A spectrum of equilibration processes in game theory

Journal of Evolutionary Economics

Volumn 8, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 67-87

  Walliser, Bernard ^a  

^a Centre de Recherche en Epistemologie Appliquee Ecole Polytechnique   (France)

Author keywords

Bounded rationality; Cognitive rationality; Evolution; Game equilibrium; Learning

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032383933     PISSN: 09369937     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001910050056     Document Type: Article

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