Evolutionary microeconomics

Evolutionary Microeconomics

Volumn , Issue , 2006, Pages 1-296

  Lesourne, Jacques ^a   Orléan, André ^b   Walliser, Bernard ^c  

^a Bioinformatique et Chimie Moléculaire   (France)

^b Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques   (France)

^c UNIVERSITÉ PARIS EST   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84895277119     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1007/3-540-28537-7     Document Type: Book

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