An experimental analysis of subgame perfect play: The entry deterrence game

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 37, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 443-462

  Mason, Charles F ^a   Nowell, Cliff ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING   (United States)

^b WEBER STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

C72; C91; Entry deterrence; Experiments; L12; Subgame perfection

Indexed keywords

EID: 0013113199     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0167-2681(98)00113-9     Document Type: Article

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