메뉴 건너뛰기




Volumn 27, Issue 4, 2014, Pages 784-795

Mechanistic constraints and the unlikely evolution of reciprocal cooperation

Author keywords

Bootstrapping; Evolution of cooperation; Genetic constraints; Reciprocity

Indexed keywords

BOOTSTRAPPING; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; EVOLUTIONARY THEORY; RECIPROCITY; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 84896314021     PISSN: 1010061X     EISSN: 14209101     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/jeb.12351     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (18)

References (67)
  • 1
    • 76249088580 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The evolution of reciprocity: social types or social incentives
    • André, J.B. 2010. The evolution of reciprocity: social types or social incentives? Am. Nat. 175: 197-210.
    • (2010) Am. Nat. , vol.175 , pp. 197-210
    • André, J.B.1
  • 2
    • 34248635406 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Perfect reciprocity is the only evolutionarily stable strategy in the continuous iterated prisoner's dilemma
    • André, J.B. & Day, T. 2007. Perfect reciprocity is the only evolutionarily stable strategy in the continuous iterated prisoner's dilemma. J. Theor. Biol. 247: 11-22.
    • (2007) J. Theor. Biol. , vol.247 , pp. 11-22
    • André, J.B.1    Day, T.2
  • 6
    • 0019480612 scopus 로고
    • The evolution of cooperation
    • Axelrod, R. & Hamilton, W.D. 1981. The evolution of cooperation. Science 211: 1390-1396.
    • (1981) Science , vol.211 , pp. 1390-1396
    • Axelrod, R.1    Hamilton, W.D.2
  • 7
    • 79952348996 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Cooperation among non-relatives evolves by state-dependent generalized reciprocity
    • Barta, Z., McNamara, J.M., Huszár, D.B. & Taborsky, M. 2011. Cooperation among non-relatives evolves by state-dependent generalized reciprocity. Proc. Biol. Sci. 278: 843-848.
    • (2011) Proc. Biol. Sci. , vol.278 , pp. 843-848
    • Barta, Z.1    McNamara, J.M.2    Huszár, D.B.3    Taborsky, M.4
  • 9
    • 44049110303 scopus 로고
    • Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata
    • Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L. 1992. Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata. J. Econ. Theory 57: 278-305.
    • (1992) J. Econ. Theory , vol.57 , pp. 278-305
    • Binmore, K.1    Samuelson, L.2
  • 10
    • 36849147091 scopus 로고
    • No pure strategy is evolutionarily stable in the repeated Prisoners-Dilemma game
    • Boyd, R. & Lorberbaum, J.P. 1987. No pure strategy is evolutionarily stable in the repeated Prisoners-Dilemma game. Nature 327: 58-59.
    • (1987) Nature , vol.327 , pp. 58-59
    • Boyd, R.1    Lorberbaum, J.P.2
  • 11
    • 70449124742 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Cooperation between non-kin in animal societies
    • Clutton-Brock, T. 2009. Cooperation between non-kin in animal societies. Nature 462: 51-57.
    • (2009) Nature , vol.462 , pp. 51-57
    • Clutton-Brock, T.1
  • 12
    • 0000970433 scopus 로고
    • Pseudo-reciprocity: investing in mutualism
    • Connor, R.C. 1986. Pseudo-reciprocity: investing in mutualism. Anim. Behav. 34: 1562-1566.
    • (1986) Anim. Behav. , vol.34 , pp. 1562-1566
    • Connor, R.C.1
  • 13
    • 0029107862 scopus 로고
    • Altruism among non-relatives: alternatives to the 'Prisoners' Dilemma
    • Connor, R.C. 1995a. Altruism among non-relatives: alternatives to the 'Prisoners' Dilemma. Trends Ecol. Evol. I: 84-86.
    • (1995) Trends Ecol. Evol. , vol.1 , pp. 84-86
    • Connor, R.C.1
  • 14
    • 0029065042 scopus 로고
    • The benefits of mutualism: a conceptual framework
    • Connor, R.C. 1995b. The benefits of mutualism: a conceptual framework. Biol. Rev. 70: 427-457.
    • (1995) Biol. Rev. , vol.70 , pp. 427-457
    • Connor, R.C.1
  • 16
    • 33750031286 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Imitation processes with small mutations
    • Fudenberg, D. & Imhof, L.A. 2006. Imitation processes with small mutations. J. Econ. Theory 131: 251-262.
    • (2006) J. Econ. Theory , vol.131 , pp. 251-262
    • Fudenberg, D.1    Imhof, L.A.2
  • 17
    • 0000028492 scopus 로고
    • The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting or with incomplete information
    • Fudenberg, D. & Maskin, E. 1986. The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting or with incomplete information. Econometrica 54: 533-554.
    • (1986) Econometrica , vol.54 , pp. 533-554
    • Fudenberg, D.1    Maskin, E.2
  • 18
    • 84860370102 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The structure of mutations and the evolution of cooperation
    • Garcia, J. & Traulsen, A. 2012. The structure of mutations and the evolution of cooperation. PLoS ONE 1-4.
    • (2012) PLoS ONE , pp. 1-4
    • Garcia, J.1    Traulsen, A.2
  • 19
    • 4143126973 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • To give and to give not: the behavioral ecology of human food transfers
    • Gurven, M. 2004. To give and to give not: the behavioral ecology of human food transfers. Behav. Brain Sci. 27: 543-559.
    • (2004) Behav. Brain Sci. , vol.27 , pp. 543-559
    • Gurven, M.1
  • 20
    • 0034215531 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • "It's a Wonderful Life": signaling generosity among the Ache of Paraguay
    • Gurven, M., Allen-Arave, W., Hill, K. & Hurtado, M. 2000a. "It's a Wonderful Life": signaling generosity among the Ache of Paraguay. Evol. Hum. Behav. 21: 263-282.
    • (2000) Evol. Hum. Behav. , vol.21 , pp. 263-282
    • Gurven, M.1    Allen-Arave, W.2    Hill, K.3    Hurtado, M.4
  • 21
    • 0033839297 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Food transfers among Hiwi foragers of Venezuela: tests of reciprocity
    • Gurven, M., Hill, K., Kaplan, H., Hurtado, A. & Lyles, R. 2000b. Food transfers among Hiwi foragers of Venezuela: tests of reciprocity. Hum. Ecol. 28: 171-218.
    • (2000) Hum. Ecol. , vol.28 , pp. 171-218
    • Gurven, M.1    Hill, K.2    Kaplan, H.3    Hurtado, A.4    Lyles, R.5
  • 22
    • 0013770258 scopus 로고
    • The genetical evolution of social behaviour, I & II
    • Hamilton, W.D. 1964. The genetical evolution of social behaviour, I & II. J. Theor. Biol. 7: 1-52.
    • (1964) J. Theor. Biol. , vol.7 , pp. 1-52
    • Hamilton, W.D.1
  • 23
    • 0842274347 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Why is reciprocity so rare in social animals? A protestant appeal
    • (P. Hammerstein, ed) -MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
    • Hammerstein, P. 2003. Why is reciprocity so rare in social animals? A protestant appeal. In: Genetic and Cultural Evolution of Cooperation (P. Hammerstein, ed), pp. 83-95. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
    • (2003) Genetic and Cultural Evolution of Cooperation , pp. 83-95
    • Hammerstein, P.1
  • 24
    • 0027091820 scopus 로고
    • Reciprocal allogrooming in impala, Aepyceros melampus
    • Hart, B.L. & Hart, L.A. 1992. Reciprocal allogrooming in impala, Aepyceros melampus. Anim. Behav. 44: 1073-1083.
    • (1992) Anim. Behav. , vol.44 , pp. 1073-1083
    • Hart, B.L.1    Hart, L.A.2
  • 26
    • 0036327805 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Altruistic cooperation during foraging by the ache, and the evolved human predisposition to cooperate
    • Hill, K. 2002. Altruistic cooperation during foraging by the ache, and the evolved human predisposition to cooperate. Hum. Nat. 13: 105-128.
    • (2002) Hum. Nat. , vol.13 , pp. 105-128
    • Hill, K.1
  • 27
    • 79952526207 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Co-residence patterns in hunter-gatherer societies show unique human social structure
    • Hill, K.R., Walker, R.S., Božičević, M., Eder, J., Headland, T., Hewlett, B. et al. 2011. Co-residence patterns in hunter-gatherer societies show unique human social structure. Science 331: 1286-1289.
    • (2011) Science , vol.331 , pp. 1286-1289
    • Hill, K.R.1    Walker, R.S.2    Božičević, M.3    Eder, J.4    Headland, T.5    Hewlett, B.6
  • 29
    • 76249084735 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Stochastic evolutionary dynamics of direct reciprocity
    • Imhof, L.A.L. & Nowak, M.A. 2010. Stochastic evolutionary dynamics of direct reciprocity. Proceedings of the Royal. pp. 463-468.
    • (2010) Proceedings of the Royal , pp. 463-468
    • Imhof, L.A.L.1    Nowak, M.A.2
  • 30
    • 0030830846 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The seed-storing corvid Clark's nutcracker learns geometric relationships among landmarks
    • Kamil, A.C. & Jones, J.E. 1997. The seed-storing corvid Clark's nutcracker learns geometric relationships among landmarks. Nature 390: 276-279.
    • (1997) Nature , vol.390 , pp. 276-279
    • Kamil, A.C.1    Jones, J.E.2
  • 32
    • 0002951077 scopus 로고
    • Sexual selection and the evolution of female choice
    • Kirkpatrick, M. 1982. Sexual selection and the evolution of female choice. Evolution 36: 1-12.
    • (1982) Evolution , vol.36 , pp. 1-12
    • Kirkpatrick, M.1
  • 34
    • 38049042914 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Experimental evidence of reciprocal altruism in the pied flycatcher
    • Krams, I., Krama, T., Igaune, K. & Mänd, R. 2008. Experimental evidence of reciprocal altruism in the pied flycatcher. Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol. 62: 599-605.
    • (2008) Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol. , vol.62 , pp. 599-605
    • Krams, I.1    Krama, T.2    Igaune, K.3    Mänd, R.4
  • 35
    • 0002196809 scopus 로고
    • Animal signals: mind-reading and manipulation
    • Krebs, J.R. & Dawkins, R., 1984. Animal signals: mind-reading and manipulation. Behav. Ecol. 2: 380-402.
    • (1984) Behav. Ecol. , vol.2 , pp. 380-402
    • Krebs, J.R.1    Dawkins, R.2
  • 36
    • 33747314412 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The evolution of cooperation and altruism - a general framework and a classification of models
    • Lehmann, L. & Keller, L. 2006. The evolution of cooperation and altruism - a general framework and a classification of models. J. Evol. Biol. 19: 1365-1376.
    • (2006) J. Evol. Biol. , vol.19 , pp. 1365-1376
    • Lehmann, L.1    Keller, L.2
  • 37
    • 0030761117 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Reciprocity and communication of partner quality
    • Leimar, O. 1997. Reciprocity and communication of partner quality. Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 264: 1209-1215.
    • (1997) Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. , vol.264 , pp. 1209-1215
    • Leimar, O.1
  • 38
    • 26244444748 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • By-product benefits, reciprocity, and pseudoreciprocity in mutualism
    • (P. Hammerstein, ed.)-MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
    • Leimar, O. & Connor, R. 2003. By-product benefits, reciprocity, and pseudoreciprocity in mutualism. In: Genetic and Cultural Evolution of Cooperation (P. Hammerstein, ed.), pp. 203-223. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
    • (2003) Genetic and Cultural Evolution of Cooperation , pp. 203-223
    • Leimar, O.1    Connor, R.2
  • 40
    • 0028165939 scopus 로고
    • No Strategy Is Evolutionarily Stable in the Repeated Prisoners-Dilemma
    • Lorberbaum, J. 1994. No Strategy Is Evolutionarily Stable in the Repeated Prisoners-Dilemma. J. Theor. Biol. 168: 117-130.
    • (1994) J. Theor. Biol. , vol.168 , pp. 117-130
    • Lorberbaum, J.1
  • 41
    • 0036353441 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Are there really no evolutionarily stable strategies in the iterated prisoner's dilemma
    • Lorberbaum, J.P., Bohning, D.E., Shastri, A. & Sine, L.E. 2002. Are there really no evolutionarily stable strategies in the iterated prisoner's dilemma? J. Theor. Biol. 214: 155-169.
    • (2002) J. Theor. Biol. , vol.214 , pp. 155-169
    • Lorberbaum, J.P.1    Bohning, D.E.2    Shastri, A.3    Sine, L.E.4
  • 44
    • 77957273010 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Variation and the response to variation as a basis for successful cooperation
    • McNamara, J.M. & Leimar, O. 2010. Variation and the response to variation as a basis for successful cooperation. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. B Biol. Sci. 365: 2627-2633.
    • (2010) Philos. Trans. R. Soc. B Biol. Sci. , vol.365 , pp. 2627-2633
    • McNamara, J.M.1    Leimar, O.2
  • 45
    • 1942455801 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Variation in behaviour promotes cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma game
    • McNamara, J.M., Barta, Z. & Houston, A.I. 2004. Variation in behaviour promotes cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Nature 428: 745-748.
    • (2004) Nature , vol.428 , pp. 745-748
    • McNamara, J.M.1    Barta, Z.2    Houston, A.I.3
  • 46
    • 0026471294 scopus 로고
    • Tit for tat in heterogeneous populations
    • Nowak, M. & Sigmund, K. 1992. Tit for tat in heterogeneous populations. Nature 355: 250-253.
    • (1992) Nature , vol.355 , pp. 250-253
    • Nowak, M.1    Sigmund, K.2
  • 47
    • 0027336968 scopus 로고
    • A strategy of win stay, lose shift that outperforms tit for-tat in the Prisoners-Dilemma game
    • Nowak, M. & Sigmund, K. 1993. A strategy of win stay, lose shift that outperforms tit for-tat in the Prisoners-Dilemma game. Nature 364: 56-58.
    • (1993) Nature , vol.364 , pp. 56-58
    • Nowak, M.1    Sigmund, K.2
  • 48
    • 1942517277 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite populations
    • Nowak, M.A., Sasaki, A., Taylor, C. & Fudenberg, D. 2004. Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite populations. Nature 428: 646-650.
    • (2004) Nature , vol.428 , pp. 646-650
    • Nowak, M.A.1    Sasaki, A.2    Taylor, C.3    Fudenberg, D.4
  • 49
    • 79960235537 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Resolving the iterated prisoner's dilemma: theory and reality
    • Raihani, N.J. & Bshary, R. 2011. Resolving the iterated prisoner's dilemma: theory and reality. J. Evol. Biol. 24: 1628-1639.
    • (2011) J. Evol. Biol. , vol.24 , pp. 1628-1639
    • Raihani, N.J.1    Bshary, R.2
  • 51
    • 0032499940 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Development of cooperative relationships through increasing investment
    • Roberts, G. & Sherratt, T.N. 1998. Development of cooperative relationships through increasing investment. Nature 394: 175-179.
    • (1998) Nature , vol.394 , pp. 175-179
    • Roberts, G.1    Sherratt, T.N.2
  • 52
    • 57649217613 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Avian mobbing: byproduct mutualism not reciprocal altruism
    • Russell, A.F. & Wright, J. 2009. Avian mobbing: byproduct mutualism not reciprocal altruism. Trends Ecol. Evol. 24: 3-5.
    • (2009) Trends Ecol. Evol. , vol.24 , pp. 3-5
    • Russell, A.F.1    Wright, J.2
  • 55
    • 77950325437 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
    • Seeley, T.D. 2010. Honeybee Democracy. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
    • (2010) Honeybee Democracy
    • Seeley, T.D.1
  • 56
    • 33747856809 scopus 로고
    • Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
    • Selten, R. 1975. Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games. Int. J. Game Theory 4: 25-55.
    • (1975) Int. J. Game Theory , vol.4 , pp. 25-55
    • Selten, R.1
  • 57
    • 0000488786 scopus 로고
    • Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games
    • Selten, R. 1983. Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games. Math. Soc. Sci. 5: 269-363.
    • (1983) Math. Soc. Sci. , vol.5 , pp. 269-363
    • Selten, R.1
  • 58
    • 0034827674 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The importance of phenotypic defectors in stabilizing reciprocal altruism
    • Sherratt, T.N., Roberts, G. & Ne, T. 2001. The importance of phenotypic defectors in stabilizing reciprocal altruism. Behav. Ecol. 12: 313-317.
    • (2001) Behav. Ecol. , vol.12 , pp. 313-317
    • Sherratt, T.N.1    Roberts, G.2    Ne, T.3
  • 59
    • 0842326544 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Why be nice? Psychological constraints on the evolution of cooperation
    • Stevens, J.R. & Hauser, M.D. 2004. Why be nice? Psychological constraints on the evolution of cooperation. Trends Cogn. Sci. 8: 60-65.
    • (2004) Trends Cogn. Sci. , vol.8 , pp. 60-65
    • Stevens, J.R.1    Hauser, M.D.2
  • 60
    • 30344461012 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Evolving the psychological mechanisms for cooperation
    • Stevens, J.R., Cushman, F.A. & Hauser, M.D. 2005. Evolving the psychological mechanisms for cooperation. Annu. Rev. Ecol. 36: 499-518.
    • (2005) Annu. Rev. Ecol. , vol.36 , pp. 499-518
    • Stevens, J.R.1    Cushman, F.A.2    Hauser, M.D.3
  • 61
    • 33746227636 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Stochastic dynamics of invasion and fixation
    • Traulsen, A., Nowak, M. & Pacheco, J. 2006. Stochastic dynamics of invasion and fixation. Phys. Rev. E 74: 011909.
    • (2006) Phys. Rev. E , vol.74 , pp. 011909
    • Traulsen, A.1    Nowak, M.2    Pacheco, J.3
  • 62
    • 0002414229 scopus 로고
    • The evolution of reciprocal altruism
    • Trivers, R. 1971. The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Q. Rev. Biol. 46: 35-57.
    • (1971) Q. Rev. Biol. , vol.46 , pp. 35-57
    • Trivers, R.1
  • 63
    • 34547909929 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Evolutionary explanations for cooperation
    • West, S., Griffin, A. & Gardner, A. 2007a. Evolutionary explanations for cooperation. Curr. Biol. 17: R661-R672.
    • (2007) Curr. Biol. , vol.17
    • West, S.1    Griffin, A.2    Gardner, A.3
  • 64
    • 33847019914 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Social semantics: altruism, cooperation, mutualism, strong reciprocity and group selection
    • West, S.A., Griffin, A.S. & Gardner, A. 2007b. Social semantics: altruism, cooperation, mutualism, strong reciprocity and group selection. J. Evol. Biol. 20: 415-432.
    • (2007) J. Evol. Biol. , vol.20 , pp. 415-432
    • West, S.A.1    Griffin, A.S.2    Gardner, A.3
  • 65
    • 33847019914 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Social semantics: altruism, cooperation, mutualism, strong reciprocity and group selection
    • West, S.A., Griffin, A.S. & Gardner, A. 2007c. Social semantics: altruism, cooperation, mutualism, strong reciprocity and group selection. J. Evol. Biol. 20: 415-432.
    • (2007) J. Evol. Biol. , vol.20 , pp. 415-432
    • West, S.A.1    Griffin, A.S.2    Gardner, A.3
  • 67
    • 34547876106 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The costs and benefits of resource sharing: reciprocity requires resource heterogeneity
    • Whitlock, M.C., Davis, B.H. & Yeaman, S. 2007. The costs and benefits of resource sharing: reciprocity requires resource heterogeneity. J. Evol. Biol. 20: 1772-1782.
    • (2007) J. Evol. Biol. , vol.20 , pp. 1772-1782
    • Whitlock, M.C.1    Davis, B.H.2    Yeaman, S.3


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.