81 Minn. L. Rev. 1543 (1997).
119. Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1995).
120. See, e.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 613-15 (2009) (reading CERCLA liability apportionment in light of common law tort principles).
121. John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 29-36 (2001) [hereinafter Manning, Equity of the Statute] (summarizing the origins and scope of the doctrine in English courts).
122. Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of General Law, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 503, 521-25 (2006) (cataloging the incorporation of common law concepts in the interpretation of statutes).
123. See, e.g., NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968) (describing the congressional override of a decision holding that a statute abrogated the common law distinction between employees and independent contractors).
124. Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1995).
125. See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 661 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (asking Congress to override the majority's interpretation)
126. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (overriding Ledbetter because of its impairment of statutory protections).
127. Astrue v. Ratliff, 130 S. Ct. 2521, 2533 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (calling on Congress to clarify its statutory language).
128. Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1995).
129. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533, 544 (1983) ("[Sometimes a] statute plainly hands courts the power to create and revise a form of common law.... ")
130. Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 34-35 (1985) (discussing how the Supreme Court has sometimes ignored evidence of specific intention when construing vague statutory or constitutional provisions)
131. Peter Westen & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78 Mich. L. Rev. 311, 331-32 (1980) (concluding that a court serves the same function when engaging in statutory interpretation as it does when acting in a common law capacity).
132. Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1995).
133. See Homemakers N. Shore, Inc. v. Bowen, 832 F.2d 408, 411 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J.) ("An ambiguous legal rule does not have a single 'right' meaning.
134. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 239 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing for broad deference to the interpretations of the administrative agency charged with enforcing the statute)
135. Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty: An Institutional Theory of Legal Interpretation 4 (2006) (contending that the legal system is at its best when the interpretation of an ambiguous statute is left to an administrative agency).
136. This argument assumes that state constitutions vest in or impliedly reserve for the judiciary general common law powers. Common law powers in many states might be understood as legislative grants via reception statutes that incorporate common law not inconsistent with state law. See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 4.04.010 (West 2005). This might limit a court's prerogative. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Judicial Prerogative, 12 Pace L. Rev. 327, 346 (1992) (citing reception statutes as legislative justification for state common law).
137. Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1995).
138. Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1995).
139. Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1995).
140. Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1995).
141. Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 34-35 (1985) (discussing how the Supreme Court has sometimes ignored evidence of specific intention when construing vague statutory or constitutional provisions)
142. Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1995).
143. Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1995).
144. See Derek Auchie, The Undignified Death of the Casus Omissus Rule, 25 Statute L. Rev. 40, 41-42 (2004) (discussing the casus omissus rule's gap-filling role)
145. Hans W. Baade, The Casus Omissus: A Pre-History of Statutory Analogy, 20 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. 45, 46 (1994) (summarizing the history and development of the differing views of the casus omissus in civil law and common law systems).
146. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533, 544 (1983) ("[Sometimes a] statute plainly hands courts the power to create and revise a form of common law.... ")
147. John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 29-36 (2001) [hereinafter Manning, Equity of the Statute] (summarizing the origins and scope of the doctrine in English courts).
148. See Derek Auchie, The Undignified Death of the Casus Omissus Rule, 25 Statute L. Rev. 40, 41-42 (2004) (discussing the casus omissus rule's gap-filling role)
149. Cf. Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353, 370 (1981) (stating that a court's power to make law when the legislature has been silent does not imply a similar ability to alter statutes).
150. See Jerry Mashaw, As If Republican Interpretation, 97 Yale L.J. 1685, 1686 (1988) ("Any theory of statutory interpretation is at base a theory about constitutional law. ")
151. Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 74, 76 (2000) (coining the handy phrase: "interpretive choice"). One must also interpret the constitution to derive norms for interpreting statutes. The question of interpretive choice in the constitutional context is beyond the scope of this Article, but some argue that the method might differ in constitutional and statutory contexts.
152. Here I focus on written constitutions. Unwritten constitutions pose additional questions and arguably blur into the third category-considerations about the nature of law. Cf. Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The Myth of the Common Law Constitution, in Common Law Theory 204, 235-36 (Douglas E. Edlin ed., 2007) (describing the legal nature of unwritten constitutions in terms of official consensus).
153. Cf. Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15AA (Austl.) (giving preference to interpretations that would "best achieve the purpose or object of the Act")
154. Cf. Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15AA (Austl.) (giving preference to interpretations that would "best achieve the purpose or object of the Act")
155. John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 29-36 (2001) [hereinafter Manning, Equity of the Statute] (summarizing the origins and scope of the doctrine in English courts).
156. Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1995).
157. John Copeland Nagle, The Worst Statutory Interpretation Case in History, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1445, 1468 (2000) ("The received wisdom suggests that state court judges have been more likely to follow textualist approaches than federal judges, but Popkin offers an insightful reason for why the opposite should be the case. ").
158. I appreciate the dangers of talking about state constitutions in gross. Nevertheless, state constitutions also share features, and scholars of state constitutionalism address state separation of powers questions in general, see, for example, Stanley H. Friedelbaum, State Courts and the Separation of Powers: A Venerable Doctrine in Varied Contexts, 61 Alb. L. Rev. 1417, 1457-60 (1998)
159. Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 1167, 1238-40 (1999)
160. Robert A. Schapiro, Contingency and Universalism in State Separation of Powers Discourse, 4 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 79, 107-08 (1998)
161. G. Alan Tarr, Interpreting the Separation of Powers in State Constitutions, 59 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 329, 340 (2003).
162. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the "Judicial Power" in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 990, 1096-98 (2001) (arguing that interpretations of statutes necessarily encompass nontextual considerations).
163. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the "Judicial Power" in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 990, 1096-98 (2001) (arguing that interpretations of statutes necessarily encompass nontextual considerations).
164. Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1995).
165. John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 29-36 (2001) [hereinafter Manning, Equity of the Statute] (summarizing the origins and scope of the doctrine in English courts).
166. John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 29-36 (2001) [hereinafter Manning, Equity of the Statute] (summarizing the origins and scope of the doctrine in English courts).
167. See generally Anthony J. Bellia Jr., State Courts and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 59 Vand. L. Rev. 1501, 1529-52 (2006) (analyzing the practices of state courts in interpreting federal statutes from 1789 to 1820).
168. John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 29-36 (2001) [hereinafter Manning, Equity of the Statute] (summarizing the origins and scope of the doctrine in English courts).
169. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533, 544 (1983) ("[Sometimes a] statute plainly hands courts the power to create and revise a form of common law.... ")
170. John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 29-36 (2001) [hereinafter Manning, Equity of the Statute] (summarizing the origins and scope of the doctrine in English courts).
171. John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 29-36 (2001) [hereinafter Manning, Equity of the Statute] (summarizing the origins and scope of the doctrine in English courts).
172. John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 29-36 (2001) [hereinafter Manning, Equity of the Statute] (summarizing the origins and scope of the doctrine in English courts).
173. Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1995).
174. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 321, 383 (1990) (arguing that statutory interpretation is "fundamentally similar to judicial lawmaking in the areas of constitutional law and common law")
175. Peter L. Strauss, The Common Law and Statutes, 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 225, 225-26 (1999) (arguing that a fundamental commitment to a system of precedent is incompatible with the view that courts' only legitimate role in statutory interpretation is to seek textual meaning, because the reality of any common law system means that any judicial determination regarding a statute will affect that statute's subsequent interpretation).
176. See, e.g., Martha A. Field, The Legitimacy of Federal Common Law, 12 Pace L. Rev. 303, 317 (1992) (rejecting the Supreme Court's stance that federal common law violates the separation of powers, and instead embracing the view that federal common law operates to effect congressional intent)
177. Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts, 12 Pace L. Rev. 263, 274-76 (1992) (criticizing the view that the text of the Constitution can be read to establish a strict separation of powers between the legislative and judicial branches)
178. Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 805, 838-42 (1989) (arguing that a narrow view of federal common law-which purports to respect principles of separation of powers-instead reflects an unrealistic assessment of the nature of the judicial process, legal realism, and the character of American federalism).
179. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312 (1981) (disavowing federal common law rule-making authority).
180. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 3, 13 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997)
181. See Robert P. Young, Jr., A Judicial Traditionalist Confronts Justice Brennan's School of Judicial Philosophy, 33 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 263, 268-69 (2008) (criticizing Judge Kaye's judicial philosophy, which views judges as having a "responsibility" to reshape society and to interpret statutes based on "perception[s] of the 'common good,'" as an "unfortunately... commonplace" notion).
182. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogenity: How to Read a Statute in a Lower Court, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 433, 433 (2012) (describing institutional differences between different courts in the appellate hierarchy and arguing that these differences "justify a heterogeneous regime in which courts at different levels of the judicial hierarchy use somewhat different interpretive methods")
183. Robert A. Schapiro, Contingency and Universalism in State Separation of Powers Discourse, 4 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 79, 107-08 (1998)
184. Robert A. Schapiro, Contingency and Universalism in State Separation of Powers Discourse, 4 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 79, 107-08 (1998)
185. John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 29-36 (2001) [hereinafter Manning, Equity of the Statute] (summarizing the origins and scope of the doctrine in English courts).
186. Originalists might suspect this inference to be anachronistic. Advocates for judicial elections argued that the process would be best suited to select competent and impartial judges. Early advocates and opponents of judicial elections often shared a pre-legal realist understanding of the judge as an apolitical oracle or technician. Caleb Nelson, A Re-Evaluation of Scholarly Explanations for the Rise of the Elective Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 Am. J. Legal Hist. 190, 210-13 (1993).
187. Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1995).
188. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogenity: How to Read a Statute in a Lower Court, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 433, 433 (2012) (describing institutional differences between different courts in the appellate hierarchy and arguing that these differences "justify a heterogeneous regime in which courts at different levels of the judicial hierarchy use somewhat different interpretive methods")
189. See Jerry Mashaw, As If Republican Interpretation, 97 Yale L.J. 1685, 1686 (1988) ("Any theory of statutory interpretation is at base a theory about constitutional law. ")
190. William Popkin is an early exception. Yet in both his general theorizing and his close study of a state court's opinions, his work assumes that state and federal cases are interchangeable for purposes of his theoretical analysis. See William D. Popkin, Statutory Interpretation in State Courts-A Study of Indiana Opinions, 24 Ind. L. Rev. 1155, 1158 (1991) (arguing that "[t]wo of the issues prominent in contemporary literature [on statutory interpretation] can be profitably explored in the context of state cases"). See generally William D. Popkin, Statutes in Court: The History and Theory of Statutory Interpretation (1999) (providing a historical analysis of the evolution of statutory interpretation at the state and federal levels). This may be true, but, as we will see later, not obviously so.
191. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 885, 886 (2003).
192. Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 74, 76 (2000) (coining the handy phrase: "interpretive choice"). One must also interpret the constitution to derive norms for interpreting statutes. The question of interpretive choice in the constitutional context is beyond the scope of this Article, but some argue that the method might differ in constitutional and statutory contexts.
193. Originalists might suspect this inference to be anachronistic. Advocates for judicial elections argued that the process would be best suited to select competent and impartial judges. Early advocates and opponents of judicial elections often shared a pre-legal realist understanding of the judge as an apolitical oracle or technician. Caleb Nelson, A Re-Evaluation of Scholarly Explanations for the Rise of the Elective Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 Am. J. Legal Hist. 190, 210-13 (1993).
194. Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 Sup. Ct. Rev. 231, 254-56 (supporting textual statutory interpretation methods on the basis that the plain meaning of the text provides some common ground upon which individuals with divergent interests and abilities can approach a problem).
195. Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 74, 76 (2000) (coining the handy phrase: "interpretive choice"). One must also interpret the constitution to derive norms for interpreting statutes. The question of interpretive choice in the constitutional context is beyond the scope of this Article, but some argue that the method might differ in constitutional and statutory contexts.
196. Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 74, 76 (2000) (coining the handy phrase: "interpretive choice"). One must also interpret the constitution to derive norms for interpreting statutes. The question of interpretive choice in the constitutional context is beyond the scope of this Article, but some argue that the method might differ in constitutional and statutory contexts.
197. Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 74, 76 (2000) (coining the handy phrase: "interpretive choice"). One must also interpret the constitution to derive norms for interpreting statutes. The question of interpretive choice in the constitutional context is beyond the scope of this Article, but some argue that the method might differ in constitutional and statutory contexts.
198. See Jeff A. King, Institutional Approaches to Judicial Restraint, 28 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 409, 422-23 (2008) (describing the theories of the members of the Legal Process School that involved institutional competences).
199. Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 74, 76 (2000) (coining the handy phrase: "interpretive choice"). One must also interpret the constitution to derive norms for interpreting statutes. The question of interpretive choice in the constitutional context is beyond the scope of this Article, but some argue that the method might differ in constitutional and statutory contexts.
200. Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 179, 189-90 (1986).
201. See Carlos E. González, Reinterpreting Statutory Interpretation, 74 N.C. L. Rev. 585, 608 (1996) (arguing that judges should imaginatively reconstruct legislative intent when the statute must be applied to situations the legislators did not foresee)
202. Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 179, 189-90 (1986).
203. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1479, 1479-80 (1987).
204. See G. Alan Tarr & Mary Cornelia Aldis Porter, State Supreme Courts in State and Nation 55 (1988) ("[O]ver 70 percent [of state judges] have held at least one nonjudicial political office prior to selection [as a judge], and most ha[ve] held two or more such offices. ")
205. Shirley S. Abrahamson & Robert L. Hughes, Shall We Dance? Steps for Legislators and Judges in Statutory Interpretation, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 1045, 1081-82, 1085 (1991) (observing that some state supreme courts offer advisory opinions, some state judges sit on law reform committees, and some informally lobby legislators)
206. Hans A. Linde, Observations of a State Court Judge, in Judges and Legislators: Toward Institutional Comity 117, 128 (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1988) (finding "no insurmountable legal obstacles to useful interaction between judges and legislators in the development of good policies" if there are "clear distinctions as to whether a judge speaks for the institutional concerns of the judicial branch, for the personal interests of judges as a group, or as an individual citizen").
207. Ellen A. Peters, Getting Away from the Federal Paradigm: Separation of Powers in State Courts, 81 Minn. L. Rev. 1543 (1997).
208. See Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes 54-56 (1982) (insisting that "inconsistent, unprincipled, or preferential treatment" in lawmaking should be respected so long as it represents the wishes of the current majorities or coalitions of minorities and is constitutional)
209. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 20, 61 (1988) (proposing a "nautical theory" that would "treat statutes as if they were enacted yesterday")
210. Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 2027, 2034 (2002) (supporting the proposition that judges should be constrained to maximize the extent to which statutory results accurately reflect the political preferences accepted in society).
211. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Nature of the Common Law 2-3 (1988).
212. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogenity: How to Read a Statute in a Lower Court, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 433, 433 (2012) (describing institutional differences between different courts in the appellate hierarchy and arguing that these differences "justify a heterogeneous regime in which courts at different levels of the judicial hierarchy use somewhat different interpretive methods")
213. For a discussion of reappointment as opposed to re-election in state courts, see Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Constitutionality of Federal Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation and the History of State Judicial Selection and Tenure, 98 Va. L. Rev. 839, 860-61 (2012) (discussing how, even in states where judges serve by appointment, "the vast majority [of high court judges] must also run in either a contested election or, more often, an uncontested public referendum in order to keep their jobs").
214. Cf. Stephen M. Johnson, Competition: The Next Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 18 Southeastern Envtl. L.J. 1, 36 (2009) (considering, in the context of administrative law, that it is better to rely on "case-by-case adjudications to develop... general agency rules" than through rule making).
215. Gerald J. Postema, Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part II), 3 Oxford U. Commonwealth L.J. 1, 3 (2003). The classical common lawyer would not agree that his discipline is a mere branch of legislation or applied philosophy.
216. Cf. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 128-36 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing the necessarily "open texture" of legislation).
217. D. Zachary Hudson, Comment, A Case for Varying Interpretive Deference at the State Level, 119 Yale L.J. 373, 374 (2009).
218. But see Ernest J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law 204, 206-08 (1995) (defending the autonomy of private law from public law)
219. John C.P. Goldberg, Introduction: Pragmatism and Private Law, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1640, 1661-62 (2012) (same).
220. John C.P. Goldberg, Introduction: Pragmatism and Private Law, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1640, 1661-62 (2012) (same).
221. Robert A. Schapiro, Contingency and Universalism in State Separation of Powers Discourse, 4 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 79, 107-08 (1998)
222. Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the "Passive Virtues": Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 1833, 1844-75 (2001) (explaining that, unlike federal courts, state courts can issue advisory opinions, adjudicate "political questions, " and review administrative agency decisions)
223. Hans A. Linde, Observations of a State Court Judge, in Judges and Legislators: Toward Institutional Comity 117, 128 (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1988) (finding "no insurmountable legal obstacles to useful interaction between judges and legislators in the development of good policies" if there are "clear distinctions as to whether a judge speaks for the institutional concerns of the judicial branch, for the personal interests of judges as a group, or as an individual citizen").
224. See G. Alan Tarr & Mary Cornelia Aldis Porter, State Supreme Courts in State and Nation 55 (1988) ("[O]ver 70 percent [of state judges] have held at least one nonjudicial political office prior to selection [as a judge], and most ha[ve] held two or more such offices. ")
225. See G. Alan Tarr & Mary Cornelia Aldis Porter, State Supreme Courts in State and Nation 55 (1988) ("[O]ver 70 percent [of state judges] have held at least one nonjudicial political office prior to selection [as a judge], and most ha[ve] held two or more such offices. ")
226. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogenity: How to Read a Statute in a Lower Court, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 433, 433 (2012) (describing institutional differences between different courts in the appellate hierarchy and arguing that these differences "justify a heterogeneous regime in which courts at different levels of the judicial hierarchy use somewhat different interpretive methods")
227. D. Zachary Hudson, Comment, A Case for Varying Interpretive Deference at the State Level, 119 Yale L.J. 373, 374 (2009).
228. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) ("The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created... program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly, or explicitly, by Congress. " (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)
229. Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 74, 76 (2000) (coining the handy phrase: "interpretive choice"). One must also interpret the constitution to derive norms for interpreting statutes. The question of interpretive choice in the constitutional context is beyond the scope of this Article, but some argue that the method might differ in constitutional and statutory contexts.
230. Cass R. Sunstein, Is Tobacco a Drug? Administrative Agencies as Common Law Courts, 47 Duke L.J. 1013, 1019 (1998).
231. D. Zachary Hudson, Comment, A Case for Varying Interpretive Deference at the State Level, 119 Yale L.J. 373, 374 (2009).
232. Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 74, 76 (2000) (coining the handy phrase: "interpretive choice"). One must also interpret the constitution to derive norms for interpreting statutes. The question of interpretive choice in the constitutional context is beyond the scope of this Article, but some argue that the method might differ in constitutional and statutory contexts.
233. Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 74, 76 (2000) (coining the handy phrase: "interpretive choice"). One must also interpret the constitution to derive norms for interpreting statutes. The question of interpretive choice in the constitutional context is beyond the scope of this Article, but some argue that the method might differ in constitutional and statutory contexts.
234. Like the affirmative case, the skeptical case in this subpart assumes that common law adjudication is a form of positive lawmaking-a position that finds support on both sides of the purposivist-textualist divide. See Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1245, 1247-49 (1996) (noting that federal courts engage in "interstitial 'lawmaking'" as part of the process of interpreting statutes and make positive law when they create federal common law rules)
235. Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1995).
236. See generally Anthony J. Bellia Jr., State Courts and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 59 Vand. L. Rev. 1501, 1529-52 (2006) (analyzing the practices of state courts in interpreting federal statutes from 1789 to 1820).
237. For a fascinating discussion on this, see Michael Steven Green, Erie's Suppressed Premise, 95 Minn. L. Rev. 1111, 1126-27 & nn.88-90 (2011).
238. Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 731, 732 (2010).
239. Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1995).
240. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1753 (2010) [hereinafter Gluck, Laboratories] ("The vast majority of statutory interpretation theory is based on a strikingly small slice of American jurisprudence, the mere two percent of litigation that takes place in federal courts-and, really, only the less-than-one percent of that litigation that the U.S. Supreme Court decides. ").
241. This objection also applies to theories that ascribe to federal courts similar common law powers. See Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Substance of the New Legal Process, 77 Calif. L. Rev. 919, 939 (1989) (reviewing William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Cases and Materials on Legislation: Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy (1988) ("Nothing in Eskridge's theory explains the disjunction between using purely positivistic approaches to interpretation in the easy cases-where a recently-enacted statute speaks plainly and no strong policy choices counsel another result-and nonpositivistic approaches in other situations. ")
242. Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 731, 732 (2010).
243. Mass. Const. pt. 2, ch. 3.
244. See G. Alan Tarr & Mary Cornelia Aldis Porter, State Supreme Courts in State and Nation 55 (1988) ("[O]ver 70 percent [of state judges] have held at least one nonjudicial political office prior to selection [as a judge], and most ha[ve] held two or more such offices. ")
245. John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 29-36 (2001) [hereinafter Manning, Equity of the Statute] (summarizing the origins and scope of the doctrine in English courts).
246. John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 29-36 (2001) [hereinafter Manning, Equity of the Statute] (summarizing the origins and scope of the doctrine in English courts).
247. John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 29-36 (2001) [hereinafter Manning, Equity of the Statute] (summarizing the origins and scope of the doctrine in English courts).
248. All states except Nebraska have a two-chambered legislature and all states have an executive veto.
249. See Amended State Constitutional Provisions Regarding Reductions to Judicial Salaries (January 2009), NCSC, http://www.ncsconline.org/d_kis/salary_survey/provisions.asp (reporting that twenty-nine states clearly prohibit reductions in judicial salaries and that another five states permit reductions only if applicable to all public officers).
250. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10.
251. Robert A. Schapiro, Contingency and Universalism in State Separation of Powers Discourse, 4 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 79, 107-08 (1998)
252. Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 1167, 1238-40 (1999)
253. Robert A. Schapiro, Contingency and Universalism in State Separation of Powers Discourse, 4 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 79, 107-08 (1998)
254. See G. Alan Tarr & Mary Cornelia Aldis Porter, State Supreme Courts in State and Nation 55 (1988) ("[O]ver 70 percent [of state judges] have held at least one nonjudicial political office prior to selection [as a judge], and most ha[ve] held two or more such offices. ")
255. Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 1167, 1238-40 (1999)
256. See G. Alan Tarr & Mary Cornelia Aldis Porter, State Supreme Courts in State and Nation 55 (1988) ("[O]ver 70 percent [of state judges] have held at least one nonjudicial political office prior to selection [as a judge], and most ha[ve] held two or more such offices. ")
257. John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 29-36 (2001) [hereinafter Manning, Equity of the Statute] (summarizing the origins and scope of the doctrine in English courts).
258. Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 1167, 1238-40 (1999)
259. Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 1167, 1238-40 (1999)
260. All states have a gubernatorial veto of some kind, and every state except Nebraska has two legislative chambers that must approve legislation.
261. Robert A. Schapiro, Contingency and Universalism in State Separation of Powers Discourse, 4 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 79, 107-08 (1998)
262. See G. Alan Tarr & Mary Cornelia Aldis Porter, State Supreme Courts in State and Nation 55 (1988) ("[O]ver 70 percent [of state judges] have held at least one nonjudicial political office prior to selection [as a judge], and most ha[ve] held two or more such offices. ")
263. See G. Alan Tarr & Mary Cornelia Aldis Porter, State Supreme Courts in State and Nation 55 (1988) ("[O]ver 70 percent [of state judges] have held at least one nonjudicial political office prior to selection [as a judge], and most ha[ve] held two or more such offices. ")
264. John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 29-36 (2001) [hereinafter Manning, Equity of the Statute] (summarizing the origins and scope of the doctrine in English courts).
265. John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 29-36 (2001) [hereinafter Manning, Equity of the Statute] (summarizing the origins and scope of the doctrine in English courts).
266. John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 29-36 (2001) [hereinafter Manning, Equity of the Statute] (summarizing the origins and scope of the doctrine in English courts).
267. See G. Alan Tarr & Mary Cornelia Aldis Porter, State Supreme Courts in State and Nation 55 (1988) ("[O]ver 70 percent [of state judges] have held at least one nonjudicial political office prior to selection [as a judge], and most ha[ve] held two or more such offices. ")
268. See G. Alan Tarr & Mary Cornelia Aldis Porter, State Supreme Courts in State and Nation 55 (1988) ("[O]ver 70 percent [of state judges] have held at least one nonjudicial political office prior to selection [as a judge], and most ha[ve] held two or more such offices. ")
269. See G. Alan Tarr & Mary Cornelia Aldis Porter, State Supreme Courts in State and Nation 55 (1988) ("[O]ver 70 percent [of state judges] have held at least one nonjudicial political office prior to selection [as a judge], and most ha[ve] held two or more such offices. ")
270. See Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Reason and Reasonableness in Review of Agency Decisions, 104 Nw. U. L. Rev. 799, 836-37 (2010) (discussing agencies' comparative competence in fact gathering and policy making).
271. See Walter F. Murphy & Joseph Tanenhaus, The Study of Public Law 65-66 (1972) (stating that courts are "usually passive instruments of government" lacking a "self-starter" and that "[n]ormally, someone outside of the judicial system has to bring a suit or invoke a set of special circumstances to transform judicial power from a potential to a kinetic state").
272. See Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 883, 884 (2006) (arguing that, if he or she only focuses on the facts of the case at hand, a judge may produce a suboptimal rule for later cases if the case at hand is not representative "of the full array of events that the ensuing rule or principle will encompass").
273. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, in The Principles of Social Order: Selected Essays of Lon L. Fuller 86, 111-21 (Kenneth I. Winston ed., 1981) (explaining why "polycentric" problems are frequently unsuited to solution by adjudication).
274. Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 34-35 (1985) (discussing how the Supreme Court has sometimes ignored evidence of specific intention when construing vague statutory or constitutional provisions)
275. For an encomium to the superiority of rule making, see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise § 6.8 (5th ed. 2010).
276. From this perspective, barriers to action facing state legislatures may still leave state court updating a second-best option. Cf. Paul R. Verkuil, Rulemaking Ossification-A Modest Proposal, 47 Admin. L. Rev. 453, 453 (1995) (bemoaning procedural obstacles to administrative rule making).
277. John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 29-36 (2001) [hereinafter Manning, Equity of the Statute] (summarizing the origins and scope of the doctrine in English courts).
278. John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 29-36 (2001) [hereinafter Manning, Equity of the Statute] (summarizing the origins and scope of the doctrine in English courts).
279. Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Determinacy, Objectivity, and Authority, in Law and Interpretation: Essays in Legal Philosophy, at 203.
280. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593 (1958)
281. Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 630 (1958).
282. Cf. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 128-36 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing the necessarily "open texture" of legislation).
283. Cf. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 128-36 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing the necessarily "open texture" of legislation).
284. See, e.g., Mtley Crüe, Kickstart My Heart, on Dr. Feelgood (Elektra 1989) (exemplifying the genre).
285. Cf. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 128-36 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing the necessarily "open texture" of legislation).
286. Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality 194-97 (1979) (explaining that legislators often pass "deliberately underdetermined rules" because they prefer to let the courts exercise discretion in filling in the gaps within the limits of a core general framework and giving rules referring to reasonableness, fairness, and just cause as examples).
287. Cf. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 128-36 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing the necessarily "open texture" of legislation).
288. Cf. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 128-36 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing the necessarily "open texture" of legislation).
289. Cf. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 128-36 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing the necessarily "open texture" of legislation).
290. Cf. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 128-36 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing the necessarily "open texture" of legislation).
291. The cognate form of originalist textualism in constitutional interpretation relies on a similar distinction. See generally Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 Const. Comment. 95, 95-96 (2010) (distinguishing "interpretation" of the original and public semantic meaning of constitutional text from "construction" of the text when its meaning is underdetermined).
292. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 609, 618 (1990) ("[I]nterpreter and text are indissolubly linked as a matter of being.
293. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 321, 383 (1990) (arguing that statutory interpretation is "fundamentally similar to judicial lawmaking in the areas of constitutional law and common law")
294. See generally Brian Bix, Robert Alexy, Radbruch's Formula and the Nature of Legal Theory, 37 Rechtstheorie 139 (2006).
295. See Larry Alexander, All or Nothing at All? The Intentions of Authorities and the Authority of Intentions, in Law and Interpretation: Essays in Legal Philosophy, at 357, 359-63 (explaining that "texts mean what their authors intend them to mean" and, therefore, when interpreting a text, a judge changes a text when he diverts from the author's intentions).
296. Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Legislative Intentions, Legislative Supremacy, and Legal Positivism, 42 San Diego L. Rev. 493, 518 (2005) (condemning natural law theories of judicial decision making on the basis that they lead to the usurpation of legislative supremacy).
297. John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 29-36 (2001) [hereinafter Manning, Equity of the Statute] (summarizing the origins and scope of the doctrine in English courts).
298. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1185 (1989) ("But when [a court] does not have a solid textual anchor or an established social norm from which to derive the general rule, its pronouncement appears uncomfortably like legislation. ").
299. See, e.g., Scott J. Shapiro, Legality 252-54 (2011) (describing critics of textualism's linkage of the theory to legal positivism)
300. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1185 (1989) ("But when [a court] does not have a solid textual anchor or an established social norm from which to derive the general rule, its pronouncement appears uncomfortably like legislation. ").
301. Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 15-23 (1986).
302. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1185 (1989) ("But when [a court] does not have a solid textual anchor or an established social norm from which to derive the general rule, its pronouncement appears uncomfortably like legislation. ").
303. Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 277, 286-88 (1985) (propounding a natural law theory of adjudication as opposed to one rooted in legal positivism)
304. Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Legislative Intentions, Legislative Supremacy, and Legal Positivism, 42 San Diego L. Rev. 493, 518 (2005) (condemning natural law theories of judicial decision making on the basis that they lead to the usurpation of legislative supremacy).
305. Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 15-23 (1986).
306. Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 15-23 (1986).
307. 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889).
308. 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889).
309. Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 15-23 (1986).
310. Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 15-23 (1986).
311. Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 15-23 (1986).
312. See Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin, Demystifying Legal Reasoning 25-26 (2008) (courts either "reason deductively from rules posited by others.
313. See Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Reason and Reasonableness in Review of Agency Decisions, 104 Nw. U. L. Rev. 799, 836-37 (2010) (discussing agencies' comparative competence in fact gathering and policy making).
314. A.W.B. Simpson, The Common Law and Legal Theory, in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence: Second Series 77, 89 (1973) (describing and criticizing this as the "school-rules" model of common law).
315. Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality 194-97 (1979) (explaining that legislators often pass "deliberately underdetermined rules" because they prefer to let the courts exercise discretion in filling in the gaps within the limits of a core general framework and giving rules referring to reasonableness, fairness, and just cause as examples).
316. See D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 468 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring) (explaining that federal common law "to put it bluntly, " allows the Court to "make our own law from materials found in common-law sources")
317. Like the affirmative case, the skeptical case in this subpart assumes that common law adjudication is a form of positive lawmaking-a position that finds support on both sides of the purposivist-textualist divide. See Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1245, 1247-49 (1996) (noting that federal courts engage in "interstitial 'lawmaking'" as part of the process of interpreting statutes and make positive law when they create federal common law rules)
318. Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts, 12 Pace L. Rev. 263, 274-76 (1992) (criticizing the view that the text of the Constitution can be read to establish a strict separation of powers between the legislative and judicial branches)
319. Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1995).
320. Roger J. Traynor, Reasoning in a Circle of Law, 56 Va. L. Rev. 739, 751 (1970) [hereinafter Traynor, Reasoning in a Circle] (characterizing judging as "the recurring choice of one policy over another" in the formulation of new rules).
321. Cf. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 128-36 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing the necessarily "open texture" of legislation).
322. Originalists might suspect this inference to be anachronistic. Advocates for judicial elections argued that the process would be best suited to select competent and impartial judges. Early advocates and opponents of judicial elections often shared a pre-legal realist understanding of the judge as an apolitical oracle or technician. Caleb Nelson, A Re-Evaluation of Scholarly Explanations for the Rise of the Elective Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 Am. J. Legal Hist. 190, 210-13 (1993).
323. See Larry Alexander, All or Nothing at All? The Intentions of Authorities and the Authority of Intentions, in Law and Interpretation: Essays in Legal Philosophy, at 357, 359-63 (explaining that "texts mean what their authors intend them to mean" and, therefore, when interpreting a text, a judge changes a text when he diverts from the author's intentions).
324. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 321, 383 (1990) (arguing that statutory interpretation is "fundamentally similar to judicial lawmaking in the areas of constitutional law and common law")
325. Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 15-23 (1986).
326. Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 15-23 (1986).
327. See Gerald J. Postema, Philosophy of the Common Law, in The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law 588, 596 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002) ("Classical common law jurisprudence resolutely resisted the theoretical pressure to identify law with canonically formulated, discrete rules of law. ").
328. Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 15-23 (1986).
329. Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Legislative Intentions, Legislative Supremacy, and Legal Positivism, 42 San Diego L. Rev. 493, 518 (2005) (condemning natural law theories of judicial decision making on the basis that they lead to the usurpation of legislative supremacy).
330. See Heydon's Case, (1584) 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (K.B.) 638, 3 Co. Rep. 7a, 7b (announcing that statutes shall be interpreted in light of the mischief they sought to remedy)
331. Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 15-23 (1986).
332. See James McCauley Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in Harvard Legal Essays 213, 215 (1934) (discussing judges' use of the doctrine of equity to conform statutes to generally recognized aims of the law)
333. Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 Colum. L. Rev. 605, 614 (1908) (acknowledging that common law has failed to properly address certain modern issues and should draw on legislation for fresh principles of growth)
334. Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 12-14 (1936) (describing the treatment of statutes as sources of law which judicial decisions can extend).
335. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 321, 383 (1990) (arguing that statutory interpretation is "fundamentally similar to judicial lawmaking in the areas of constitutional law and common law")
336. Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1995).
337. Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1995).
338. Roger J. Traynor, Reasoning in a Circle of Law, 56 Va. L. Rev. 739, 751 (1970) [hereinafter Traynor, Reasoning in a Circle] (characterizing judging as "the recurring choice of one policy over another" in the formulation of new rules).
339. Robert A. Schapiro, Contingency and Universalism in State Separation of Powers Discourse, 4 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 79, 107-08 (1998)
340. Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 15-23 (1986).
341. John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 29-36 (2001) [hereinafter Manning, Equity of the Statute] (summarizing the origins and scope of the doctrine in English courts).
342. For an example of a textualist identifying and providing an originalist justification for federal courts' inherent powers to craft procedural common law, see generally Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common Law, 94 Va. L. Rev. 813 (2008).
343. Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, In the Shadow of the Legislature: The Common Law in the Age of the New Public Law, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 875, 875 (1991) (exploring how modern common law judges, in light of the role of statutes as the primary source of law, should view their role in relationship to the legislature).
344. Roger J. Traynor, Reasoning in a Circle of Law, 56 Va. L. Rev. 739, 751 (1970) [hereinafter Traynor, Reasoning in a Circle] (characterizing judging as "the recurring choice of one policy over another" in the formulation of new rules).
345. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533, 544 (1983) ("[Sometimes a] statute plainly hands courts the power to create and revise a form of common law.... ")
346. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533, 544 (1983) ("[Sometimes a] statute plainly hands courts the power to create and revise a form of common law.... ")
347. For example, statutory language indicating a legislative remedy was exclusive would prohibit extension, and due process notice norms would likely prohibit the purposive extension of criminal statutes.
348. Robert A. Schapiro, Contingency and Universalism in State Separation of Powers Discourse, 4 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 79, 107-08 (1998)
349. See G. Alan Tarr & Mary Cornelia Aldis Porter, State Supreme Courts in State and Nation 55 (1988) ("[O]ver 70 percent [of state judges] have held at least one nonjudicial political office prior to selection [as a judge], and most ha[ve] held two or more such offices. ")
350. Hans W. Baade, The Casus Omissus: A Pre-History of Statutory Analogy, 20 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. 45, 46 (1994) (summarizing the history and development of the differing views of the casus omissus in civil law and common law systems).
351. See P.S. Atiyah, Common Law and Statute Law, 48 Mod. L. Rev. 1, 12 (1985) (noting that courts tend to view the legislative reversal of judicial decisions as "not affecting the underlying principles of those decisions").
352. See D.C. Pearce & R.S. Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia 24-30 (5th ed. 2001) (discussing codified methodology).
353. See D.C. Pearce & R.S. Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia 24-30 (5th ed. 2001) (discussing codified methodology).
354. See P.S. Atiyah, Common Law and Statute Law, 48 Mod. L. Rev. 1, 12 (1985) (noting that courts tend to view the legislative reversal of judicial decisions as "not affecting the underlying principles of those decisions").
355. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1185 (1989) ("But when [a court] does not have a solid textual anchor or an established social norm from which to derive the general rule, its pronouncement appears uncomfortably like legislation. ").
356. This is not to say such statutes completely displace the common law. For example, even complex regulatory regimes governing power rates will require courts to repair to common law principles governing contracts. See Nat'l Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 811 F.2d 1563, 1569 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (giving deference to the agency's interpretation of a contract when the issue is the simple construction of language)
357. See Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Reason and Reasonableness in Review of Agency Decisions, 104 Nw. U. L. Rev. 799, 836-37 (2010) (discussing agencies' comparative competence in fact gathering and policy making).
358. One may argue extension is less risky as a matter of policy because the legislature has chosen to act and selected the policy vehicle that the court applies elsewhere. That argument falsely presumes that using a good tool more often will lead to better solutions. More pulleying will not get the job done when you need a block and tackle.
359. See, e.g., Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023 (West 2004) (instructing courts to engage in purposive interpretation of unambiguous statutes)
360. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1753 (2010) [hereinafter Gluck, Laboratories] ("The vast majority of statutory interpretation theory is based on a strikingly small slice of American jurisprudence, the mere two percent of litigation that takes place in federal courts-and, really, only the less-than-one percent of that litigation that the U.S. Supreme Court decides. ").
361. John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 29-36 (2001) [hereinafter Manning, Equity of the Statute] (summarizing the origins and scope of the doctrine in English courts).
362. John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 29-36 (2001) [hereinafter Manning, Equity of the Statute] (summarizing the origins and scope of the doctrine in English courts).
363. Roger J. Traynor, Reasoning in a Circle of Law, 56 Va. L. Rev. 739, 751 (1970) [hereinafter Traynor, Reasoning in a Circle] (characterizing judging as "the recurring choice of one policy over another" in the formulation of new rules).
364. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1753 (2010) [hereinafter Gluck, Laboratories] ("The vast majority of statutory interpretation theory is based on a strikingly small slice of American jurisprudence, the mere two percent of litigation that takes place in federal courts-and, really, only the less-than-one percent of that litigation that the U.S. Supreme Court decides. ").
365. See Larry Alexander, All or Nothing at All? The Intentions of Authorities and the Authority of Intentions, in Law and Interpretation: Essays in Legal Philosophy, at 357, 359-63 (explaining that "texts mean what their authors intend them to mean" and, therefore, when interpreting a text, a judge changes a text when he diverts from the author's intentions).
366. Perhaps the danger of infelicitously labeling an activity "interpretation" is to load the rhetorical dice in favor of legitimacy. Judges are on safer ground if they are "interpreting" statutes than when they are making law or consulting the brooding omnipresence.
367. To believe this, one need not hold that common law is strictly analogous to legislation. See John Gardner, Some Types of Law, in Common Law Theory, at 51, 67-71 (arguing that although case law constitutes positive law, it differs from legislation because it is not expressly made and is the work of an individual agent, not an institutionalized group).
368. See, e.g., Brennan v Comcare (1994) 50 FCR 555, 572 (Austl.) ("The judicial technique involved in constructing a statutory text is different from that required in applying previous decisions expounding the common law. ").
369. See generally Anthony J. Bellia Jr., State Courts and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 59 Vand. L. Rev. 1501, 1529-52 (2006) (analyzing the practices of state courts in interpreting federal statutes from 1789 to 1820).
370. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1753 (2010) [hereinafter Gluck, Laboratories] ("The vast majority of statutory interpretation theory is based on a strikingly small slice of American jurisprudence, the mere two percent of litigation that takes place in federal courts-and, really, only the less-than-one percent of that litigation that the U.S. Supreme Court decides. ").
371. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1753 (2010) [hereinafter Gluck, Laboratories] ("The vast majority of statutory interpretation theory is based on a strikingly small slice of American jurisprudence, the mere two percent of litigation that takes place in federal courts-and, really, only the less-than-one percent of that litigation that the U.S. Supreme Court decides. ").
372. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1753 (2010) [hereinafter Gluck, Laboratories] ("The vast majority of statutory interpretation theory is based on a strikingly small slice of American jurisprudence, the mere two percent of litigation that takes place in federal courts-and, really, only the less-than-one percent of that litigation that the U.S. Supreme Court decides. ").
373. 859 P.2d 1143, 1146-47 (Or. 1993)
374. Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation Methodology as "Law": Oregon's Path-Breaking Interpretive Framework and Its Lesson for the Nation, 47 Willamette L. Rev. 539, 540-41 (2011) (explaining the significance of the new test).
375. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1753 (2010) [hereinafter Gluck, Laboratories] ("The vast majority of statutory interpretation theory is based on a strikingly small slice of American jurisprudence, the mere two percent of litigation that takes place in federal courts-and, really, only the less-than-one percent of that litigation that the U.S. Supreme Court decides. ").
376. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1753 (2010) [hereinafter Gluck, Laboratories] ("The vast majority of statutory interpretation theory is based on a strikingly small slice of American jurisprudence, the mere two percent of litigation that takes place in federal courts-and, really, only the less-than-one percent of that litigation that the U.S. Supreme Court decides. ").
377. 921 P.2d 1312 (Or. 1996).
378. 921 P.2d 1312 (Or. 1996).
379. 921 P.2d 1312 (Or. 1996).
380. See Larry Alexander, All or Nothing at All? The Intentions of Authorities and the Authority of Intentions, in Law and Interpretation: Essays in Legal Philosophy, at 357, 359-63 (explaining that "texts mean what their authors intend them to mean" and, therefore, when interpreting a text, a judge changes a text when he diverts from the author's intentions).
381. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533, 544 (1983) ("[Sometimes a] statute plainly hands courts the power to create and revise a form of common law.... ")
382. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533, 544 (1983) ("[Sometimes a] statute plainly hands courts the power to create and revise a form of common law.... ")
383. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533, 544 (1983) ("[Sometimes a] statute plainly hands courts the power to create and revise a form of common law.... ")
384. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533, 544 (1983) ("[Sometimes a] statute plainly hands courts the power to create and revise a form of common law.... ")
385. This worry is not new. See Charles L.B. Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation, 16 Minn. L. Rev. 361, 364 (1932) ("[I]t savors of absurdity to impute to the legislature an intention to create a civil liability, where it has manifested no intention of creating a civil remedy. ").
386. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. for Physical & Emotional Harm § 14 cmt. b (2010).
387. Susan J. Stabile, The Role of Congressional Intent in Determining the Existence of Implied Private Rights of Action, 71 Notre Dame L. Rev. 861, 865 n.19 (1996) ("Although... negligence per se... is not the same as an implied cause of action... the two claims get the plaintiff to the same place. ").
388. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. for Physical & Emotional Harm § 14, § 14 cmt. f (2010).
389. See Heydon's Case, (1584) 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (K.B.) 638, 3 Co. Rep. 7a, 7b (announcing the mischief rule).
390. See, e.g., Staffordshire Invs., Inc. v. Cal-Western Reconveyance Corp., 149 P.3d 150, 156-57 (Or. Ct. App. 2006) (applying the PGE approach in the illegal contract context).
391. See, e.g., Staffordshire Invs., Inc. v. Cal-Western Reconveyance Corp., 149 P.3d 150, 156-57 (Or. Ct. App. 2006) (applying the PGE approach in the illegal contract context).
392. See, e.g., Staffordshire Invs., Inc. v. Cal-Western Reconveyance Corp., 149 P.3d 150, 156-57 (Or. Ct. App. 2006) (applying the PGE approach in the illegal contract context).
393. See Caroline Forell, Statutory Torts, Statutory Duty Actions, and Negligence Per Se: What's the Difference?, 77 Or. L. Rev. 497, 514-15 (1998) (criticizing Scovill for failing to acknowledge that the court, not the legislature, created the tort action)
394. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1916) (citing 1 Comyn's Digest tit. (F) (allowing a private damages suit for a violation of the federal act "according to a doctrine of the common law.... Ubi jus ibi remedium")
395. Harvey S. Perlman, Thoughts on the Role of Legislation in Tort Cases, 36 Willamette L. Rev. 813, 834 (2000) ("The early common-law rule that every right deserves a remedy was not based on a finding of legislative intent.
396. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533, 544 (1983) ("[Sometimes a] statute plainly hands courts the power to create and revise a form of common law.... ")
397. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1753 (2010) [hereinafter Gluck, Laboratories] ("The vast majority of statutory interpretation theory is based on a strikingly small slice of American jurisprudence, the mere two percent of litigation that takes place in federal courts-and, really, only the less-than-one percent of that litigation that the U.S. Supreme Court decides. ").
398. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogenity: How to Read a Statute in a Lower Court, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 433, 433 (2012) (describing institutional differences between different courts in the appellate hierarchy and arguing that these differences "justify a heterogeneous regime in which courts at different levels of the judicial hierarchy use somewhat different interpretive methods")
399. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogenity: How to Read a Statute in a Lower Court, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 433, 433 (2012) (describing institutional differences between different courts in the appellate hierarchy and arguing that these differences "justify a heterogeneous regime in which courts at different levels of the judicial hierarchy use somewhat different interpretive methods")
400. But see Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, §§ 3, 8 (U.K.) (providing a judicial remedy for violations of the European Convention of Human Rights and requiring judges to interpret statutes, to the extent possible, to be compatible with the convention).
401. For a helpful overview of current debates on common law constitutionalism in the United Kingdom, see Thomas Poole, Back to the Future? Unearthing the Theory of Common Law Constitutionalism, 23 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 435 (2003).
402. Hans W. Baade, The Casus Omissus: A Pre-History of Statutory Analogy, 20 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. 45, 46 (1994) (summarizing the history and development of the differing views of the casus omissus in civil law and common law systems).
403. See, e.g., T.R.S. Allan, Text, Context, and Constitution: The Common Law as Public Reason, in Common Law Theory, at 190 ("The better attainment of the statute's general purposes is a good reason for its extension to the doubtful case. ").
404. See James Crawford & Brian Opeskin, Australian Courts of Law 196-97 (4th ed. 1996) (detailing the Australian High Court's functions as a final appellate court).
405. See, e.g., Elaine Thompson, The Constitution and the Australian System of Limited Government, Responsible Government and Representative Democracy: Revisiting the Washminster Mutation, 24 U. New S. Wales L.J. 657, 657-58 (2001) (outlining the structure of the Australian government).
406. Robert A. Schapiro, Contingency and Universalism in State Separation of Powers Discourse, 4 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 79, 107-08 (1998)
407. See Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15AA (Austl.) (giving preference to interpretations that "best achieve the purpose or object of the Act")
408. See Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15AA (Austl.) (giving preference to interpretations that "best achieve the purpose or object of the Act")
409. See D.C. Pearce & R.S. Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia 24-30 (5th ed. 2001) (discussing codified methodology).
410. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1753 (2010) [hereinafter Gluck, Laboratories] ("The vast majority of statutory interpretation theory is based on a strikingly small slice of American jurisprudence, the mere two percent of litigation that takes place in federal courts-and, really, only the less-than-one percent of that litigation that the U.S. Supreme Court decides. ").
411. See, e.g., Brennan v Comcare (1994) 122 ALR 555, 572 (Austl.) (analyzing the differences between interpreting statutes and common law precedents).
412. See Larry Alexander, All or Nothing at All? The Intentions of Authorities and the Authority of Intentions, in Law and Interpretation: Essays in Legal Philosophy, at 357, 359-63 (explaining that "texts mean what their authors intend them to mean" and, therefore, when interpreting a text, a judge changes a text when he diverts from the author's intentions).
413. See H. Miles Foy, III, Some Reflections on Legislation, Adjudication, and Implied Private Actions in the State and Federal Courts, 71 Cornell L. Rev. 501, 548 (1986) (stating that "[t]he plaintiff was entitled to an adequate remedy for legal wrongs, including wrongs defined by legislation").
414. See H. Miles Foy, III, Some Reflections on Legislation, Adjudication, and Implied Private Actions in the State and Federal Courts, 71 Cornell L. Rev. 501, 548 (1986) (stating that "[t]he plaintiff was entitled to an adequate remedy for legal wrongs, including wrongs defined by legislation").
415. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 426 (1964) ("Federal courts will provide the remedies required to carry out the congressional purpose of protecting federal rights. ").
416. See, e.g., Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1916) (allowing for a private right of action because it was clearly implied in the context of the intended legislative scheme).
417. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 287 ("'Raising up causes of action where a statute has not created them may be a proper function for common-law courts, but not for federal tribunals.'" (citation omitted).
418. Originalists might suspect this inference to be anachronistic. Advocates for judicial elections argued that the process would be best suited to select competent and impartial judges. Early advocates and opponents of judicial elections often shared a pre-legal realist understanding of the judge as an apolitical oracle or technician. Caleb Nelson, A Re-Evaluation of Scholarly Explanations for the Rise of the Elective Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 Am. J. Legal Hist. 190, 210-13 (1993).
419. Robert A. Schapiro, Contingency and Universalism in State Separation of Powers Discourse, 4 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 79, 107-08 (1998)
420. See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 424-25 (2003) (invoking the doctrine of "obstacle" preemption to override state law which frustrates, but does not formally conflict with, federal law or policy)
421. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990) (discussing the doctrine of field preemption).
422. For a fascinating discussion on this, see Michael Steven Green, Erie's Suppressed Premise, 95 Minn. L. Rev. 1111, 1126-27 & nn.88-90 (2011).
423. Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 179, 189-90 (1986).
424. Fleming James, Jr., Tort Law in Midstream: Its Challenge to the Judicial Process, 8 Buff. L. Rev. 315, 334-37 (1959) (encouraging tort doctrine to spread the cost of accidents through enterprise liability).
425. Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 74, 76 (2000) (coining the handy phrase: "interpretive choice"). One must also interpret the constitution to derive norms for interpreting statutes. The question of interpretive choice in the constitutional context is beyond the scope of this Article, but some argue that the method might differ in constitutional and statutory contexts.
426. But see Ernest J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law 204, 206-08 (1995) (defending the autonomy of private law from public law)
427. Andrew S. Gold, A Moral Rights Theory of Private Law, 52 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1873, 1873-74 (2011) (arguing that private law is best understood as a means for individuals to exercise their moral enforcement rights)
428. John C.P. Goldberg, Introduction: Pragmatism and Private Law, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1640, 1661 (2012) (rejecting the theory that the norms of private law reduce to norms of public law).
429. Roger J. Traynor, Reasoning in a Circle of Law, 56 Va. L. Rev. 739, 751 (1970) [hereinafter Traynor, Reasoning in a Circle] (characterizing judging as "the recurring choice of one policy over another" in the formulation of new rules).
430. Robert E. Keeton, Statutes, Gaps, and Values in Tort Law, 44 J. Air L. & Com. 1, 19 (1978) (arguing for policy-oriented interpretation of statutes intersecting with tort law).
431. Professor Zipursky, however, recently has demonstrated how non-instrumental private law theory can shed light on public law questions concerning constitutional limits on punitive damages and federal preemption of state law. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Palsgraf, Punitive Damages, and Preemption, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1757 (2012).
432. Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 34-35 (1985) (discussing how the Supreme Court has sometimes ignored evidence of specific intention when construing vague statutory or constitutional provisions)
433. Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretive Process: An "Institutionalist" Perspective, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 761, 768-69 (1989) (critiquing judicial policy choices where a legislature has already indicated its own choice on the same subject).
434. See, e.g., Martha A. Field, The Legitimacy of Federal Common Law, 12 Pace L. Rev. 303, 317 (1992) (rejecting the Supreme Court's stance that federal common law violates the separation of powers, and instead embracing the view that federal common law operates to effect congressional intent)
435. Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 805, 838-42 (1989) (arguing that a narrow view of federal common law-which purports to respect principles of separation of powers-instead reflects an unrealistic assessment of the nature of the judicial process, legal realism, and the character of American federalism).
436. See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) (holding that in such cases, it "is for the federal courts to fashion the governing rule of law according to their own standards" in the absence of statutes).
437. For salutary exceptions, see Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 317, 318 (2005) (arguing that inferior courts have no sound basis for applying the Supreme Court's doctrine of statutory stare decisis)
438. For salutary exceptions, see Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 317, 318 (2005) (arguing that inferior courts have no sound basis for applying the Supreme Court's doctrine of statutory stare decisis)
439. For salutary exceptions, see Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 317, 318 (2005) (arguing that inferior courts have no sound basis for applying the Supreme Court's doctrine of statutory stare decisis)
440. For salutary exceptions, see Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 317, 318 (2005) (arguing that inferior courts have no sound basis for applying the Supreme Court's doctrine of statutory stare decisis)
441. Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 179, 189-90 (1986).
442. Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 179, 189-90 (1986).
443. Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 179, 189-90 (1986).
444. Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 179, 189-90 (1986).
445. Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 179, 189-90 (1986).
446. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 515-16, 526-29 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority took on a legislative role when it created the government contractor defense in disregard of Congress's prior refusal to create a similar defense).
447. Larry J. Gusman, Note, Rethinking Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. Government Contractor Defense: Judicial Preemption of the Doctrine of Separation of Powers?, 39 Am. U. L. Rev. 391, 395 (1990) (asserting that the Court, in barring recovery for individuals harmed by a product designed by a government contractor, "functioned as the writer of laws, rather than the interpreter of laws").
448. Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 34-35 (1985) (discussing how the Supreme Court has sometimes ignored evidence of specific intention when construing vague statutory or constitutional provisions)
449. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1753 (2010) [hereinafter Gluck, Laboratories] ("The vast majority of statutory interpretation theory is based on a strikingly small slice of American jurisprudence, the mere two percent of litigation that takes place in federal courts-and, really, only the less-than-one percent of that litigation that the U.S. Supreme Court decides. ").
450. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1753 (2010) [hereinafter Gluck, Laboratories] ("The vast majority of statutory interpretation theory is based on a strikingly small slice of American jurisprudence, the mere two percent of litigation that takes place in federal courts-and, really, only the less-than-one percent of that litigation that the U.S. Supreme Court decides. ").
451. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1753 (2010) [hereinafter Gluck, Laboratories] ("The vast majority of statutory interpretation theory is based on a strikingly small slice of American jurisprudence, the mere two percent of litigation that takes place in federal courts-and, really, only the less-than-one percent of that litigation that the U.S. Supreme Court decides. ").
452. Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 74, 76 (2000) (coining the handy phrase: "interpretive choice"). One must also interpret the constitution to derive norms for interpreting statutes. The question of interpretive choice in the constitutional context is beyond the scope of this Article, but some argue that the method might differ in constitutional and statutory contexts.
453. Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 74, 76 (2000) (coining the handy phrase: "interpretive choice"). One must also interpret the constitution to derive norms for interpreting statutes. The question of interpretive choice in the constitutional context is beyond the scope of this Article, but some argue that the method might differ in constitutional and statutory contexts.
454. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogenity: How to Read a Statute in a Lower Court, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 433, 433 (2012) (describing institutional differences between different courts in the appellate hierarchy and arguing that these differences "justify a heterogeneous regime in which courts at different levels of the judicial hierarchy use somewhat different interpretive methods")
455. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogenity: How to Read a Statute in a Lower Court, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 433, 433 (2012) (describing institutional differences between different courts in the appellate hierarchy and arguing that these differences "justify a heterogeneous regime in which courts at different levels of the judicial hierarchy use somewhat different interpretive methods")
456. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1753 (2010) [hereinafter Gluck, Laboratories] ("The vast majority of statutory interpretation theory is based on a strikingly small slice of American jurisprudence, the mere two percent of litigation that takes place in federal courts-and, really, only the less-than-one percent of that litigation that the U.S. Supreme Court decides. ").
457. Cf. Asarco Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 623-24 (1989) (applying Arizona standing principles to hear a controversy even if it would have been nonjusticiable under federal justiciability doctrine).
458. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533, 544 (1983) ("[Sometimes a] statute plainly hands courts the power to create and revise a form of common law.... ")
459. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 2085, 2108 (2002) ("Interpretive rules are substantive law, and they go hand in hand with the substantive statutes of the legislatures that create them. ").
460. Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 15-23 (1986).
461. See Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition 8 (1983) ("The law contains within itself a legal science, a meta-law, by which it can be both analyzed and evaluated. ").