Entry preventing locations under incomplete information

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 21, Issue 6, 2003, Pages 809-829

  Boyer, Marcel ^a   Mahenc, Philippe ^b,c   Moreaux, Michel ^c  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE MONTRÉAL   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITÉ DE PERPIGNAN   (France)

^c UNIVERSITY OF TOULOUSE CAPITOLE   (France)

Author keywords

Entry deterrence; Location; Signal

Indexed keywords

EID: 84867970695     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-7187(02)00124-8     Document Type: Article

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