Adaptive learning vs. equilibrium refinements in an entry limit pricing game

Economic Journal

Volumn 107, Issue 442, 1997, Pages 553-575

  Cooper, David J ^a   Garvin, Susan ^a   Kagel, John H ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000372803     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.1997.tb00027.x     Document Type: Article

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