Do liars believe? Beliefs and other-regarding preferences in sender-receiver games

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 94, Issue , 2013, Pages 268-277

  Sheremeta, Roman M ^a   Shields, Timothy W ^a  

^a CHAPMAN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Beliefs; Deception; Experiment; Lying; Other regarding preferences; Strategic communication

Indexed keywords

EID: 84884415541     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2012.09.023     Document Type: Article

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