Burning money and (pseudo) first-mover advantages: An experimental study on forward induction

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 51, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 109-127

  Huck, Steffen ^a   Müller, Wieland ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Battle of the sexes game; Burning money; Coordination; Experiments; First mover advantage; Forward induction; Physical timing

Indexed keywords

EID: 14644434435     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2004.03.006     Document Type: Article

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