The evolution of reciprocity: Social types or social incentives?

American Naturalist

Volumn 175, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 197-210

  André, Jean Baptiste ^a  

^a Unité Mixte de Recherche 7625   (France)

Author keywords

Cooperation; Human behavior; Payoffs variability; Signaling

Indexed keywords

CONSPECIFIC; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY; HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE; HUMAN BEHAVIOR; MODEL TEST; RECIPROCITY; SIGNALING; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; THEORETICAL STUDY;

ARTICLE; EVOLUTION; HUMAN; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; THEORETICAL MODEL;

EVOLUTION; HUMANS; MODELS, THEORETICAL; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR;

EID: 76249088580     PISSN: 00030147     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/649597     Document Type: Article

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