Predation, asymmetric information and strategic behavior in the classroom: An experimental approach to the teaching of industrial organization

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 18, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 205-225

  Capra, C Monica ^a   Goeree, Jacob K ^b,c   Gomez, Rosario ^d   Holt, Charles A ^b  

^a WASHINGTON AND LEE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

^d UNIVERSITY OF MÁLAGA   (Spain)

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; C72; C92; Classroom experiments; Multi market games; Predatory pricing

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034582216     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0167-7187(99)00040-5     Document Type: Article

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