Robust solutions to Stackelberg games: Addressing bounded rationality and limited observations in human cognition

Artificial Intelligence

Volumn 174, Issue 15, 2010, Pages 1142-1171

  Pita, James ^a   Jain, Manish ^a   Tambe, Milind ^a   Ordóñez, Fernando ^a,b   Kraus, Sarit ^c,d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CHILE   (Chile)

^c BAR ILAN UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^d UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

Author keywords

Behavioral game theory; Security; Stackelberg; Uncertainty

Indexed keywords

AGENT INTERACTION; BEHAVIORAL GAME THEORY; BOUNDED RATIONALITY; EMPIRICAL VALIDATION; HUMAN COGNITION; HUMAN INTERACTIONS; HUMAN PERCEPTION; HUMAN SUBJECTS; LOS ANGELES INTERNATIONAL AIRPORTS; MIXED INTEGER LINEAR PROGRAM; NATURAL MODELS; NEW APPROACHES; OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKETS; OPTIMAL RESPONSE; OPTIMAL SOLUTIONS; OPTIMALITY; ROBUST SOLUTIONS; SECURITY; SECURITY APPLICATION; SECURITY DOMAINS; STACKELBERG; STACKELBERG GAMES; UNCERTAINTY;

AIRPORT SECURITY; ALGORITHMS; INTEGER PROGRAMMING; OPTIMIZATION; PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 77955848771     PISSN: 00043702     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.artint.2010.07.002     Document Type: Article

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