Conventions, local interaction, and automata networks

Journal of Evolutionary Economics

Volumn 6, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 297-312

  Berninghaus, Siegfried K ^a   Schwalbe, Ulrich ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KARLSRUHE   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM   (Germany)

Author keywords

Automata networks; Conventions; Evolutionary games; Interaction structure

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030305747     PISSN: 09369937     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF01193635     Document Type: Article

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