Judicialization and the construction of governance

Comparative Political Studies

Volumn 32, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 147-184

  Sweet, Alec Stone ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033412440     PISSN: 00104140     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0010414099032002001     Document Type: Review

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