Unifying the field of comparative judicial politics: Towards a general theory of judicial behaviour

European Political Science Review

Volumn 2, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 297-327

  Dyevre, Arthur ^a  

^a Centro de Estudios Politicos y Constitucionales   (Spain)

Author keywords

comparative politics; courts; judicial behaviour; law; neo institutionalism

Indexed keywords

EID: 85011453521     PISSN: 17557739     EISSN: 17557747     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S1755773910000044     Document Type: Article

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