One fundamental corporate governance question we face: Can corporations be managed for the long term unless their powerful electorates also act and think long term?

Business Lawyer

Volumn 66, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 1-26

  Strine Jr , Leo E ^a,b,c,d  

^a Delaware Court of Chancery ^*  (United States)

^b HARVARD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

^d The Aspen Institute   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79551595745     PISSN: 00076899     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (158)

1. By fundamentally sound, I emphasize the non-gimmicky generation of profits through the sale of things or services of utility to others. I implicitly contrast that with financial gimmicks designed to increase GAAP accounting profits.
2. See WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 91 (2003) (noting that "the ability of the corporate form to segregate assets may encourage risk-averse shareholders to invest in risky ventures");
3. see also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89,94-97 (1985) (noting that limited liability fosters diversification of investment portfolios by allowing the transferability of shares, and therefore that "limited liability facilitates optimal investment decisions" because managers "can accept [risky] ventures (such as development of new products) without exposing the investors to ruin. Each investor can hedge against the failure of one project by holding stock in other firms.");
4. REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 91-111 (2d ed. 2009) (explaining that limited liability, which protects owners from an entitys creditors, and independent legal personality, which protects an entity from the creditors of its owners, combine to create a system of "asset partitioning," whereby separation "can increase the value of both types of assets as security for debt").
5. See, e.g., ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 16.2, at 677-80 (1986) (noting that corporations "increase social welfare, because without them certain large-scale business ventures would be impossible or would be carried out in a wasteful way");
6. ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 1-12 (1977) (arguing that the rise of the modem professionally managed corporation has been a "source of permanence, power, and continued growth");
7. see generally Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13,1970, at SM17.
8. Many of the leading voices in the institutional investor community agree that corporations should be managed for the long term. See CALPERS GLOBAL PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTABLE CORPORATE GOV-ERNANCE 7 (Feb. 2010), available at http:www.calpers-governance.org/docs-sof/principles/2010-5-2-global-principles- of-accountable-corp-gov.pdf ("Corporate directors and management should have a long-term strategic vision that, at its core, emphasizes sustained shareowner value. In turn, despite differing investment strategies and tactics, shareowners should encourage corporate management to resist short-term behavior by supporting and rewarding long-term superior returns.");
9. TIAA-CREF POUCY STATEMENT ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 7 (Mar. 2007), available at http://www.tiaa-cref.org/ucm/groups/content/@ap-ucm-p-tcp/ documents/document/tiaa01007871.pdf ("The board of directors is responsible for ⋯ overseeing the development of the corporations long-term business strategy and monitoring its implementation⋯ [and] representing the long-term interests of shareholders.");
10. ICGN GLOBAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES (July 1999), available at http.//wwwcgn.org/best-practice/documents/earlier-editions/-/page/441/ ("The overriding objective of the corporation should be to optimize over time the returns to its shareowners. ⋯ To achieve this objective, the corporation should endeavor to ensure the long-term viability of its business ⋯ .");
11. ICGN STATEMENT ON INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER RESPONSIBILITIES § 1.2 (2003) (indicating that the "general objective of⋯ activities [by in-stitutional investors) is to stimulate the preservation and growth of the companies' long-term value");
12. see also Press Release, TIAA-CREF, New TIAA-CREF Policy Brief Calls on Shareholders to Take an Active Role in Corporate Governance (Feb. 2, 2010), available at http://www.tiaa-cref.org/public/about/press/about-us/releases/ pressrelease319.html (recommending "measures that will enable long-term institutional shareholders to uphold their responsibilities as shareholders" and noting that "[i]t is imperative that large long-term investors such as retirement systems and mutual funds-to which millions of investors entrust their savings-encourage portfolio companies to adopt governing practices that promote sustainable growth and lead to long-term value creation").
13. For an interesting example of this, see the history of the Ford Motor Company contained in M. Todd Henderson, The Story of Dodge v. Ford Motor Company: Everything Old Is New Again, in CORPORATE LAW STORIES 37, 37-49 (J. Mark Ramseyer ed., 2009).
14. See generally STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 202 (2002) ("[I]n large corporations, authority-based decisionmaking structures are desirable because of the potential for division and specialization of labor. Bounded rationality and complexity, as well as the practical costs of losing time when one shifts jobs, make it efficient for corporate constituents to specialize. Directors and managers specialize in the efficient coordination of other specialists. In order to reap the benefits of specialization, all other corporate constituents should prefer to specialize in functions unrelated to decisionmaking, such as risk-bearing (shareholders) and labor (employees), delegating decisionmaking to the board and senior management⋯. Separating ownership and control by vesting decisionmaking authority in a centralized nexus distinct from the shareholders and all other constituents is what makes the large public corporation feasible.").
15. Although there are obvious and important reasons not to take analogizing the governance of for-profit corporations to the governance of actual political republics too far, it is also vital not to ignore the clear influence republican principles have had on the American approach to corporate law. For an accessible discussion of how republican concepts find resonance in corporate law statutes, charters, and by laws
16. see Alan R. Palmiter, Public Corporation as Private Constitution, 6 ICFAI J. CORP. & SEC. L. 8 (2009).
17. TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., Nos. 10427 & 10298, 1989 WL 20290, at *8 n.14 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989) ("While corporate democracy is a pertinent concept, a corporation is not a New England town meeting; directors, not shareholders, have responsibilities to manage the business and affairs of the corporation, subject however to a fiduciary obligation.").
18. Eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (2001 & Supp. 2008) (requiring that a merger agreement be submitted to the shareholders of all constituent corporations at an annual or special meeting for a vote); id. § 271 (requiring that a sale of "substantially all" of a corporation's assets be approved by the holders of a majority of the outstanding shares); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 11.04(b) (4th ed. 2008) ("[A]fter adopting the plan of merger or share exchange the board of directors must submit the plan to the shareholders for their approval.").
19. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001) ("The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors."); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) ("All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business and affairs of the corporation managed by or under the direction of, its board of directors.").
20. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 6, at 202-03 &n.ll (noting that "(directors and managers specialize in the efficient coordination" of the corporation's affairs and that shareholders can simultaneously benefit from the board's expertise and hedge their risk through a diversification strategy: "By virtue of their nondiversified investment in firm specific human capital, managers bear part of the risk of firm failure. As the firm's residual claimants, however, shareholders also bear a portion of the risk associated with firm failure. Portfolio theory tells us that individual shareholders can minimize that risk through diversification, which managers cannot do with respect to their human capital. Separating ownership and control thus unbundles the risks associated with the firm and allocates each of those risks to the party who can bear it at the lowest cost.").
21. For an excellent discussion of this problem, see Joseph A. Grundfest, The SEC's Proposed Proxy Access Rules: Politics, Economics, and the Law, 65 BUS. LAW. 361, 380-82 (2010) (discussing "megaphone externalities" that lead certain stockholders to desire proxy access at a low access threshold in order to gain publicity for causes other than the promotion of long-term corporate value).
22. Many activist investors speak in the language of republican democracies, and expect to be treated like citizens. See, e.g., Press Release, CalPERS, CalPERS Urges U.S. Senate Committee to Protect Shareowner Access to Corporate Election Ballots, Seeks Strong Message to SEC About Proposed Rule Change (Nov. 14, 2007), available at http://governance.calpers.org/marketinitiatives/ initiatives/press-releases/calpers-urges-us-senate ("The [Securities and Exchange] Commission should stand for more corporate democracy, not less democracy. For all the sophistication of our markets in the U.S., we continue to lag other countries in corporate democracy. We are the worlds only developed economy that keeps shareowners from placing director nominees on company ballots.");
23. Press Release, Cal-STRS, Statement by CalSTRS and Other Institutional Investors on Marsh & McLennan's Decision to Add an Independent Director to Its Board of Directors (Mar. 18, 2004), available at http://www.calstrs.com/ newsroom/20p4/news031804.aspx ("Only through improved shareholder democracy can we ensure the true owners of the company are heard in the board room.");
24. Press Release, AFSCME, AFSCME Employees Pension Plan Concludes Successful Proxy Season, Applauds SEC Staff Recommendations (July 15, 2003), available at http://www.afscme.org/press/6935.cfm ("There is an urgent need for shareholder democracy. We urge the Commissioners to quickly institute measures that allow access to the proxy ⋯." (quoting AFSCME Plan Chair Gerald W McEntee));
25. Letter from the Council of Institutional Investors to Representative Michael N. Castle, U.S. House of Representatives (Dec. 2, 2008) (noting that institutional investors are "major long-term shareowners" and "significant long-term investors" in U.S. capital markets);
26. Nell Minow, Money Managers: If Not Them, Who?, LENS INC. (Oct. 1994), http:/www.lens-librarycom/info/whan.html (calling for increased "corporate democracy" and noting that pension funds' "commitment to the long term makes them good, if not perfect, corporate citizens"). But, the rhetoric used typically does not embrace the full tradition of citizenship, particularly that part involving the obligations of loyalty that come with the status of citizenship. Dating back to ancient Athens, the concept of citizenship has involved reciprocity, the mutual obligations of citizen to state and state to citizen.
27. See DEREK HEATER, CITIZENSHIP: THE CIVIC IDEAL IN WORLD HISTORY, POLITICS AND EDUCATION 1-5, 83 (3d ed. 2004) (quoting Aristotle by describing citizens as "all who share in the civic life of ruling and being ruled in turn"). In the republican tradition, it is accepted that the republic cannot thrive if citizens do not honor their duty of loyalty to the republic and act in a virtuous manor designed to advance the interests of the republic, and not simply the citizens' personal interests.
28. Id. at 41 (summarizing Rousseau's views as "the true citizen seeks the realization of the General Will, the common good, not the satisfaction of his own selfish interests");
29. JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 79 (1862) (describing a citizen as one who is "called upon ⋯ to weigh interests not his own); to be guided, in case of conflicting claims, by another rule than his private partialities; to apply, at every turn, principles and maxims which have for their reason of existence the common good; and he usually finds associated with him m the same work minds more familiarized than his own with these ideas and operations, whose study it will be to supply reasons to his understanding and stimulation to his feeling for the general interest");
30. see also RAYMOND ARON, PROGRESS AND DISILLUSION: THE DIALECTICS OF MODERN SOCIETY 238 (1968) ("Perhaps in a modern society there are not many citizens in Rousseau's sense of the word; that is, men who are concerned about the public good as such and willing to sacrifice their own interests for it."). By strong contrast, in the American corporate law tradition, stockholders who are not directly controlling board action are entitled to pursue only their own self-interest, without owing any fiduciary duties to other stockholders or the corporation itself.
31. See Weinstein Enters., Inc. v. Orloff, 870 A.2d 499, 507 (Del. 2005); Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 490 A.2d 1050, 1055 (Del. Ch. 1984); see also Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1265-73 (2008). By essentially demanding to be regarded as citizens of a corporate polity, institutional stockholders who simultaneously cling to the corporate law tradition that stockholders owe no obligation to consider any interest other than their own are distorting an important intellectual tradition by advocating a responsibility-free notion of citizenship in the corporate realm. In an era where activist stockholders exert power that influences corporate policy, the absence of any articulated concept of the duty owed to the corporation renders the rhetorical borrowing from the republican tradition clearly selective.
32. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 658 (Del. Ch. 1988) ("The shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial power rests.").
33. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 949 (Del. 1985) (holding that the board's managerial power extended to deploying takeover defenses so long as they did so reasonably and in good faith).
34. For my previous musings on this subject, see Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk's Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1759, 1775-77 (2006) [hereinafter Strine, Toward a True Corporate Republic);
35. William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the American Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of One Small State, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 953,999-1001 (2003).
36. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 112, 113 (2001) (giving stockholders broad authority to shape the corporate election process, provide for reimbursement costs to insurgent slates, and permit access to the corporations proxy).
37. One model for an enhanced "Rule 14a-8E" as in "election" might involve the following: i) affording proponents 1, 000 or more words to describe the election reform proposal, given the relative complexity of the subject matter involved; ii) granting proponents the ability to also hyperlink to the text of the actual election bylaw proposals; iii) requiring that any issuer who failed to implement, amended, or otherwise altered a stockholder-adopted proposal under Rule Ha-8E disclose the reasons for that action in the next 10-Q and the next 10-K.
38. In prior writings, 1 have outlined one possible model for a periodic system. See Strine, Toward a True Corporate Republic, supra note 16.
39. Charles Nathan and Parul Mehta have incisively pointed out that the term "activist investor" is commonly used to describe two different kinds of investors, who have different motives, world views, and agendas. See Charles Nathan & Parul Mehta, The Parallel Universes of Institutional Investors and Institutional Voting, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Apr. 6, 2010, 9:01 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/04/06/the- parallel-universes-of-institutional-investing-and-instnutional-voting/#1. One type of activist investor is the "event driven" hedge fund or similar actor. Those investors tend to favor short-term strategies like leverage, big dividends, recapitalizations, sales, and similar transactions that return capital immediately to shareholders. But, there is another type of "activist investor" who may be best described as "corporate governance activists." Those are institutional investors such as CalPERS, CalSTERS, TIAA-CREF, and the AFL-CIO. It is the latter type of "governance" activists that have focused on features of the governance structures of firms. Unlike activist investors in the hedge fund sense, corporate governance activists primarily agitate only about corporate governance. These two types of activists, however, have a symbiotic relationship that tilts the direction of corporate management toward short-termism. The "governance activists" often amplify the power of the hedge funds by pushing corporate governance measures-such as the elimination of classified boards and other takeover defenses-that make boards more susceptible to immediate market pressures.
40. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 684 (2010) ("The hedge funds have inspired interventions by large, mainstream investment advisors; they also have depended on and received the support of other, more passive institutional investors.").
41. For a good discussion ofhow this is possible, see Anabtawi& Stout, supra note 13, at 1258-59, 1291-92.
42. See id. at 1287;
43. see also Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership: Taxonomy, Implications, and Reform, 61 BUS. LAW. 1011 (2006);
44. Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. III. L. REV. 775.
45. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 6, at 470 ("[Slhareholders have the strongest economic incentive to care about the size of the residual claim [on returns to corporate assets], which means that they have the greatest incentive to elect directors committed to maximizing firm profitability.");
46. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 68 (1991) (noting that shareholders are given voting rights because "[a]s the residual claimants, shareholders have the appropriate incentives (collective action problems notwithstanding) to make discretionary decisions. The firm should invest in new products, plants, and so forth, until the gains and costs are identical at the margin. Yet all of the actors, except the shareholders, lack the appropriate incentives.").
47. To give the corporate electorate better information about activist investors seeking to influence corporate change and issuers and regulators better information about trading in derivatives that could adversely affect issuers, section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 could be amended to: (1) reduce the reporting threshold from 5 percent to 3 percent; (2) require reporting of any position, long or short, that meets that threshold (in either direction); (3) expand the definition of beneficial ownership to cover derivatives; and (4) give the SEC authority to require earlier disclosures and more prompt updating. This reform would follow the model of the recent reforms in the United Kingdom, which have made much more information available on a more timely basis.
48. See Fin. Servs. Auth., Disclosure and Transparency Rule 5 (2009) (U.K.).
49. See A. A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931);
50. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 333-57 (1932).
51. As an essay by Nathan and Mehta highlights, the separation concept does not even stop at ownership itself. See Nathan & Mehta, supra note 20. This is because within many institutional investor complexes, the staff who vote shares do so based on an overall philosophy about corporate governance that has little, if anything, to do with what is best for a particular firm. Their staff are often entirely separate from the professional investors who actually decide what stocks to buy and how long to hold them.
52. See id.
53. But, at some of these complexes, these "voting" staffs are quite active in the sense of pushing corporate governance ideas at many corporations despite the non-involvement of the personnel who actually act as investors, however short term.
54. As I have noted previously: Most Americans invest with a rational time horizon consistent with sound corporate planning. They invest with the hope of putting a child through college or providing for themselves in retirement. But individual Americans don't wield control over who sits on the boards of public companies. The financial intermediaries who invest their capital do. These intermediaries have powerful incentives - in important instances, not of their own making - to push corporate boards to engage in risky activities that may be adverse to the interest of long-term investors and society. That is, there is now a separation of "ownership from ownership" that creates conflicts of its own that are analogous to those of the paradigmatic, but increasingly outdated, Berle-Means model for separation of ownership from control. Unless these incentives and conflicts are addressed, it should be expected that corporate boards will continue to face strong pressures to manage their enterprises in a manner that emphasizes the short term over the long term, and that involves greater risk than is socially optimal.
55. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Why Excessive Risk-Taking Is Not Unexpected, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Oct. 5, 2009, 1:30 PM), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/ 10/05/dealbook-dialogue-leo-strine/;
56. see also Leo E. Strine, Jr., Human Freedom and Two Friedmen: Musings on the Implications of Globalization for the Effective Regulation of Corporate Behaviour, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 241 (2008);
57. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of Corporate Governance, 33 J. CORP. L. 1 (2007) [hereinafter Strine, Toward Common Sense].
58. See John C. Bogle, Restoring Faith in Financial Markets, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 2010, at A25 (noting that institutional investors control almost 70 percent of the shares of U.S. corporations);
59. Press Release, The Conference Bd., U.S. Institutional Investors Continue to Boost Ownership of U.S. Corporations 1 (Jan. 22, 2007) (on file with The Business Lawyer) (indicating that "in 2005 institutional investors held a record 61.2% of total 2005 U.S. equities, up from 51.4% in 2000").
60. Bill Barker, Turnover and Cash Reserves, MOTLEY FOOL, http://www.fool.com/school/mutualfunds/costs/tumover.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2010) ("In plain[ ] English, turnover represents how much of a mutual fund's holdings are changed over the course of a year through buying and selling.").
61. See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 13, at 1291-92 (citing Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561, 579 (2006)); HENNESSEE GROUP LLC, COMMENTS OF HENNESSEE GROUP LLC FOR THE U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ROUNDTABLE ON HEDGE FUNDS (May 14-15, 2003), available at http:/www.sec.gov/spotlight/hedgefunds/hedge-gradante.pdf (stating that, for 2002, the average portfolio manager turns its portfolio over three times - a 30 percent increase from 1999).
62. Not surprisingly in light of the decline of defined benefit retirement plans and the tax incentives and limited investment options given to 401(k) investors, the percentage of U.S. equities controlled by mutual funds is growing rapidly.
63. See Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch & Marcel Kahan, Director Elections and the Role of Proxy Advisors, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 649, 655 (2009) (citing BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES, FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS, FOURTH QUARTER 2006, at 90 tbl. L.213 (2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/zl/20070308/zl.pdf (showing that mutual funds went from controlling 7 percent of U.S. equities in 1990 to 32 percent by 2006; the actual data cited seems to indicate an increase to over one-third)).
64. See Brian Reid & Kimberlee Miller, Mutual Funds and Portfolio Turnovers, RES. COMMENT. (Inv. Co. Inst. Nov. 17, 2004) (on file with The Business Lawyer) (reporting a 117 percent average annual turnover and 65 percent median annual turnover in stock mutual fund portfolios);
65. CHRISTINE BENZ, PETER DI TERESA & RUSSEL KINNEL, MORNINGSTAR GUIDE TO MUTUAL FUNDS 11 (2004) (reporting a 114 percent average annual turnover in stock mutual fund portfolios);
66. see also Barker, supra note 29 ("Managed mutual funds have an average turnover rate of approximately 85%, meaning that funds are turning over nearly all of their holdings every year. Many funds, in fact, have turnover rates of more than 100%, meaning their average holding period for a stock is less than one year.");
67. Laura Bruce, Mutual Fund Turnover and Taxes, BANKRATE.COM (Nov. 6, 2003), http./www.bankrate.com/brm/news/investing/20020306a.asp ("William Harding, an analyst with Morningstar, says the average turnover rate for managed domestic stock funds is 130 percent. 'Many managers claim to be long-term investors when, in reality, the average mutual fund manager is turning the portfolio more than once a year.'"). Stock trading in general has seen an increase in volatility For example, annualized turnover on the New York Stock Exchange for December 2008 was 138 percent, compared to 123 percent in December 2007 and. 118 percent in December 2006. NYSE Facts and Figures: NYSE Group Turnover 2000-2009, NYXDATA.COM, http://www.nyxdata.com/nysedata/asp/factbook/ viewer-edition.asp?mode=table&key=2992&rcategory=3 (last visited Feb. 23, 2009). Even under the approach favored by the mutual fund industry, which is based on asset weighted turnover and which includes index funds, the turnover rate of stock mutual funds is nearly 60 percent.
68. See INV. CO. INST., 2009 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 29 fig. 2.9 (2009), available at http./www.icifactbook.org/pdf/2009-factbook.pdf. That means that the typical fund turns over its entire portfolio in less than two years. A turnover rate of that kind is hardly consistent with a focus on the long-run best interests of the companies in which the funds invest.
69. Reid & Miller, supra note 32.
70. One respected academic commentator suggests that even pension funds "typically turn over their portfolios in a year." Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Board as a Path Toward Corporate Social Responsibility, in THE NEW CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW 279, 303 (Doreen McBarnet, Aurora Voiculescu & Tom Campbell eds., 2007).
71. NYSEFacts and Figures:NYSEGroup Turnover 200-2009, NYXDATA.COM,http:// www.nyxdata.com/nysedata/asp/factbook/viewer-edition.asp?mode=table&key= 2992&category=3 (last visited Jan. 19, 2010);
72. cf. Lawrence E. Mitchell, Who Needs the Stock Market? Part I: The Empirical Evidence 5 (Oct. 23, 2008), available at http://papers.ssm com/sol3/paperscfm?abstract-id=1292403 [hereinafter Mitchell, Stock Market] (citing NYSE data that annualized turnover on the NYSE was 123 percent and 118 percent for December 2007 and 2006 respectively);
73. LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY: How FINANCE TRIUMPHED OVER INDUSTRY 277-78 (2007) (citing an increase in turnover on the NYSE from 36 percent in 1980 to 88 percent in 2000);
74. Rob Wherry, 13 Funds that Stand by Their Stock Picks, SMARTMONEY.COM (May 1, 2009) (citing Morningstar for the fact that the average turnover rate among domestic equity funds rose to 102.5 percent in 2009 from 97.5 percent in 2007).
75. See 2010 Statistical Abstract, Table 1360: U.S. and Foreign Stock Markets-Market Capitalization and Value of Shares Traded: 2000 to 2008, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2010/tables/l0sl360.pdf (last visited Aug. 16, 2010) (indicating that the total market value of all domestic listed companies was $ 11, 737 billion in 2008, and that the total value of shares traded in 2008 was $36,467 billion).
76. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. CARNEY, CORPORATE FINANCE: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 118-19 (2004) (discussing an implication of the "efficient capital markets hypothesis," which is that, because security prices efficiently reflect most of, if not all, public information about the value of a security, sophisticated investors will not trade in hope of "beating the market" based upon public announcements of new information but will simply adjust their reservation prices accordingly);
77. BURTON MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET: THE TIME-TESTED STRATEGY FOR SUCCESSFUL INVESTING (2003) (setting forth the commonly accepted corporate finance principle that an active trading strategy is unlikely to beat the performance of market averages);
78. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 20, at 692-93, 707 (noting that the efficient capital markets hypothesis does not imply that a stock price necessarily equals the discounted free cash flows of a corporation, and that a stock price may differ systematically from the corporation's fundamental value because that stock price in part reflects the present owners option to sell the stock to a more optimistic investor - i.e., stock prices reflect the speculative expectations of market participants);
79. John E Gaski, Capital Market Efficiency and Its Implications for the Investor: A Case of a Superior Product Mismarketed, in INNOVATIONS IN INVESTMENTS AND CORPORATE FINANCE 105, 106 (Mark Hirschey, Kose John & Anil K. Makhija eds., 2002) (explaining that, because of market efficiency, an investment strategy of buy-and-hold will produce the highest returns).
80. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 20, at 658-59 ("A shareholder-based agency model of the corporation sends management a simple instruction: in all circumstances, manage to maximize the market price of the stock. And that is exactly what managers of some critical financial firms did in recent years. They managed to a market that focused on their ability to increase observable earnings and, as it turned out, failed to factor in concomitant increases in risk that went largely unobserved.").
81. See Strine, Toward Common Sense, supra note 27, at 4-5.
82. See JOHN BOGLE, THE BATTLE FOR THE SOUL OF CAPITALISM 127 (2006) (noting weak activism on the part of indexed mutual funds, and calling for a "federation of long-term investors" that would aggre-gate and direct the voting power of such funds).
83. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 998-999 (2010) [hereinafter Kahan &r Rock, Embattled CEOs] (documenting the large number of corporations targeted by hedge fund activism); April Klein & Emanuel Zur, Hedge Fund Activism 39-40 (N.Y. Univ. Stem Sch. of BUS., Working Paper No. CLB-06-017, 2006) (showing steady increase in hedge fund activism from 1995 through 2005, the end of the period studied);
84. Press Release, RiskMetrics Group, Hedge Funds on Track to Set New Record for Activist Campaigns (Feb. 14, 2008), available at http:/www.riskmetrics.com/ press/articles/20080214-dj (discussing increase in hedge fund activism);
85. Bratton &r Wachter, supra note 20, at 682 (noting that "[a]ctivist hedge funds⋯ are impatient shareholders, who look for value and want it realized in the near or immediate term [and] tell managers how to realize value and challenge publicly those who resist the advice").
86. Berle himself predicted that capital was likely to reaggregate. In 1957, Berle estimated that pension funds would eventually own half of equity stocks and that the funds themselves would become "naked power vehicles" as a result.
87. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., ECONOMIC POWER AND THE FREE SOCIETY 10-13 (1957).
88. The number of stockholder proposals, withhold campaigns, and proxy fights that American public corporations face continues to grow.
89. See, e.g., CHRIS YOUNG, THE M&A AND HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM LANDSCAPE 12, 30, 42, 48 (Oct. 2009), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/cbl/ Chris-Young.pdf;
90. GEORGESON, ANNUAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW 14-35 (2008). In terms of the impact of activism encouraging stock buybacks over investment in capital expenditures, Professor Mitchell estimates that for the three years ending in 3Q 2007, 279 out of the 500 corporations in the S&P 500 had spent more on stock buybacks than on capital expenditures during that period. See Mitchell, Stock Market, supra note 35, at 23.
91. A look at corporate governance activism in the wake of the Enron/WorldCom meltdown does not suggest that institutional investors changed their focus to concentrate more on issues of fundamental risk, fraud avoidance, and effective risk and leverage management practices. Although stockholders advanced initiatives dealing with board committees, those initiatives did not deal with the structure of the boards approach to risk management. See GEORGESON, supra note 43, at 14-35 (providing a detailed examination of stockholder activism for the period 2004 to 2008, and indicating that most corporate governance activism remained focused on takeover defenses, making boards more immediately responsive to investor sentiment (e.g., through the adoption of so-called majority voting), and executive compensation). It is easy to find examples of activism designed to encourage boards to increase leverage in order to pump up immediate returns to stockholders.
92. See Shareholder Activism: Boon, Bane or Both?, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (June 13, 2007, 2:13 PM), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/06/13/shareholder- activism-boon-bane-or-both/?scp=4&sq=investor%20activism%201everage6lst= Search (discussing investor activism resulting in increasingly leveraged corporations);
93. YOUNG, supra note 43, at 29 (noting that leveraged recapitalization is one of activist hedge funds' typical strategies). But it is virtually impossible to find any institutional investor initiatives or policies directed to promoting the adoption of more effective corporate policies and procedures to reduce the possibility of firm failure. A review of the detailed corporate governance policies of two of the most experienced and respected institutional investor voices on corporate governance, the Council of Institutional Investors and TIAA-CREF, reveals an absence of attention to risk management, leverage, or other similar issues fundamental to the avoidance of financial debacles and a much greater emphasis on making sure that boards are more immediately responsive to the demands of the stock market. At best, these documents acknowledge in brief passing the need for boards to be effective monitors, while spending much greater time on other board duties.
94. See TIAA-CREF, POLICY STATEMENT ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 4, at 15 (stating simply that the "Audit Committee is responsible for the adequacy of the companys internal controls and the effectiveness of managements processes to monitor and manage business risk"); CALPERS GLOBAL PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTABLE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 4, at 19-20 (addressing audit committee briefly without any mention of leverage or indicators of risk of firm failure);
95. COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE POUCHES (2009), http://www.cii.org/policies (follow "Full Council Corporate Governance Policies" hyperlink) (setting forth detailed prescriptions for public company corporate governance but never discussing risk management or leverage control).
96. See, e.g.. Are Heavyweight Investors Turning on Private Equity?, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (May 8, 2007, 7:28 AM), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/ 05/08/are-heavyweight-investors-tuming-on-private-equity/(discussing the power shift between institutional investors and buyout dealmak-ers, because shareholders including institutional investors grew tired of watching private equity firms make drastically higher profits);
97. The Incredible Shrinking Stock Market?, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (May 17, 2007, 2:56 PM), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/05/17/the-incredible- shrinking-stock-market/(noting the recent trend of institutional investors to shift allocations toward private equity funds to procure higher returns);
98. see also Bratton &r Wachter, supra note 20, at 716-17, 720 (stating that "evidence suggests that shareholders first fell in love, and then fell out of love [during the financial crisis], with the financial companies that were taking on the most risk and the most leverage," that the "relative weight of the financial sector within the S&P 500 grew from 13.0% in 1999 to 22.3% in 2006" due to the "stock market favor[ing) the banks between 2000 and 2007 because of rising earnings that resulted from wide spreads between expected returns on lending and the costs of increasing leverage in a stable economic environment," and that this led to a clear "instruction manual" for management: "get with the program by generating more risky loans and doing so with more leverage").
99. Kahan & Rock, Embattled CEOs, supra note 41, at 1051 (concluding "that the balance of power between CEOs, boards, and shareholders has shifted dramatically in the last decade in favor of shareholders").
100. Executive compensation based on more direct measures of corporate performance became a goal of many institutional investors in the early 1990s.
101. See, e.g., ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY 174 (1991) (discussing instances where "increasing pressure by the public and institutional investors" led to "many corporations ⋯ tying pay to performance");
102. The SEC and the Issue of Runaway Executive Pay: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Oversight of Government Management, 102d Cong. 99 (1991) (statement of Robert Monks, President, Institutional Shareholders Partners); Geraldine Fabrikant, Market Place; Pension Funds Tell Paramount It's Time to Take Some Action, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1993, at D6 (reporting that Wisconsin's state pension fund informed Paramount Communications Inc. that the fund would withhold its vote for four board members on the company's compensation committee because "management's annual and long-term bonuses are not tied to the company's return to shareholders," and that the Council of Institutional Investors said it would support the funds plan);
103. Richard Stevenson, Large Foot in the Board-Room Door, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1 at D1 (quoting CalPERS' chief executive officer as saying that "CalPERS was likely to take on more companies over the issue of executive compensation. [CalPERS'] objection was not to huge paychecks in and of themselves. Rather, [the CEO] said, directors have no place approving pay packages that enrich chief executives who preside over falling stock prices and eroding business prospects. 'This is going to be one of the big issues of the 90s,' [the CEO] said.");
104. Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, A Survey of Shareholder Activism: Motivation and Empirical Evidence, CONTEMP. FIN. DIGEST, Autumn 1998, at 10,19 (noting that "in 1993, Fidelity Investments announced that it would vote against directors if executive compensation were not sufficiently linked to corporate performance"). For the intellectual underpinnings of this movement, see, for example, Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225 (1990);
105. Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives: It's Not How Much You Pay, but How, HARV. BUS. REV., May-June 1990, at 138.
106. See, e.g., Martin Lipton, David A. Katz & Laura A. Mclntosh, The System Isn't Broken: A Legislative Parade of Horribles, in 1 THE ALTMAN GROUP, GOVERNANCE COMPENDIUM SERIES 34, 43 (2009) (citing www.SharkRepellent.net to indicate that the percentage of the S&P 500 with staggered boards has declined from 61 percent in 1999 to 34 percent at the end of 2008);
107. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 20, at 679 ("Staggered boards (which together with poison pills afford the maximum available protection) among S&P 100 companies declined from 44 percent to 16 percent between 2003 and 2008; the decline among S&P 500 companies is from 57 percent in 2003 to 36 percent in 2007."); Frank Aquila & Samantha Lipton, In the Face of an Unsolicited Bid, PRACTICAL LAW: THE JOURNAL, May 2010, at 78, 79 ("Today US public companies have far weaker anti-takeover defenses than in previous years: [o]nly 17% of companies in the S&P 500 had shareholder rights plans by the end of 2009, down from 60% of companies as recently as 2002; [o]nly 32% of the companies in the S&P 500 had a staggered board by the end of 2009, down from 60% in 2002." (citation omitted));
108. Poison Pill Usage Continues to Decline, DEAL LAWYERS.COM (Oct. 29, 2009, 6:45 AM), http://www.deallawyers.com/Blog/2009/10/poison-pill-usage-continues- to-decline.html (citing proprietary RiskMetrics report).
109. Protecting Shareholders and Restoring Public Confidence by Improving Corporate Governance: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities, Insurance & Investment of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 8 (2009) (statement of John J. Castellani, President, Business Roundtable) (noting that "more than 70% of S&P 500 companies" have adopted a majority voting statute as of October 2008).
110. See Press Release, Standard & Poor's, S&P 500 Stock Buybacks Retreat 66% in Fourth Quarter; Off 42% in 2008 (Mar. 26, 2009), available at https://www.sp-indexdata.com/idpfiles/indexalert/prc/active/pressreleases/ 032609-buyback-pr.pdf (reporting that, in 2008, "S&P 500 buybacks reached $339.6 billion - a 42.3% drop from the record setting $589.1 billion spent during 2007");
111. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 20, at 686 ("In 1987, repurchases amounted to 1.6% of average market capitalization, and total payout amounted to 3.8%; in 2007, repurchases amounted to 4.6%, and total payout amounted to 6.3%."); Ben Steverman, The Incredible Shrinking Stock Buyback, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. (June 18, 2009, 9:36 PM), http:/www.businessweek.com/investor/content/ jun2009/pi20090618-506017.htm?chan=top+news-top+news+index+-temp- news+%2B+analysis ("[I]n the third quarter of 2007, when stocks were near their all-time peak, S&P 500 firms bought back a record $172 billion in shares. Buybacks had become a wildly popular way for firms to reward shareholders. By buying shares and taking them off the market, firms can bolster their earnings per share.");
112. Elizabeth Douglass, Stock Buybacfcs Earn Oil Firms a Gusher of Criticism, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2007, at Al (noting that "buybacks across all industries hit a record-high $117.7 billion in the first quarter of 2007" and that, in particular, "[t]he top four oil companies booked a combined $57.5 billion in profits in the first half of the year and devoted $22.9 billion-40% of their total earnings-to share repurchasing");
113. Shareholder Activism: Boon, Bane or Both?, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (June 13, 2007, 2:13 PM), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/06/13/shareholder- activism-boon-bane-or-both/?scp=4&sq=investor%20activism%201everage&st= Search (discussing investor activism resulting in increasingly leveraged corporations).
114. Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 883 n.58 (2002) (detailing the evidence of shorter CEO tenure and increased terminations of CEOs); Kahan & Rock, Embattled CEOs, supra note 41, at 45-46 (documenting the huge increase in CEO turnover and CEO performance-related turnover at public companies);
115. Steven N. Kaplan & Bemadette A. Minton, How Has CEO Turnover Changed? Increasingly Performance Sensitive Boards and Increasingly Uneasy CEOs (NBER Working Paper No. 12465, 2006), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/ pdf/cbl/kaplanminton0806.pdf (finding a material uptick in CEO turnover beginning in the 1990s, and evidence that boards are increasingly sensitive to firm performance when deciding whether to retain a CEO).
116. See, e.g., John C. Coates, IV, M&A Break Fees: US Litigation vs. UK Regulation 23-24 (Harvard Law Sch. Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 09-57, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1475354 (showing that the incidence of successful bids for control and M&A activity in the United States was higher than in the United Kingdom in the period 1990 to 2008 "usually by a significant margin"). Although on paper the UK system arguably fosters a more open market for corporate control, the American system has generated a huge amount of M&A activity that has put premiums regularly in the pockets of sell-side stockholders.
117. See id. at 30 (showing that from 1989 to 2008, the incidence of premium-generating bids was higher in the United States than in the United Kingdom). Moreover, the American requirement for annual elections and the Rule 14a-8 process has resulted in far more frequent exercises of stockholder voting than elsewhere in the developed world. See GEORGESON, supra note 43, at 14 (indicating that, in 2007, 665 corporate governance proposals were submitted in the United States). In most other systems, boards are not subject to reelection on an annual basis and the overall incidence of stockholder activism is far lower than in the United States. In 2007, for example, there were only sixty-eight stockholder proposals made among the companies listed on the major exchanges found in the European Union. GEORGESON, PROXY VOTING SEASON REVIEW 2007: UK & EUROPE 31 (2007).
118. Professor Mitchell has noted the increasing lack of linkage between the interests of active equity investors and the long-term fate of corporations: [M]odern investment theory effectively detaches the stock from the corporation. Stock picking, portfolio selection, and portfolio rebalancing, typically occur within these boundaries, relying far less on the fundamental factors that make a given corporation unique than on the statistical behavior of its stock price. This is not, by any means, to say that the corporations performance is irrelevant. Obviously its stock price variance will be importantly dependent upon factors like its financial performance. But it is to say that the corporation itself as a unique, economically productive entity, as an actor in the real economy, has become a significantly unimportant factor in the typical investors buy and sell decisions.
119. Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Morals of the Marketplace: A Cautionary Essay for Our Time, 20 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 171, 179 (2009). Mitchell argues that this trend has transformed the stock market from "a place for investment to a highly sophisticated gambling den," pointing to the following turnover statistics as evidence: Turnover on the New York Stock Exchange in 2007 was 123%. This compares to 88% in 2000, the year in which the dotcom bubble collapsed, and 36% as recently as 1980. Indeed one has to go back to 1928 and '29 (and before that, to the mid-teens, and then to 1910) in order to observe turnover ratios as high or higher than have been seen in recent years.
120. Id. at 180 (citing ROBERT SOBEL, THE BIG BOARD: A HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK STOCK MARKET 159 (1965);
121. ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 52 (2d ed. 2005)). Most disturbingly, Professor Mitchell cites evidence that corporate managers have sacrificed attractive long-term strategies to please a short-term stock market: [T]he corporation itself as a unique, economically productive entity, as an actor in the real economy, has become a significantly unimportant factor in the typical investors buy and sell decisions. At the same time, those buy and sell decisions can have a profound effect on managerial behavior because of the manner in which market movements affect not only the individual corporation's stock price but its cost of capital and public perceptions of its solidity. Recent evidence has made this clear. For example, a 2005 survey of the chief financial officers of 400 major corporations found that they would have been willing to take action that harmed their corporations in the long-term in order to meet analysts' quarterly stock price projections. These included laying-off workers, cutting research and development budgets, delaying necessary capital investment, and the like. Several recent studies have alio demonstrated an increasing short-termism in managerial behavior, encouraged, if not created, by the need to satisfy the stock market.
122. Id. at 179-30.
123. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Why Excessive Risk-Taking Is Not Unexpected, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Oct. 5, 2009, 1:30 PM), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/ 10/05/dealbook-dialogue-leo-strine/("Ideally, we want a system where corporate boards are highly accountable and responsive to their stockholders for the generation of sustainable profits. But for that policy objective to be achieved, stockholders themselves must act like genuine investors, who are interested in the creation and preservation of long-term wealth, not short-term movements in stock prices. So long as many of the most influential and active investors continue to think short term, it is unrealistic to expect the corporate boards they elect to strike the proper balance between the pursuit of profits through risky endeavors and the prudent preservation of value.");
124. see also Bratton & Wachter, supra note 20, at 688-715 (arguing that, because of information asymmetries between management and stockholders and because of speculative pricing that results from heterogenous expectations, there is an inevitable "gulf between managing to maximize long-term fundamental value and managing to maximize the market price of the stock").
125. Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting, 96 GEO. LJ. 1227, 1232 (2008) ("With annual turnover of shares in a public company around 99%, the shareholder base is constantly in flux." (citing NYSE OVERVIEW STATISTICS, http://www.nysedata.com/factbook (follow "NYSE Historical Statistics" hyperlink, then follow "NYSE Overview Statistics" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 12, 2008))).
126. Institutional S'holder Servs., Today's Dynamic M&A Landscape: The Interplay of M&A and Activism 19 (June 27, 2007) (unpublished slides, on file with The Business Lawyer) (voting recommendations are directed at a hypothetical two-year holder).
127. See 26 U.S.C. § 1222(3) (2006). Typically, short-term capital gains are taxed at 35 percent, while so-called "long-term" gains are taxed at either 5 percent or 15 percent, depending upon the individual's tax bracket.
128. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 2002 & Supp. 2010).
129. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(6) (2006).
130. Compare Steven N. Kaplan, Are U.S. CEOs Overpaid?, 22 ACAD. MGMT. PERSP. 1 (2008), with Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without Performance: An Overview of the Issues, 30 J. CORP. L. 647 (2005).
131. See Richard A. Posner, Are American CEOs Overpaid, and, If So, What If Anything Should Be Done About It?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1022 (2009) ("Because business executives, as distinct from entrepreneurs, do not like risk, they will demand a higher wage if the wage has a substantial risky component; and stock options are risky.").
132. See Robert B. Reich, Don't Count on Shareholders, AM. PROSPECT, Apr. 2007, at 52.
133. See, e.g., Damon Silvers, Commentary on "Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of Corporate Governance" by Leo E. Strine.fr., 33 J. CORP. L. 85 (2007).
134. See, e.g., N.Y. STOCK EXCH., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303.A05(a) (2009) ("Listed companies must have a compensation committee composed entirely of independent directors.");
135. NASDAQ STOCK MKT., INC., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4350(c)(3) (2004), available at http://www.nasdaq.com/about/CorporateGovernance.pdf (requiring that compensation for executives be set by "a majority of independent directors" or "a compensation committee comprised solely of independent directors").
136. See SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, 2009 TRENDS IN THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF THE LARGEST US PUBLIC COMPANIES: GENERAL GOVERNANCE PRACTICES 11 (2009) (reporting that, out of 100 large U S. publicly traded companies surveyed, "[t]he CEO is the only non-independent director at 49 of the Top 100 Companies" and "[i]ndependent directors constitute 75% or more of the boards of 88 of the Top 100 Companies surveyed this year");
137. see also Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1473-76 (2007) (canvassing a number of studies to show that the percentage of independent directors sitting on the boards of U.S. public companies increased from 20 percent in 1950 to approximately 70 percent in 2005).
138. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2001); Criden v. Steinberg, No. 17082,2000 WL 354390, at *3 (Del. Ch. Mar. 23, 2000); Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 895-902 (Del. Ch. 1999).
139. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, § 13211, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312, 469-71 (codified at 26 U.S.C.A. § 162(m) (West 2002 & Supp. 2010)); see also N.Y. STOCK EXCH., NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A 08 (2009) (requiring NYSE-listed companies to obtain shareholder approval for stock option plans and material revisions to stock option plans).
140. I do not wish to exaggerate the promise of this use of the franchise. One of the proposals the institutional investor community has pursued in the wake of the financial sector meltdown has been "say on pay." But, as a respected scholar, Professor Brian Cheffins, has noted, "say on pay" has been in place in the United Kingdom since 2002. From the time of its introduction to the market debacle, UK stockholders overwhelmingly endorsed banker compensation packages. Brian R. Cheffins, Did Corporate Governance "Fail" During the 2008 Stock Market Meltdown? The Case of the SbP 500, 65 BUS. LAW. 1, 57 (2009). Although a 2009 report from the UK government indicated that the past banker compensation policies had created incentives for excessive risk taking, the stockholder vote requirement apparently did not result in any check or even modest complaint about those incentives. Id. Thus, Professor Cheffins concludes that "to the extent that policymakers in the United States are inclined to rely on 'say on pay' as a check against the adoption of the sort of counter-productive incentives that helped to precipitate the recent financial crisis, their expectations are unlikely to be fulfilled." Id.
141. And, even in the current environment, many stockholder majorities have decided that "say on pay" is not advisable for their corporations. See David A. Katz & Laura A. Mcintosh, Corporate Governance Update: 2009 Proxy Season Review and a Look Ahead to 2010, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Nov. 29, 2009, 2:30 PM) (noting that there were seventy-nine "say on pay" resolutions in 2009, which only garnered support from an average of 46 percent of shareholders (citing RISKMETRICS GROUP, POSTSEASON REPORT 5-6 (Oct. 2009)));
142. GEORGESON, ANNUAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW 4 (2009) (stating that, in 2007, shareholder-sponsored "say on pay" resolutions averaged 39 percent of votes in favor; in 2008, 39 percent of shareholders voted in favor; and in 2009, 44 percent of shareholders voted in favor).
143. One such example is Microsoft's recent adoption of a "say on pay" policy that will allow shareholders to cast a non-binding, advisory vote every three years on the compensation plans for the company's senior executives. See Brad Smith & John Seethoff, Microsoft's Board Adopts New "Say-on-Pay" Policy, MICROSOFT ON THE ISSUES (Sept. 17, 2009, 4:50 PM), http://blogs.technet.com/b/microsoft-on-the-issues/archive/2009/09/18/ microsoft-s-board-adopts-new-say-on-pay-policy.aspx. That policy was adopted after conversations between Microsoft and one of the nation's most thoughtful corporate governance experts, Edward Durkin, of the Carpenters' Union Pension Trust.
144. See Grundfest, supra note 12, at 365.
145. For example, to amend the Constitution requires a very strong consensus. U.S. CONST, an. V (providing that "[t]he Congress, whenever two thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, or, on the application of the legislatures of two thirds of the several states, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of the several states, or by conventions in three fourths thereoP). Likewise, many state constitutions can only be amended if two successive legislatures support an amendment by a two-thirds vote.
146. See, e.g., DEL. CONST, art. XVI, § 1 ("Any amendment or amendments to this Constitution may be proposed in the Senate or House of Representatives; and if the same shall be agreed to by two-thirds of all the members elected to each House, such proposed amendment or amendments shall be entered ⋯ if in the General Assembly next⋯ such proposed amendment or amendments shall upon yea and nay vote be agreed to by two-thirds of all the members elected to each House, the same shall thereupon become part of the Constitution.");
147. see also id. art. IX, § 1 ("No general incorporation law, nor any special act of incorporation, shall be enacted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members elected to each House of the General Assembly").
148. Cf. Thomas Wentworth Higginson, The Birth of a Nation, HARPER'S NEW MONTHLY MAG., Jan. 1884, at 242, available at http://cdl.library.comell.edu/cgi- bin/moa/moa-cgi?notisid=ABK4014-0068&byte=124245405 (describing a fabled discussion between George Washington and Thomas Jefferson, where Jefferson poured his coffee into a saucer to cool it, and Washington noted that legislation is similarly "poured into the Senatorial saucer to cool it").
149. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Breaking the Corporate Governance Logjam in Washington: Some Constructive Thoughts on a Responsible Path Forward, 63 BUS. LAW. 1079, 1088 (2008) [hereinafter Strine, Breaking the Logjam].
150. GEORGESON, supra note 43, at 22.
151. Strine, Breaking the Logjam, supra note 73, at 1100.
152. As to social proposals, I accept the reality that 14a-8 has long created a low-cost forum for social activists to raise issues of concern with public corporations. How effective it has been for social activism is debatable-social concerns not being traditionally regarded as a deep concern of capital-but I advocate no reduction in voice of this kind.
153. ANDREA TRUE, More, More, More, on MORE, MORE, MORE (Buddah Records 1975).
154. See, e.g., N.Y. STOCK EXCH., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL §§ 303A.04, 303A.05, 303A.07 (2009) (requiring independent directors to comprise nominating/corporate governance, compensation, and audit committees); NASDAQ STOCK MKT., INC., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4350(c), (d) (2004), available at http://www.riasdaq.corn/about/CorporateGovernance.pdf (requiring independent directors to comprise nominating, compensation, and audit committees).
155. See KPMG, FALL 2009 AUDIT COMMITTEE ROUNDTABLE REPORT 3 (2010), available at http//www.kpmginstuutes.com/aci/inisights/2010/pdf/fall-2009-roundttable- report.pdf (indicating that, of the audit committees surveyed, 70 percent were responsible for financial risk management, 63 percent were responsible for compliance risk management, and 58 percent were responsible for IT security risk management).
156. In this regard, consider that the New York Stock Exchange's Listed Company Manual sets forth the audit committee's "duties and responsibilities," which include "at a minimum" the following: (A) at least annually, obtain and review a report by the independent auditor describing: the firms internal quality-control procedures; any material issues raised by the most recent internal quality-control review, or peer review, of the firm, or by any inquiry or investigation by governmental or professional authorities, within the preceding five years, respecting one or more independent audits carried out by the firm, and any steps taken to deal with any such issues; and (to assess the auditors independence) all relationships between the independent auditor and the listed company;(B) meet to review and discuss the listed companys annual audited financial statements and quarterly financial statements with management and the independent auditor, including reviewing the listed companys specific disclosures under "Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations";(C) discuss the listed company's earnings press releases, as well as financial information and earnings guidance provided to analysts and rating agencies;(D) discuss policies with respect to risk assessment and risk management;(E) meet separately, periodically, with management, with internal auditors (or other personnel responsible for the internal audit function) and with independent auditors;(F) review with the independent auditor any audit problems or difficulties and managements response;(G) set clear hiring policies for employees or former employees of the independent auditors; and(H) report regularly to the board of directors.
157. N.Y. STOCK EXCH., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.07(b)(iii) (2009).
158. Kahan & Rock, Embattled CEOs, supra note 41, at 59 ("Shareholder resolutions often come in waves, with every year or so witnessing the emergence of a new 'flavor of the year' type precatory resolution and the decline of some prior types.").