Abuse of a dominant position: Cases and experiments

Experiments and Competition Policy

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 107-159

  Van Damme, Eric ^a   Larouche, Pierre ^b   Müller, Wieland ^a  

^a TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^b TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84890079006     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511576201.006     Document Type: Chapter

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