Establishing and Maintaining Judicial Independence

The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages

  Vanberg, Georg ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA   (United States)

Author keywords

Credibility; Independent judiciary; Judges; Judicial accountability; Judicial decisions; Judicial independence; Reciprocity; Separation of powers

Indexed keywords

EID: 84923531704     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199208425.003.0007     Document Type: Chapter

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