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Volumn 17, Issue 1, 2014, Pages 1-23

Mixing the carrots with the sticks: Third party punishment and reward

Author keywords

Norm enforcement; Punishment; Reward; Social norms; Third party

Indexed keywords


EID: 84895905806     PISSN: 13864157     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10683-013-9354-z     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (42)

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