A Sense of Déjà Vu? The FCC's Preliminary European Stability Mechanism Verdict

German Law Journal

Volumn 14, Issue 1, 2013, Pages 1-19

  Schmidt, Susanne K ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BREMEN   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84881501689     PISSN: None     EISSN: 20718322     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S2071832200001693     Document Type: Article

References (67)

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18. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVERFG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BVR 197/83, Oct. 22, 1986, 73 BVERFGE 339 (Ger.).
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22. See Fritz W. Scharpf, The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of Diversity, 40 J. Common Mkt. Studs. 645, 645 (2002); Susanne K. Schmidt, Law-Making in the Shadow of Judicial Politics, in The "Community Method": Obstinate or Obsolete? 43, 43 (Renaud Dehousse ed., 2011); Philipp Genschel & Markus Jachtenfuchs, How the European Union Constrains the State: Multilevel Governance of Taxation, 50 Eur. J. Pol. Res. 293, 293 (2011).
23. See Fritz W. Scharpf, The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of Diversity, 40 J. Common Mkt. Studs. 645, 645 (2002); Susanne K. Schmidt, Law-Making in the Shadow of Judicial Politics, in The "Community Method": Obstinate or Obsolete? 43, 43 (Renaud Dehousse ed., 2011); Philipp Genschel & Markus Jachtenfuchs, How the European Union Constrains the State: Multilevel Governance of Taxation, 50 Eur. J. Pol. Res. 293, 293 (2011).
24. See Fritz W. Scharpf, The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of Diversity, 40 J. Common Mkt. Studs. 645, 645 (2002); Susanne K. Schmidt, Law-Making in the Shadow of Judicial Politics, in The "Community Method": Obstinate or Obsolete? 43, 43 (Renaud Dehousse ed., 2011); Philipp Genschel & Markus Jachtenfuchs, How the European Union Constrains the State: Multilevel Governance of Taxation, 50 Eur. J. Pol. Res. 293, 293 (2011).
25. See Martin Höpner et al., Kampf um Souveränität? Eine Kontroverse zur europäischen Integration nach dem Lissabon-Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 51 Politische Vierteljahresschrift 323, 347 (2012). Recently, the Czech constitutional court has declared a CJEU judgment ultra vires, motivated by an internal judicial conflict. See Jan Komárek, Czech Constitutional Court Playing with Matches: The Czech Constitutional Court Declares a Judgment of the Court of Justice of the EU Ultra Vires; Judgment of 31 January 2012, Pl. ÚS 5/12, 8 Eur. Const. L. Rev. 323, 323 (2012).
26. See Martin Höpner et al., Kampf um Souveränität? Eine Kontroverse zur europäischen Integration nach dem Lissabon-Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 51 Politische Vierteljahresschrift 323, 347 (2012). Recently, the Czech constitutional court has declared a CJEU judgment ultra vires, motivated by an internal judicial conflict. See Jan Komárek, Czech Constitutional Court Playing with Matches: The Czech Constitutional Court Declares a Judgment of the Court of Justice of the EU Ultra Vires; Judgment of 31 January 2012, Pl. ÚS 5/12, 8 Eur. Const. L. Rev. 323, 323 (2012).
27. See Das Lissabon-Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgericht: Auswege aus dem drohenden Justizkonflikt, EuropaUnion Berlin, available at http://berlin.europa-union.de/fileadmin/files-eud/Appell-Vorlagepflicht-BVerfG.pdf.
28. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVERFG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 2661/06, July 6, 2010, 126 BVERFGE 286 (Ger.).
29. See Case C-144/04, Mangold v. Helm, 2005 E.C.R. I-9981.
30. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVERFG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 2661/06, July 6, 2010, 126 BVERFGE 286 (Ger.).
31. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVERFG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BVR 987/10, May 7, 2010, 125 BVERFGE 385 (Ger.).
32. See Temporary Injunction to Prevent Giving of Guarantee for Loans to Greece is Not Issued, BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT, available at http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/press/bvg10-030en.html [hereinafter Temporary Injunction].
33. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVERFG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BVR 1099/10, Jun. 9, 2010, 126 BVERFGE 158 (Ger.).
34. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BVR 987/10, May 7, 2010, 125 BVerfGE 385 (Ger.); see also Antje von Ungern-Sternberg, Parliaments-Fig Leaf or Heartbeat of Democracy? German Federal Constitutional Court Judgment of 7 September 2011, Euro Rescue Package, 8 Eur. Const. L. Rev. 304, 304 (2012); Sebastian Recker, Casenote-Euro Rescue Package Case: The German Federal Constitutional Court Protects the Principle of Parliamentary Budget, 12 German L.J. 2071, 2071 (2011).
35. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BVR 987/10, May 7, 2010, 125 BVerfGE 385 (Ger.); see also Antje von Ungern-Sternberg, Parliaments-Fig Leaf or Heartbeat of Democracy? German Federal Constitutional Court Judgment of 7 September 2011, Euro Rescue Package, 8 Eur. Const. L. Rev. 304, 304 (2012); Sebastian Recker, Casenote-Euro Rescue Package Case: The German Federal Constitutional Court Protects the Principle of Parliamentary Budget, 12 German L.J. 2071, 2071 (2011).
36. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BVR 987/10, May 7, 2010, 125 BVerfGE 385 (Ger.); see also Antje von Ungern-Sternberg, Parliaments-Fig Leaf or Heartbeat of Democracy? German Federal Constitutional Court Judgment of 7 September 2011, Euro Rescue Package, 8 Eur. Const. L. Rev. 304, 304 (2012); Sebastian Recker, Casenote-Euro Rescue Package Case: The German Federal Constitutional Court Protects the Principle of Parliamentary Budget, 12 German L.J. 2071, 2071 (2011).
37. Constitutional Complaints Lodged Against Aid Measures for Greece and Against the Euro Rescue Package Unsuccessful-No Violation of the Bundestag's Budget Autonomy, BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT, available at http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/pressemitteilungen/bvg11-055en.html [hereinafter Constitutional Complaints].
38. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVERFG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvE 8/11, Feb. 28, 2012 (Ger.).
39. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVERFG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvE 4/11, Jun. 19, 2012 (Ger.).
40. SEE SUCCESSFUL APPLICATION IN Organstreit PROCEEDINGS REGARDING THE 'ESM/EURO PLUS PACT,' BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT, AVAILABLE AT http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/press/bvg12-042en.html [hereinafter Successful Application].
41. Only "extracts" of the ruling are translated, which also have a different numbering than the German version. SEE EXTRACTS FROM THE DECISION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF 12 SEPTEMBER 2012, BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT, AVAILABLE AT http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/decisions/rs20120912-2bvr139012en.html [hereinafter Extracts from the Decision].
42. See Karlsruhe billigt ESM und stellt Bedingungen, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Sept. 13, 2012.
43. SEE James Hertling, GERMAN JUDGES REJECT MONTI BID FOR RESCUE-FUND BANK LICENSE, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 12, 2012, AVAILABLE AT http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-09-12/german-judges-reject-monti-bid-for-rescue-fund-bank-license.
44. See Max Steinbeis, ESM/FISKALPAKT IN KARLSRUHE, TEIL 2: PARLAMENTARIER UND IHRE VERANTWORTUNG, (2012), AVAILABLE AT http://verfassungsblog.de/esmfiskalpakt-karlsruhe-teil-2-parlamentarier-und-ihre-verantwortung/.
45. See Ferdinand Knauß & Tim Rahmann, DER GLAUBENSKRIEG DER ÖKONOMEN, WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE (2012), AVAILABLE AT http://www.wiwo.de/politik/konjunktur/professorenstreit-der-glaubenskrieg-der-oekonomen/6872348.html.
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47. See Hassel Anke & Waltraud Schelkle, HIER SPRICHT MAN DEUTSCH, BERLINER REPUBLIK (2011), AVAILABLE AT http://www.b-republik.de/archiv/hier-spricht-man-deutsch; INSIDE THE WINTER 2012 EUSA REVIEW, EUROPEAN UNION STUDIES ASSOCIATION, AVAILABLE AT http://www.eustudies.org/files/eusa-review/winter-12final.pdf.
48. See Ian Wishart, ECB UNVEILS BOND-BUYING PLAN, EUROPEANVOICE.COM, AVAILABLE AT http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2012/september/ecb-unveils-bond-buying-plan-/75090.aspx.
49. SEE ESM, GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, PASSING THE HAT ONTO IRELAND, NEWEUROPE, AVAILABLE AT http://www.neurope.eu/article/esm-german-constitutional-court-passing-hat-ireland.
50. SEE CONSTITUTIONAL JUDGEMENT 3-4-1-6-12, SUPREME COURT: REPUBLIC OF ESTONIA, AVAILABLE AT http://www.riigikohus.ee/?id=1347;Decision NO. 2012-653 DC OF 9 AUGUST 2012, CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL, AVAILABLE AT http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/english/case-law/decision/decision-no- 2012-653-dc-of-9-august-2012.115501.html.
51. SEE CONSTITUTIONAL JUDGEMENT 3-4-1-6-12, SUPREME COURT: REPUBLIC OF ESTONIA, AVAILABLE AT http://www.riigikohus.ee/?id=1347;Decision NO. 2012-653 DC OF 9 AUGUST 2012, CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL, AVAILABLE AT http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/english/case-law/decision/decision-no- 2012-653-dc-of-9-august-2012.115501.html.
52. See Daniel Halberstam & Christoph Möllers, The German Constitutional Court Says "Ja zu Deutschland!", 10 German L.J. 1241, 1241 (2009); Höpner, supra note 21; Robert C. Van Ooyen, Eine "europafeindliche" Kontinuität? Zum Politikverständnis der Lissabon-Entscheidung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 4 Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft 26, 26 (2009).
53. See Daniel Halberstam & Christoph Möllers, The German Constitutional Court Says "Ja zu Deutschland!", 10 German L.J. 1241, 1241 (2009); Höpner, supra note 21; Robert C. Van Ooyen, Eine "europafeindliche" Kontinuität? Zum Politikverständnis der Lissabon-Entscheidung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 4 Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft 26, 26 (2009).
54. Martin Höpner & Florian Rödl, Illegitim und rechtswidrig: Das neue makroökonomische Regime im Euroraum, 92 Wirtschaftsdienst 219, 219 (2012); Fritz W. Scharpf, Legitimacy Intermediation in the Multilevel European Polity and its Collapse in the Euro Crisis (Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Discussion Paper No. 12/6, 2012).
55. Martin Höpner & Florian Rödl, Illegitim und rechtswidrig: Das neue makroökonomische Regime im Euroraum, 92 Wirtschaftsdienst 219, 219 (2012); Fritz W. Scharpf, Legitimacy Intermediation in the Multilevel European Polity and its Collapse in the Euro Crisis (Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Discussion Paper No. 12/6, 2012).
56. See Giandomenico Majone, Europe's 'Democratic Deficit': The Question of Standards, 4 European Law Journal 5, 5 (1998).
57. See Fritz W. Scharpf, Legitimacy in the Multilevel European Polity, 1 Eur. Pol. Sci. Rev. 173, 173 (2009).
58. See Giandomenico Majone, Has Integration Gone Too Far-or Not Far Enough? Rethinking the Union of Europe After the Crisis of Monetary Union (2012) (unpublished manuscript).
59. See Kabinett soll Vorbehaltserklärung zum ESM erhalten, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Sept. 21, 2012.
60. See Streit über richtigen Kurs in der Euro-Krise, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Aug. 6, 2012.
61. See Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the European Union, 14 Eur. L. J. 271, 271 (2008).
62. THE MYTH OF THE PERIPHERY, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 25, 2012, AVAILABLE AT http://www.economist.com/node/15769602.
63. See Henrik Enderlein, Laura Müller & Christoph Trebesch, DEMOCRACIES DEFAULT DIFFERENTLY: REGIME TYPE AND DEBT CRISIS RESOLUTION (unpublished manuscript), AVAILABLE AT http://www.sfb-governance.de/teilprojekte/projekte-phase-1/projektbereich-d/d4/DDD-Enderlein-et-al.pdf?1277900047.
64. See Herbert Obinger, Die Finanzkrise und die Zukunft des Wohlfahrtsstaates, 40 Leviathan 441, 441 (2012).
65. See Wolfgang Streeck & Daniel Mertens, FISCAL AUSTERITY AND PUBLIC INVESTMENT: IS THE POSSIBLE THE ENEMY OF THE NECESSARY? (Max Planck Inst. for the Study of Societies, Discussion Paper No. 11/12, 2011).
66. See Neil Fligstein, Euroclash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe (2009).
67. Keohane, SUPRA note 3, at 20.