The importance of phenotypic defectors in stabilizing reciprocal altruism

Behavioral Ecology

Volumn 12, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 313-317

  Sherratt, Thomas N ^a   Roberts, Gilbert ^b  

^a DURHAM UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

^b NEWCASTLE UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Cooperation; Phenotypic defectors; Prisoner's Dilemma; Reciprocal altruism

Indexed keywords

ALTRUISM; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; EVOLUTION; PHENOTYPIC PLASTICITY; PRISONER DILEMMA;

EID: 0034827674     PISSN: 10452249     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/beheco/12.3.313     Document Type: Article

References (18)

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7. The evolution of forgiveness
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11. A strategy of win-stay lose-shift that outperforms tit-for-tat in the Prisoner's Dilemma game
12. The alternating Prisoner's dilemma
13. The ecology of relationships
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15. The evolution of reciprocal altruism
16. The continuous Prisoner's Dilemma: II. Linear reactive strategies with noise