A reinforcement learning process in extensive form games

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 33, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 219-227

  Laslier, Jean François ^a   Walliser, Bernard ^b  

^a ECOLE POLYTECHNIQUE   (France)

^b UNIVERSITÉ PARIS EST   (France)

Author keywords

Learning; Polya process; Reinforcement; Subgame perfect equilibrium

Indexed keywords

EID: 33644506135     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001820400194     Document Type: Article

References (12)

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