The myth that insulating boards serves longterm value

Columbia Law Review

Volumn 113, Issue 10, 2013, Pages 1637-1694

  Bebchuk, Lucian A ^a  

^a HARVARD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84886279804     PISSN: 00101958     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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