Information management and valuation: An experimental investigation

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 44, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 26-53

  Dickhaut, John ^a   Ledyard, Margaret ^b   Mukherji, Arijit ^d   Sapra, Haresh ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

^d NONE

Author keywords

Experimental economics; Information management; Naive bidders; Sanitized disclosure; Sophisticated bidders

Indexed keywords

EID: 23244451069     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00010-1     Document Type: Article

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