Feedback and incentives: Experimental evidence

Labour Economics

Volumn 16, Issue 6, 2009, Pages 679-688

  Eriksson, Tor ^a   Poulsen, Anders ^b   Villeval, Marie Claire ^c  

^a AARHUS UNIVERSITY   (Denmark)

^b UNIVERSITY OF EAST ANGLIA   (United Kingdom)

^c UNIVERSITÉ DE LYON   (France)

Author keywords

Evaluation; Experiment; Feedback; Peer effects; Piece rate; Tournament

Indexed keywords

EID: 70649108734     PISSN: 09275371     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.labeco.2009.08.006     Document Type: Article

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