Are there really no evolutionarily stable strategies in the iterated prisoner's dilemma?

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 214, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 155-169

  Lorberbaum, Jeffrey P ^a   Bohning, Daryl E ^a   Shastri, Ananda ^a   Sine, Lauren E ^a  

^a MEDICAL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE STRATEGY;

ARTICLE; COOPERATION; DECISION MAKING; EVOLUTION; GAME; HUMAN RELATION; MATHEMATICS; MEMORY; MODEL; POPULATION; PREDICTION; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PRISONER; PROBABILITY; TIME;

EID: 0036353441     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jtbi.2001.2455     Document Type: Article

References (17)

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7. Evolutionary stability in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game
8. No strategy is evolutionarily stable in the repeated prisoner's dilemma
9. Working memory constrains human cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma
10. Stochastic strategies in the prisoner's dilemma
11. Tit-for-Tat in heterogeneous populations
12. Win-stay, lose-shift outperforms Tit-for-Tat
13. Automata, repeated games, and noise
14. Putting game theory to the test
15. Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games