Correlation of positive and negative reciprocity fails to confer an evolutionary advantage: Phase transitions to elementary strategies

Physical Review X

Volumn 3, Issue 4, 2014, Pages

  Szolnoki, Attila ^a   Perc, Matjaž ^b  

^a INSTITUTE OF EXPERIMENTAL MEDICINE   (Hungary)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MARIBOR   (Slovenia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CO-OPERATIVE BEHAVIORS; CYCLIC DOMINANCE; DYNAMICAL BEHAVIORS; ECONOMIC EXPERIMENTS; HIGH COMPLEXITY; PARAMETER REGIONS; PUBLIC GOODS GAMES; STRONG RECIPROCITIES;

EXPERIMENTS;

BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH;

EID: 84893672575     PISSN: None     EISSN: 21603308     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevX.3.041021     Document Type: Article

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